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














ENGLAND AND RUSSIA.



*Cobden, Richard*

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**ENGLAND & RUSSIA:**

BEING

A FIFTH EDITION

OF

ENGLAND, FRANCE, RUSSIA, & TURKEY,

REVISED AND ENLARGED.

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JAMES RIDGWAY & SONS, 169, PICCADILLY.

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Critical Notices on the Former Editions of  
ENGLAND, FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND TURKEY.

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" A pamphlet has recently been published by RIDGWAY, entitled *England, France, Russia, and Turkey*, which we suspect will receive in many quarters a deeper, and perhaps more uneasy attention, than is often bestowed upon publications not avowedly from an official source. The objects of this work are to demonstrate—1st. The gulf which now yawns for the Turkish empire;—2nd. The ruinous consequences which must follow the seizure of Constantinople and the Dardanelles by Russia;—3rd. The facility with which Turkey may even now be saved, by an easy and prompt effort of British policy, which would electrify and reanimate the whole enumbed frame of the Turkish nation, and paralyze the system of Russian encroachment for whole centuries. This pamphlet traces, with a minute and elaborate, but powerful pencil, the whole conduct of the Russian cabinet during the last few years. No small share of the author's knowledge and acuteness is devoted to the exhibition of the policy to which England and France have been betrayed by Russia, and through which they have become her unconscious confederates in a scheme of which the profits are exclusively for her.

" Almost at the first page we see stated distinctly, a general proposition, of which the author never subsequently loses sight. We quote the passage, as an introduction only to the more remarkable disquisitions and narratives by which it is afterwards illustrated, and the rules of action which the author would deduce from it, for the corrections of our former errors, explained and recommended. We must soon and seriously return to it, partly for its own importance, and in part for the sake of doing justice to the knowledge, sagacity, and force, with which it has been treated by the yet unknown author."—*Times*, Dec. 1834.

" There is an article in *The Quarterly Review*, No. 105, which is making some noise. I allude to an extraordinarily well-concocted article on a pamphlet, entitled 'England, France, Russia, and Turkey.' Extracts from it are being translated for the perusal of the Sultan, who will read with pleasure so able an exposition of the interests of himself and his two friends; and who will see, with sincere satisfaction, that there are men in England who take a just view of his position. I have some authority for saying this."—*Letter from Constantinople to the Herald*, June 2.

" Having so much matter to compress into a short review, we must content ourselves with referring such of our readers as will not take our ipse dixit, to the able and eloquent pamphlet, the title of which stands at the head of this article, where they will find these positions maintained with argument capable of overwhelming all scepticism on the subject."—*Foreign Quarterly Review*, No. XXIX.

" We earnestly recommend this work to every well-wisher to the human race."—*Morning Advertiser*.

" 'England, France, Russia, and Turkey.' Such is the title of a very remarkable pamphlet, which has just been translated from the English. This essay is a vehement *placiboyer* against Russia. It matters little that the advocacy be vehement, so that it is just—that it is true. Truth loses nothing of its force from being preached with ardour. This publication, with perfect knowledge of the subject, lays bare all the details of the Eastern question. The author is thoroughly acquainted with Turkey; and

### Critical Notices, &c.

the combinations by which Russia has established over Turkey a protectorate menacing to Europe, he denounces to the world, sparing, in his rude frankness; neither the indolence of England, nor the subserviency of France, to the designs of Russia."—*Journal des Debats*, July 18.

"The author himself declares that his opinions have not been formed in a cabinet, or at a distance from the countries of which he treats—that profound conviction has dictated every word—that no syllable has been set down without mature deliberation. The oriental question is one which is to be considered as one of the most important and most urgent that the press has ever yet had to treat. Our cabinet alone feigns not to comprehend its weight, that it may escape the consequences of such a conviction."—*Courrier François*, July 25.

"For the thorough investigation of the questions, and more especially of the means by which the Turkish empire may be invigorated and defended, we must refer our readers to the translation of the English publication, where they are exposed with a remarkable acquaintance with European diplomacy, and of the state of affairs in the East. There, for the first time perhaps, a subject so important to the future destinies of Europe, appears developed in all its details."—*Constitutionnel*, July 19th.

"The action of Russia on Turkey—the treaty of Adrianople, of Unkiar Skellesi—the convention of St. Petersburg, have been so completely laid bare in '*England, France, Russia, and Turkey*,' that we need offer no remark on the subject; no attempt has been made to controvert any of its positions; no doubt seems even to remain as to their truth. That essay is too succinct to admit of useful citation; it cannot be analyzed, because it is itself a condensed analysis of an overwhelming subject. We must content ourselves with urging it on our readers' attention."—*British and Foreign Review*.

"The effect of this publication on opinion in England is perhaps unparalleled. The question interests now, because rendered intelligible."—*Foreign Quarterly Review*, No. XXX.

"The analysis of that remarkable document (the treaty of Adrianople) contained in the pamphlet from which we have already largely quoted, is so able that we must be excused for extracting it."—*Quarterly Review*, No. CV.

"We must quote a passage from the masterly pamphlet of a gentleman to whom this country is indebted for the only practical details ever yet published concerning the designs of Russia against Turkey. His reasoning derives great force, not only from the unstudied eloquence of his diction, but from what is of still more value, his personal knowledge and experience."—*Morning Chronicle*.

# INTRODUCTION

PREFIXED TO THE FIFTH EDITION.

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## IMPOSSIBILITY OF DISLODGING RUSSIA FROM THE DARDANELLES.

A LATE Royal Duke very fond of whist, was also very fond of winning at whist. It often occurred to him, in arranging his hand, to mistake his best suit for trumps. His Royal Highness finding seven clubs in his hands, and forgetting that the three of diamonds had been turned, would exclaim—"Clubs are trumps, I believe," and consequently clubs were trumps.

It would seem that Russia has taken the hint from this distinguished personage, and has got others with whom she plays to follow the example of his kind and amicable associates—Russia always plays trumps, or at least tells us that her cards are trumps, and consequently she turns the tricks and lifts the money.

Russia not only induces us to permit her to do what she wishes to do—not only makes us assist her, when she requires our help, but she makes us

believe whatever she wants us to believe. She chuses that we should believe that she *has* occupied Constantinople, and that she voluntarily retired—and we do believe it. She also wishes us to believe that the occupation of Constantinople having been in her power, has been abandoned through her spirit of moderation, and through her enlightened conviction that that acquisition would weaken her power, so that while we believe that we have it not in our power to prevent the occupation, we believe that we have it in our power to drive her out of it if she were once there.

The facts stand thus. *She did not* occupy Constantinople. She could not then, and she cannot yet occupy Constantinople. We can most easily prevent her occupying Constantinople, but when she has brought things to that point where she can occupy, it will be impossible for us to expel her, unless by such an effort as we made to overthrow Napoleon, and by means of some new discovery which, like the steam engine at that period, will now again give us the power of making such an effort. Anticipating neither of these circumstances, we say it will be impossible for us to expel her.

We might enlarge on the first point, but we will content ourselves with quoting a passage from a periodical work which, in a few words, sets at rest the question of the previous occupation, and shows by what means a real occupation is to be



brought about, and is now bringing about. We shall then offer some considerations to shew the effects of that occupation on the internal state of England—effects which will disincline England from acting, even if Russia remained as vulnerable as at present, and which we think will put it entirely out of the question to think of repairing a disaster which will have rendered Russia unapproachable.

“ Russia, had she had it in her power when her troops were encamped on the Bosphorus, never would have retired ; then it was impossible for her to have retained possession ; she encamped at *the distance* of sixteen miles from the capital, with the Bosphorus *between*, the Channel was commanded by thirteen Russian line of battle ships ; the troops occupied the Giant’s Mountain, in Asia, their tents so placed as to make the greatest possible display ; sentries on every side forbade approach ; their numbers represented as double their real amount ; every precaution, in fact, was taken to guard against attack, collision, or contact. On the moment of embarkation, a breeze that had been blowing from the south suddenly failed ; the most intense anxiety was the result, not only to the chiefs, but to the whole expedition. Fortunately, a light air sprung up, and carried them out of the channel. What service did not this breath of air render to the fortunes of Russia. But for it, Nicholas would not have to boast of the glory of

occupying Constantinople! or the greater glory of quitting it!!

J “ The troops that Russia can suddenly and at once transport to the capital must be sacrificed if a single pistol is fired, or a drop of blood drawn; she, therefore, dare not—can not attempt to occupy until she is invited; that invitation she is now labouring to bring about by three causes, or rather sets of causes;—1stly, General rumours of war—of occupation spread and repeated throughout every province with a pertinacity and a similarity most remarkable, producing a feeling of insecurity and alarm, arresting commerce and industry, and disturbing the action of government, and the idea of permanency. 2ndly, By the use she makes of her influence over the government, driving it into acts, and even crimes, that makes it despised and hated—detaching it from the other powers, and introducing administrative measures that place it in opposition to the people, their prejudices, rights, and opinions. 3rdly, Through the schism in the empire, and all the consequences of the hostile position of Mehemet Ali. These causes all acting together are now pushing Turkey forward with fearful rapidity to that point where all bonds of respect and government are dissolved, and revolution in the provinces, or revolt in the capital, or invasion from Egypt, or all these cases combined, will thoroughly disgust the Turks and their tributaries, with the government, and the Sultan; and

Russia will be called in to support the government—to protect the Sultan—to shield the people—to prevent convulsion—to arrest bloodshed. Then her intervention will be hailed by civilized Europe as an act of charitable humanity; and those who may dread the consequences will be little inclined to interfere in favour of a people that licks the hand of its betrayer and oppressor. For this peace, that is, the progress of causes in action, and the accumulation of the results of the treaty of protection are necessary. Russia cannot enter till she enters as a friend; and though this will soon be—the time is not yet come; and until it comes, collision is fatal to her projects.”\*

Now let us suppose Russia occupying Constantinople, entrenched behind the then impregnable Dardanelles, and possessing a hundred sail of men-of-war in the channel.† Will England then be

\* See “Diplomacy of Russia,” in No. 1, European Review, p. 131.

† “Few persons are aware of the maritime force that will *instantaneously* be placed at the disposal of Russia, by the occupation of Constantinople. Russia, at the close of 1834, had fifty-two men-of-war in the Black Sea; of which sixteen were line-of-battle ships: twenty-five new vessels are in construction. She will find at Constantinople forty men-of-war, of which nine are line-of-battle ships and four three-deckers, the day after occupation. She will have, therefore, at her disposal in the channel ninety-two men-of-war, with a flotilla of small **armed craft, at least** as numerous; and such is the activity that reigns in all the arsenals of the Black Sea, that in less than two years, one-half of the vessels commenced in autumn last,

disposed to make an attempt to expel Russia?—will it be in her power to do so?—and what means would be requisite for succeeding in such an attempt?

will be ready for sea. Thus in a few months she will be ready to muster one hundred sail, twenty-five being line-of-battle, within the impregnable Dardanelles; securing her acquisition, having time to organise them—having the seas of Marmora and the Euxine to exercise in; having unlimited supplies of all materials within herself, ready to her hand, and at a trifling cost. She has at present 30,000 men employed on board her vessels, or in her arsenals; she will obtain a certain number of seamen from the Black Sea and from Constantinople itself; but her great resource will be the Greek sailors; the seamen of Hydra, Ipezia, Psara, reduced by the peace, and the stagnation of Greek commerce, will flock by thousands, spurred not only by their necessities, but by a spirit of enthusiasm, to hail the symbols of the Greek Church reared above the Crescent. A single mass, chaunted in Saint Sophia, will collect every Greek seaman from far and near. This is no dream of the imagination; these materials are not to be created—they do exist, ready to be employed, and available at a moment's warning. The slightest degree of energy—the commonest feeling of self-preservation—will, in a month's time, combine these elements for securing her conquest, and with one squadron anchored in the Golden Horn, and another under the castle of the Dardanelles, who, that knows any thing of the topography of Constantinople, of the spirit of eastern populations, will be hardy enough to talk even of resistance from within, or of attack from without?

“ If it be asked, whence the pecuniary means are to come, we answer that the expenditure will, to her, be insignificant: such an acquisition would be cheaply bought at the expense of twenty campaigns; and the expenditure will, perhaps, not exceed the sum she lays out in a single year on the Caucasus. Is Russia unprepared for such a contingency? Besides, is it to be supposed that the

The occupation will take place as we have above stated—as the means of arresting convulsion and bloodshed. This state of things can only be brought about by the acts of the Government itself. Russia stepping in to restore tranquillity, has it in her power—is placed under the necessity of changing the course of internal policy that has led to convulsion. Even before convulsion has taken place could she ostensibly assume the protectorate of Turkey she would conciliate to herself the goodwill of all classes, by putting an end to those abuses into which she herself has led or pushed the Turkish Government. Occupation, therefore, by the causes that lead to it, destroys every interest for Turkey in England, deprives England

treasury of the Seraglio is empty? Will Constantinople be a less rich prize than Algiers? Are there not many means by which a conquering power can obtain money? And is it not clear that she will be able to borrow hundreds of millions of piastres from the merchants of all classes, and from the Armenian bankers, who, if they do not lend with the zeal of enthusiasm, as many will, will contribute from other motives, which Russia knows how to inspire? Will not, moreover, every place of 'Change in Europe offer her resources on such a contingency? While we affect to believe the occupation of Constantinople impossible, because of the expense it would entail upon her, she, better informed, knows, as who that has given the subject a moment's consideration does not? that, independently of all political gains, she at once lays her hand on an enormous treasure, which in itself, if she acquired nothing else, might justify all the expenditure she now incurs in furtherance of the scheme that is to give her possession of it."

" *European Review*," No. 1, p. 126.

of every support in Turkey, and of every means of acting either on the people or the Government (if it be allowed to subsist), and by its consequences attaches the Turkish population (the other populations are of course hers body and soul) to the Russian sway. The whole Ottoman empire passes at once from us to her, then our open foe. The force, the arms, the frontiers, the fortresses, the treasures, and the ships of Turkey now placed against Russia, will be placed against us—disciplined, combined, and directed by her.

J Besides this accession of wealth, strength, and defences, Russia, by making this stride in advance, covers by the occupation of a single passage, a frontier of her own of nearly 2000 miles in extent, and consequently she can assemble on this point the whole force actually engaged in watching this line, and in preventing combinations, which in its present exposed and precarious state, occupies a full half of the disposable forces of the empire. Russia can therefore immediately assemble, if need be, a couple of hundred thousand men, to be supported at the expense of Turkey, on the shores of the Mediterranean; which, strong by the nature of the country, by the divisions of the population and strength of the fortresses, by the fleet, by the moral supremacy she will have assumed, by the capital\*, and perhaps the Sultan as her

\* Constantinople offers no place of assemblage that can be used against a garrisoning force; it is cut into three parts by the Chan-

hostage, will render her unattackable, save by a body of men not less numerous.

It may be said that at least six months will be requisite for this combination ; but let us suppose that until six months after occupation she is vulnerable, will we be prepared in less time to strike ? Clearly before a messenger can carry the news to London, she will be prepared against every *possible* contingency.

Russia chooses her own time ; she prepares the events, she has them all under her own control. She sees on all sides at once ; she cannot miscalculate on such a moment as this. Her whole mind,

nel. The Russian men-of-war will occupy it and intercept all communication. By the hilly situation of the place, it is every where exposed to the guns of vessels in the harbour, or below the seraglio. The subsistences and the water will be in the power of the garrison. The seraglio will be occupied, and the Seraskier's palace, so that a position is secured in the centre of the Turkish quarter, connected with the beach. The land side is commanded, and the communications intercepted by the positions of Daoud Pasha and Ramis Chellic, where strong defensible barracks, which can easily contain 20,000 men, have been recently erected, and were occupied by the Sultan during the alarms of the Russian war. These positions secure as effectively the western approach, as the Channel does the others. It has been said that such details enlighten Russia on the state of Turkey—the English press enlighten Russia ! It is singular that the knowledge of these very details being collected by Russian agents 30 years ago, urged Selim to hasten his attempt at destroying the Janissaries, and was subsequently put forward by the Turkish Government, as its justification for cutting off a body which, in the face of such danger, prevented even precautionary measures.

energies, and resources, are concentrated on it. She will be perfectly certain of success before she makes the move ; and there is no reason whatever for her making the move before she is certain.—Match with her knowledge, decision, secrecy, rapidity, and proximity, our ignorance, uncertainty, changeableness, absence of disposable force, and distance, and then say if Russia has any thing to apprehend from the awakened interests or aroused indignation of England—at least until she has had time to fortify herself within the Dardanelles, and to concentrate at the point of attack her armies and her navies ?

But let us turn to another subject—the effect of the occupation of Constantinople on England itself.

Can England at this moment permit the subjugation of Persia ? She certainly cannot ; the practical necessity she feels in supporting that country\* is evident in the constant attention given to that country both by the Government and the East India Company, and the expenditure of nearly three millions sterling, in subsidies, &c.—Persia is gone the moment the Dardanelles are occupied. At this moment Persia is a virtual dependency of Russia ; she only allows it the appearance of independence, not to awaken England until the Darda-

\* England feels practically the necessity of supporting Persia, in consequence of the weakness of Persia ; when we allow the strength of Turkey to be undermined, then, too, will we feel the practical necessity of supporting Turkey.



nelles are occupied. Already has Persia ventured to tell us that she could not suffer British agents to be placed where there were Russian agents: "she would not be placed between the upper and the nether millstone, that if unsupported by England, she must not irritate Russia." With the moral effect of the loss of Turkey, will come home to us the loss of Persia and the accession of both to the power of Russia—the consummation of that which, without perceiving more than a small portion of the consequences, we have been labouring to prevent for 150 years. And this will be immediately felt. It will discourage, not exasperate; if it did exasperate, what material means, ready created, have we to make that exasperation effective? But Persia is important, as it involves in its own existence the security of India.

We have hitherto looked on Persia merely as a body which it is necessary to place between our Indian possessions and Russia, as a space of two thousand miles in traversing which her influence (we talk not of armies) was weakened and lost. What must that influence become after the conquest of the centre of Islamism, of the capital of the East, of the maritime key of all the countries that touch or communicate with the Euxine. What the effect—not indeed of the subjugation of Persia—but of the instantaneous transmission of the power and capabilities of Persia into the hands of Russia. That neutral space is wiped out of the

map. It is converted into a source of imposing and aggressive force; it bears a numerous, patient, and warlike people, to be disciplined and moved by Russia without inconvenience or expense. Amongst whom, too, an Indian expedition is popular by its present attractions, by traditionary associations and experience. If a camp of 50,000 men only be assembled at Herat, let those who know India judge of the consequences!

The efforts of England for many years, and her money, have accustomed the Persians to European discipline; the first, the most important obstacles among Eastern nations have been overcome; many thousands are to a certain degree disciplined,—they are, by the universal testimony of all those who have had to handle them, the finest materials for troops,—docile, intelligent, patient, and active,—therefore a very few months would suffice to collect such a body of troops on the eastern frontier, there to discipline them. These consequences will be immediately felt in London on the occupation of the Dardanelles;—indeed these consequences are already anticipated; they are even now certainties in the eyes of those who should best understand their meaning.

) Suppose the loss of India is nothing to England, —will England submit, can she submit, to the *precariousness* of tenure, to the menace of assault?—she cannot. The considerations above mentioned will come home to her with irresistible force, the

moment Constantinople is lost ; she will feel immediately the necessity of anticipating the disturbing influences about to be excited against India, by sending a reinforcement of British troops, which, having to pass round the Cape of Good Hope, may take up in their passage the time that may suffice for Russia organizing a new Persian army. Suppose we *commence* with sending only 10,000 men, at the expense of 100*l.* a man, or with such a necessity hanging over us—will we be inclined to send another expedition, not a precautionary one, but an aggressive one? Evidently our whole disposable means will be required for India ; all the financial sacrifices we will be inclined to make, will be absorbed by preparation in that quarter. This will be the case if no real danger exists. The uncertainty produced by distance alone, will paralyze our European policy, and put it wholly out of our power to employ our resources in any European contest, however trivial, far less in one where our maritime power cannot be brought to bear, where an army at least equal to that engaged at Waterloo must be transported to a distant field of action *as the first step*, for which 10,000,000*l.* will have to be voted, and 200,000 tons of shipping to be taken up.

If to-day England cannot be brought to take measures to prevent the catastrophe, how will she then be induced to decide on repairing it? If in 1833 she tamely submitted to the apparent occu-

pation of Constantinople, will she be prepared to eject Russia, when she really occupies in 1837 ;—when all she looks to now as worth having shall have been lost,—when her anxious solicitude will be turned to India,—when the question will no longer be a maritime, but a land question,—and when her whole amount of actual force will be insufficient? If to-day England, with the moral strength of the world at her disposal, cannot be brought to take up any position in opposition to Russia,—will she then, when the strength of Russia is doubled, when Russia has only one point to defend, assume the aggressive?

But these are not the only effects which the occupation of the Dardanelles will have on England. If she does not assume the aggressive, she must stand on the defensive,—there is no middle course. In what state then is Malta and the Ionian Islands? Must they not be strengthened,—must not our maritime force in the Mediterranean be placed on the footing of war? If we are on the defensive,—where is our European influence? In what state are our finances?

Our internal resources must be exhausted by an armed and expensive observation in India, the Levant, and elsewhere, which must go on increasing, without benefit, without hope. The question will present itself in this form: Shall we expel Russia, or withdraw within ourselves? The first will be hopeless; the second but a declaration of

the consequences to England of the occupation of the Dardanelles. England cannot exist without her foreign influence, commerce, and dominion; and when we are reduced to practical measures of defence, by a peaceable and practical alteration of the balance of power, it is clear that they have passed away from us.

But these are not the only effects of the occupation of Constantinople;—not only the opening prospects of commerce, but that which actually exists with the Levant, with Turkey, with the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, with Southern Russia, with central Asia, and with Persia, is at once annihilated, and the 60 or 70,000 tons of shipping so occupied thrown out of employment. It is sufficiently well known that Russia, even at a great money sacrifice, labours at present to exclude our commerce from every country under her control, or subject to her influence. She has arrested the transit trade through Georgia to Persia—she blockades permanently the eastern coast of the Black Sea—she has forced regulations injurious to us on the Turkish Government—she has done her best to prevent the introduction of our manufactures into the Provinces—she prohibits in her own rapidly extending dominions almost every article of British manufacture, except yarn, which soon also will be prohibited, and uses that which she at present imports in working up into stuffs to exclude our commerce from central Asia

—to that end Moscow cottons, made of English yarn, are sold at Teheran cheaper than they can be bought at Manchester; so that while we appear to have no commercial interests in that quarter, we believe we have a good customer in Russia. Poland, by her annexation to the Russian tariff, becomes impervious to English commerce. So will the Dardanelles, and throughout Turkey and the Levant commercial regulations, motived perhaps on the commercial injustice of England, will be promulgated by her authority, cutting us off at once from between four and five millions of exports and from an equal amount of raw imports necessary for the preparation of our exports to Germany, America, India, China, &c.—but Germany, will it not be then entirely subject to the Prussian system? France is already our commercial antagonist. Let free trade be destroyed in Turkey—let the Dardanelles be closed to us—and at once our European commerce is reduced to the precarious chances that the political state of the two Peninsulas may offer—and all this will be effected *in peace*, as retribution for the commercial restrictiveness of England, so that we shall neither have an opportunity for retaliation nor a ground for remonstrance. Will such a state, with such prospects for our commercial prosperity, counteract the depression produced by our political prostration? Will it increase our means or our spirit for undertaking a hopeless war, which will clearly be beyond our means—in

which, judging by what we see around us, we will obtain no foreign support—and in which we will be not only without a force sufficient to attack our enemy, but without force sufficient to contain (we speak not of defending) our colonial empire?

To support a struggling friend still on his feet, worsted but erect, injured but self-possessed, is an easy, a natural, an exciting thing; but to raise up one prostrate, to draw upon oneself the undivided hostility, whatever it may be, of his successful antagonist, to breathe the breath of hope and courage into nostrils from which vitality has departed, to prop up the body from which life is fled—is a wild, a hopeless enterprise, not an object to animate and exasperate, but a sight to sadden and depress—such precisely was on England, however little admitted, the effect of the conviction that a body of troops equipped suddenly in the arsenals of Russia, transported in her vessels, landed on the Bosphorus, admitted by the Turks, received as deliverers by the Sultan, arresting invasion, and after restoring peace, preserving the throne and saving the empire—voluntarily retiring. Was not this the general impression left by that event, and by the mode in which Russia succeeded in having it believed? is not such the impression very generally at this day? The natural consequence of that impression is it not that Turkey has been, and is at the mercy of Russia, and that she continues to exist merely by the sufferance of

the Emperor? Who therefore can dream of supporting Turkey against its master! against its disinterested protector! who can credit the existence of strength in Turkey—of weakness in Russia? Who can admit or comprehend destructive and disorganizing influence used on Turkey by her proprietor and defender? who can admit *designs* on the part of Russia? So much has Russia worked out from the mere topography\* of her encampment on the Giant's Mountain.

We trust what we have said is sufficient to show the objects Russia has in view, in making us believe that she has occupied Constantinople, and that we can expel her should she be so *imprudent* as to occupy it.

\* This recalls forcibly to our recollection a conversation with a man high in office in the Ottoman empire. "The progress of Russia," he observed, "is chiefly owing to a body of engineers which she has, and which no other nation has." We expressed our surprise at this assertion, and our belief that on this point Russia was greatly inferior to the other powers. "You have a great deal of fine words and science," he answered, "but you never know what ground is under your feet. Russia has a body of geographers who understand the map of Europe, which no other Government does." How much is not Europe indebted, we will not say, to the simple sense and singleness of opinion—but to the *ignorance* of the Turks. Had Constantinople been the capital, not of a minor State, but of Austria, or even France, might not the Dardanelles have been Russian long ago!



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THE demand for a fifth edition of this essay in so short a space of time, furnishes the writer with an occasion, which he seizes with extreme satisfaction, of expressing his gratification at the progress this question has made. It is not many months since he who talked of Russian designs was treated as a visionary—since he who talked of elements of regeneration in Turkey was set down as an enthusiast—since Russian aggression was considered a question of European political principles—since Turkey was considered as of no weight in the balance of power. These fallacies have separately vanished, or at least find no supporters—the contrary convictions have separately sprung up.—Russia's designs are no longer considered visionary—Turkey's power of regeneration is established—Russian aggression is considered a distinct question from legitimate and constitutional principles—Turkey is felt to be important for the preservation of that which exists, and the disposal of that Empire is considered by all as *decisive of that which is to be*. These distinct convictions, when combined, must lead to the practical conclusions, That Turkey must be saved for the preservation of peace, and

in contradiction with the majority, if not with the totality of writers on Turkey. Of course opposite opinions must be contradictory; the objection proves no more—and of contradictory opinions one must be right and one wrong; as no attempt has been made to shew that they are wrong, no further proof of their truth is required than the silence of those who have promulgated the reverse. Knowledge is to be arrived at only by study, truth by enquiry—study and enquiry imply means adapted to the subject-matter. An enquiry into the institutions of Turkey requires time, connexion, a previous knowledge of languages, intimacies, and labour on extensive and remote fields, as conditions necessary, and yet not fulfilled by the majority of those travellers who have furnished the materials on which the opinions of this country have been formed. The non-fulfilment of these conditions leads to the presupposition of error. The very boldness of the assertions that have been so generally hazarded on the state of Turkish society, warrants the suspicion of their being unfounded. So true is this that those who have more or less inquired into this question, so vast, so disheartening by its difficulties, so encouraging by its novelty, are more or less diffident—and the more so in proportion to their information, in expressing their

opinions or in hazarding conclusions. Still the views here stated are not those of one but of several individuals, formed distinctly—having examined different parts of the question—having been occupied on fields remote from each other—and whose coincidence can only be accounted for by truth.

The writer takes this opportunity of entreating those who may peruse these pages not to think that they have before them the exposition of a question on which they are to judge—but to consider them as a contribution to the scanty fund of information that is accessible on a subject which demands the most anxious and pressing attention of this nation, and the decision of its Government.

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# ENGLAND, FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND TURKEY.



## CHAPTER I.

*Connection of Turkey and Poland.—On the Dardanelles depends the Existence of both.—Weakness of Russia there.—Strength elsewhere.—Concert of England and France with Russia, in undermining Turkey.—Connection of Greek Revolt with the War of 1828-9.—Position taken by Russia, 1821.—Ultimatum and Withdrawal of her Ambassador.—Answer of the Porte.—Declaration of War in 1828.—Declares Turkey detached from Europe; yet guarantees the fulfilment of the Treaty of 6th July.—Possession of the Dardanelles, necessary to the tranquillity and internal development of Russia.*

A PEOPLE, great by its numbers, its martial spirit, and its disasters, has at length sunk under the arms of Russia. If a nation can die, Poland has descended to the tomb; whether or not a day of resurrection is reserved for it in other times,—it is, now, dead to those motives which interest one state in the preservation of another; its space is void in the political map of Europe; its place is

empty at her council tables. The relative position of the other members has been violently deranged ; but, though evidently not insensible to its effects, they have accepted, without an effort to prevent, the catastrophe.

How did it happen that the two first nations in the world, in a state of peace and of closest union, should suffer the incorporation with Russia of any people whatever, whether guaranteed by treaties or not—far less of that people universally recognised the bulwark of Europe against the organised overflow of the Slavonic hordes? How could such great political interests be overlooked? How could the very cry of humanity be stifled? The difficulty, the apparently overwhelming difficulty, of the enterprise, made them turn away their eyes from interests that appeared too seriously compromised to be worth vindicating, and silenced the sympathies it was unworthy of them to avow in vain. Poland was only to be supported by a war with the three northern powers. Its extinction was, therefore, not a political necessity, that called for instantaneous decision ; it was a calamity, lamentable, but irreparable. It became even generous to silence, in favour of suffering humanity, the voice of national interest ; and a French minister had the satisfaction, at length, of proclaiming, in a French Chamber, that “ order was restored at Warsaw.” But the northern league, sufficiently powerful to compass the overthrow of

Poland, is now strengthened by the vast acquisition, and by the moral preponderance resulting from success. The struggle is inevitable, unless one party or the other sacrifices its interest, and submits without a struggle to the consequences of defeat. Europe is converted into two hostile camps; their last resources are unreservedly expended in preparatives that indicate the determination of a speedy rupture, which their pressure must hasten. Where then is the arena to be opened? Where are those bristled lines to be assailed? Who is to be the aggressor?

Russia herself has offered, in this dilemma, a solution that glares in the eyes of Europe, in the violence with which she extorted from Turkey the Treaty of the 8th of July, which ensured, as far as diplomatic bonds could ensure, the closing of the mails over the only vulnerable and the most vital part of her gigantic body.

The impulse of France, when the most trifling succour would have saved Poland, was arrested by the objection, that her armies must pass over the body of Germany. Did France not know that she could cast her shadow over the sea? Had she no chart of the Euxine—no thought of Turkey? No memory of their common and historic hostility to the destroyer of Poland?

Is the substance of Turkey, too, to be added to the growth of Russia? Is the Mammoth of the Sarmatian plains to become the Leviathan of the

Hesperian seas? Is another victim to be sacrificed within so short a space of time on the same altar; and because the same trifling succour is again withheld? Are the remains of Turkey to be laid on the tomb of Poland, to exclude every ray of hope, and render its doom irrevocable?

It is by the Dardanelles that we must reach the heart of the Ottoman empire; it is from the Bosphorus that our fleets must issue, to arrest the invader. (Invigorate Turkey, you not only save her, but repair the disaster her weakness alone has brought about\*.) The existence of Poland is bound to that of Turkey. One hand of iron is laid on both; unlock that withering grasp, and both start simultaneously to life. The Dardanelles are the key to both; both are to be secured by their possession, or sacrificed by their loss.

When some arrangement in the peninsula, some protocol in Belgium thwarts her views, when any difficulty arises in the Spanish and Belgian settlements, difficulties created by herself to occupy us elsewhere and divert our attention from Turkey,

\* The testimony contemporary with the partition of Poland is unequivocal, as to the connection between Poland and Turkey. The successful termination of the Russian war against the Turks, in 1774, caused the partition. "But the fate of Poland," says Coxe, "like that of its vassal, the Duke of Courland, must ultimately depend on the event of the present war between Russia and the Turks."



Russia thunders menaces and insults from her organs in the German press ; parades the greatness of her power, the number of her troops, the vastness of her territory, the strength of her alliances and position ; because, here, she opposes an empire, a military monarchy, and the whole German federation, to her enemy's attack. But let the Ottoman question be only hinted at—let but a squadron hover near the sensitive part, that haughty power is instantly on her knees ; protestations, explanations, declarations of magnanimity, of loyalty, and charity, are sent abroad, to conjure the storm ; here she feels how little is sufficient to reanimate her old Ottoman foe—to unite the now divided and hostile parts of that empire—to rally its repressed energies—to arouse its smothered vengeance—to detach from her, her subservient allies—to bring the war, not to her door, but on her hearth ; to concentrate on her single head the chances of a war, from which, bursting in the west, she was entirely sheltered. The difference of her language in both cases characterises the difference of danger. In the first, Russia is entrenched behind the armies of Germany, which she will ever rejoice to see engaged in an exhausting struggle. If they are overpowered, she has the entrenchment of her latitude, her deserts, and her snows. In the other, she is placed on the first rank ; she stands there alone, without shelter, without defensive armour ; and the point of the hostile sword is at her breast.

Such is the question we propose to examine. The contingency can only arise, the right only be acquired, or rather the necessity imposed, of resorting to those final measures, by the positive hostility of Russia, and the immediate danger of Turkey. It is necessary, first, to examine the relations of these two empires to each other, in the dispassionate manner that so impressive a question demands, and with as much succinctness as one so extensive will admit; nor will we be betrayed one step beyond the conclusions to which our own imperative and palpable interests lead, either by regard to her real weakness, to the use she makes of her power and influence, or by resentment for her hostility to ourselves.

It is ten years of continuous disasters, occasioned or exasperated by the hostility, open or disguised, of Russia, and the errors of France and England, that have reduced the existence of Turkey to a diplomatic decision between the courts of Europe. Here a most important consideration meets us, on the very threshold of the question. These errors of our cabinets, have they not entirely resulted from confidence in the declarations and engagements of Russia? Therefore it is, that our measures or inaction have become errors. The misfortunes for Turkey, the danger for ourselves, follow; not because there was a contest of duplicity between us and Russia, in which we were worsted, but because we treated Russia as a civilised nation, and as an European government.

The independence of Turkey has been undermined by her, under the mask of common objects, common measures, and formal alliance with the two cabinets most interested, and which may soon be under the necessity of recurring to the last resort in its support ; by an unparalleled combination of successful delusions, she not only has veiled from them her motives and her acts, but has called in the aid of their armies and fleets, and the whole weight of their moral support, for the furtherance of her designs.

Are the stipulations subsequently exacted violations of the previous contract ? Are they blows levelled at the interests which motived that contract ? It may be absurd to ask the question ; but Europe has not been accustomed, yet, to see faith broken with impunity with great European powers. It has not been accustomed to see the interests that touch nearest to the political existence of England and France, trampled on and insulted by any power whatever. It has not yet learnt that the will of the Czar of Muscovy is law in Europe ; and yet there is no means of avoiding these conclusions, other, than by supposing that England and France have exacted no pledge from Russia, and that they have no interest in Turkey.

But let us take the question such as Russia, at this very hour, presents it. She declares loudly, unequivocally, that she has no design on Turkey ; and that she has every interest and every wish to

maintain the integrity and independence of Turkey. Let us examine, therefore, in detail, how that independence has been affected by her acts, and by the acts into which she has betrayed England and France; and if, in the inquiry, we discover these acts to be in opposition to her words, her motives in contradiction with her declarations, we may legitimately infer, that she entertains different opinions from us respecting her own strength; that she perceives her objects are, as yet, only to be attained by the most impenetrable mystery and delusion. The obligation of so immense a responsibility to their nation, their predecessors, and posterity, may account for the Emperor, the Ministers, and Envoys of Russia, condescending to have recourse to means, not only unworthy of men of personal honour and character, and filling such prominent stations in society, but (excepting, always, this hard necessity) disgraceful to men sunk to a low level of moral depravity.

The Greek revolt, parent of the actual prostration of Turkey, is the most important chapter of this mighty scheme. That revolt has produced all the fruits which Russia expected from it; but it has produced others, on which she did not calculate; which we never could have most remotely anticipated, far less devised\*. But that

\* We mean docility of the Turkish mind, reformation of the abuses of the government, and a conviction of the ne-

this revolt, as the two others that preceded it, was the handwork of Russia, is a truism too trite to bear repetition.

We must consecrate a few pages to the connection between that revolt and the Treaty of Adrianople. We shall judge Russia from her own mouth. Her first document of importance is the note of Baron Strogonoff, of July 18, 1821. A paper so ably drawn up, as almost to make one feel gratified in the success of talents worthy a better cause. But what must the feelings of a Russian be? What the spirit and enthusiasm which must animate the meanest agents of a system directed to such mighty objects, so admirably conducted, and so eminently successful? But these documents should be studied at length, and with a full acquaintance with the subject, to comprehend their insidiousness, and their moral effect on both Turks and Greeks, and on the feelings of Europe, thus prepared for the positive hostility of the great powers against the Porte, which it was their object to produce, and which, consequently, was brought about\*.

cessity of associating its interests, and concerting its plans and policy with those European nations, the interests of which are injured by the progress of Russia.

\* This is the second time that Russia has made the natural allies of her prey plunge, themselves, the knife into its heart. The judicious Turkish historian, Vasiff Effendi, has this remarkable passage. "In these circumstances, the King

“ Russia saw, *in the conservation* of the Turkish government, an additional means of consolidating the peace of Europe. It was therefore her duty to condemn every enterprise which could *compromise the existence* of this government. It was her duty, moreover, as a power always loyal, always disinterested in her relations with a state, which, for five years, she had unceasingly urged to surround itself with the guarantees of a religious observance of Treaties, and the absence of every motive of discussion. But Russia did more ; she offered to the Porte a co-operation, *franchement amicale, the efficacy of which could not be doubtful.*”

The passages in italics convey hints and threats very exasperating to the Porte, but the drift of which might escape the penetration of an English reader.

“ died, and the Republic was soon a prey to internal convulsions ; the Russians took care to foment them ; they even seduced a faction of the Poles, and had the art to make themselves be called in by them. The Porte sought, by every means, to warn the Republic against these deceitful appearances of friendship ; she pointed out Russia’s projects of aggrandisement, and entreated them to be on their guard against so dangerous an ally.” A few pages afterwards, we find that the Porte, in consequence of the offensive and defensive treaty between Russia and Poland “ was exasperated to such a degree, as to declare war against the Republic.”

“ It is with the most lively regret, that Russia  
 “ sees that her propositions have not been appre-  
 “ ciated by the Sublime Porte ; that the Turkish  
 “ Government appeared not to conceive the im-  
 “ portance of appeasing these troubles, and pre-  
 “ venting their recurrence ; and that by the system  
 “ it adopted, it was about to excite, in favour of  
 “ men who had attacked its authority, sentiments  
 “ which all people revere ; sentiments of religion,  
 “ of humanity, of patriotism, of interest, inspired  
 “ by a nation reduced to despair.

“ The Sublime Porte may easily explain to  
 “ itself the consequences of such a system. *It will*  
 “ *find itself forcedly*, in spite of the most bene-  
 “ volent intentions of the powers of Europe, *in a*  
 “ *state of hostility with the christian world.*

“ Now, in the first place, if the disorders, of  
 “ which the undersigned has been forced to retrace  
 “ the afflicting picture, are to continue, or cannot  
 “ be remedied, Russia, *far from finding a guaran-*  
 “ *tee of peace ?* in the duration of the Ottoman  
 “ empire, would see itself *forced, sooner or later,*  
 “ *to accomplish that* which command—her insulted  
 “ religion, her infringed treaties, her co-religion-  
 “ aries proscribed,

“ Au reste,—the Ottoman ministry must have  
 “ already judged, by the unanimity of the repre-  
 “ sentations that have been made to it, *that the*  
 “ *cause which Russia pleads* IS AN EUROPEAN  
 “ CAUSE.”

But this note is something more than the ex-

pression of a deep and philanthropic interest—something more than the proffer of counsel and aid to the Porte. Russia's benevolence goes further; for, apprehending the blindness of the Porte to her own interest, this note becomes an *ultimatum*. Accept my advice, says Russia, or the accomplishment instantaneously of that which otherwise, "sooner or later," I shall have to accomplish. If, in eight days, the Porte did not "exhauce tous les vœux et réalise toutes les espérances de sa Majesté Imperiale," she was to be cut off from all communications with Russia; the minister was to retire; and in this declaration of war, he was the advocate of Christianity and of all Europe, and threatened the empire with invasion while revolt was kindled in its provinces, and hatred and distrust inspired into its councils against the only well-intentioned but ignorant allies who could support it. To such a pitch was this unheard-of violence pushed, that after fixing eight days for the answer, it was absolutely rejected, on the pretence of the term being expired. The simple Turkish detail of this singular transaction deserves certainly as much attention as the Russian rhetoric.

"Howsoever contrary the fixation of such a term, to the rules established between two courts, still the Sublime Porte took to heart to conform to it. Effectively, the eighth day being finished, preparation was made to transmit the answer on the next day, and the dragomans of Russia were sent for, to convey it to the minister. The



“ dragomans alleged some pretext, and intimated  
 “ that they would come for it the day after. They  
 “ did present themselves at the Reis-Effendi’s, and  
 “ declared that, the term of eight days having  
 “ expired, the minister could not receive the  
 “ answer of the Sublime Porte.” This is what  
 Russia calls rendering to the Porte “ the last  
 “ service she owed it,” and in doing which, “ the  
 “ Emperor believes he has fulfilled all his duties  
 “ jusqu’un scruple\* !”

Before dismissing this document, we must extract from it a passage eminently edifying, as proving the interest which a mighty government, in the midst of the cares attached to its dominion, finds time to take in the fate of 500,000 subjects of a foreign power. “ Public acts devote to punishment and to death a people *that had hitherto*

\* It is singular, that the rupture thus brought about, was justified chiefly on the Turkish government not withdrawing its troops from the provinces; from the very provinces that had been the focus of the insurrection which Russia had offered her troops to suppress! This was called a violation of the treaty of Bucharest; whilst Russia withheld not from subject princes, but from Turkey, the fortresses of Anapa, Poti, &c. the surrender of which was stipulated in that treaty. Those who wish to know how the English Ambassador did “ make known to the Divan, the ‘pensée’ “ of the Emperor,” will find it in Lord Strangford’s notes, and the Porte’s answer; especially an admirable one of February 1822. It is well that we should know how active we ourselves have been in wounding Turkey.

“ *been protected!* by positive stipulations and a respect tacit, but indispensable for the other people of Europe. It would be superfluous to cite all the stipulations of His Highness, which attest the exactitude of this assertion. That which is too certain is, that not only the authors of these disorders, but the Greek nation en masse, and the sources of its existence and reproduction, are attacked by the measures taken by the court of Constantinople.”

Deep conviction must have surely spoken in these energetic expressions—benevolence and humanity must be the presiding genii in her councils—and late events in Poland a dream.

It is not for the idle purpose of criminating Russia that we quote these passages, but with the serious and practical object of proving, by her fears, her weakness; the sole motive which can lead her to assume a part otherwise so puerile.

We certainly will not attempt to analyse the Russian declaration of war; we will merely extract a few passages.

“ His Imperial Majesty expecting, from the union of the three courts, the prompt cessation of the war in the east, renounced all insular influence, rejected every idea of exclusive measures in this major question. Under his auspices the conferences of Ackermann were opened; they concluded, in an additional convention to the Treaty of Bucharest, a convention,

“ the clauses of which bear the seal of that  
“ calculated moderation which, submitting every  
“ demand to the immutable principles of strict  
“ justice, consults neither *the advantages of*  
“ *position*, the superiority of forces, nor the  
“ facility of success.”

In the answer of the Porte, we have a very different version, or, at least, an explanation of the meaning in Russia, of “calculated moderation.”

“ After several meetings, the Russian plenipotentiaries presented, contrary to the convention, a separate document, under the name of *ultimatum*, demanding that it should be approved and accepted, without alteration. In vain did the plenipotentiaries of the Sublime Porte represent how much such a proposition was contrary to all diplomatic forms, and to the basis of the conference. “*Notre mission*,” answered the Russians, “*a pour unique objet de faire absolument accepter cette pièce.*” The Turks finally gave way, in consequence of the official declaration of the Russian plenipotentiaries, in the name of their court, “that Russia would in no way interfere with the Greek question. This declaration, consigned in the protocols on both sides, appeared a pledge of peace and friendship between the two empires, for the present and the future. The close of the conference was implicitly motived on the said declaration,

“ and the treaty was concluded, *de bonne grace*  
 “ without looking too closely at each of the  
 “ articles.”

The declaration of war, after expressing the regret of the Emperor that his sacrifices were never appreciated, nor his moderation understood, thus continues :—

“ However, a war with Turkey involved no  
 “ complication of the relations of Russia and her  
 “ allies—no compact of guaranteeship—no political  
 “ obligations connected the destinies of the Otto-  
 “ man Empire with the reparatory stipulations of  
 “ 1814 and 1815, under the shadow of which,  
 “ *civilised and christian* Europe reposed from  
 “ its long discords, and saw its governments  
 “ united by the *memory of a common glory\**, and  
 “ by a happy identity of principles and intentions.”

How does she forget, in 1828, that in 1821 she spoke to Turkey merely as an advocate of the christian and European cause? The Greek revolution had produced its effect on Europe, and the treaty of July had been signed; not indeed a treaty of her own making, or of her proposing, but one to which she merely adhered, from innate horror at the expenditure of human life; and gratified the Great Captain of the age, by the proof her adhesion afforded, of the influence he possessed over her councils.

\* A warning to France!

But, “ Russia, by her state of hostility with the  
 “ Porte, from motives independent of the Treaty  
 “ of July, adheres, and will adhere, to the stipu-  
 “ lations of that Act. The duties it imposes on  
 “ her, the principles on which it is founded, will  
 “ be—the first, fulfilled with the most scrupulous  
 “ fidelity,—the second, observed without deviation.  
 “ Her allies will always find her ready to concert  
 “ her march with them in the execution of the  
 “ Treaty of London; and ever anxious to aid in  
 “ a work, which her religion, and all the senti-  
 “ ments honourable to humanity, recommend to  
 “ her active solicitude; always disposed to *profit*  
 “ *by her actual position*, only for the purpose of  
 “ accelerating the accomplishment of the clauses  
 “ of the 6th of July; not to change their nature  
 “ or effects.”

Russia creates the Greek insurrection, denounces J  
 it to the Porte, and offers to assist in quelling it;  
 then menaces war in consequence of the severe  
 measures taken by the Porte—spreads the revolt  
 by these menaces, publicly notified by the depar-  
 ture of her ambassador,—brings about the hostility  
 between Turkey and Christendom, which she de-  
 plores—makes herself be entreated by England to  
 enter the alliance, settled by the treaty of July—  
 obtains the important advantages of the conven-  
 tion of Akermann, by renouncing, in favour of  
 Turkey, all further interference in the affairs of

Greece\* ; is then permitted by her allies to seize that inestimable moment, when Turkey was apparently at the last gasp, for making war, so that she might bring about the settlement of the affairs of Greece. When she has brought about enmity

“ \* In April, Russia signed the protocol by which she engaged to interfere in the affairs of Greece. In September, she procured the acceptance of the Convention of Akermann, by engaging not to interfere in these affairs. In July, she signed the Treaty of London, renewing the engagements of April, with the addition of a determination to use force if necessary : and in October, her admiral, acting on the *nautical* interpretation of that document, took part in the battle of Navarino, where the Ottoman fleet was annihilated, in the midst of profound peace, by the three powers who had so lately concluded a treaty of ‘ peace, mediation and conservation.’ Yet a mental reservation, of which the Porte accused itself in a letter to its own subjects, was the only intelligible cause of complaint on which Russia could found a pretext for detaching herself from her allies, and declaring war *upon separate grounds*.

“ After the battle of Navarino and the departure of the ambassadors from Constantinople, the Porte did not doubt that it was at war with the three powers, and it therefore appealed to the patriotism of the Turks, and called upon them to arm themselves in defence of their country and their religion. At the same time it informed them, not that it had been deceived by Russia, which was the truth, but, that it had deceived Russia, and had signed the Convention of Akermann for the purpose of gaining time.”  
—*Quarterly Review*, No. CV. p. 234, 235. *Note to Fifth Edition.*

and hostility between Turkey and Europe, she discovers that Turkey is no longer necessary to the balance of European power. Generosity induces her not to destroy it. She engages herself not to "profit by the position" in which her allies have placed her, to deviate in no way from the stipulations (stipulations of mediation, of peace, and conservation) of the 6th July. Mediator in Greece, she is belligerent only in Roumelia and Anatoly; but she captures vessels in the Archipelago, and blockades the Dardanelles; and she subsidises Greece at the same moment, to maintain 20,000 troops on her frontiers, to paralyse the operations of the Turks\*.

Was it for this that Canning devised that memorable Treaty? Was it thus that the "influence of Russia in Greece was to be nullified, and her interference in Turkey prevented?" In the

\* But these men, instead of entering the exposed provinces on the border, were restrained in an inaction wholly inconceivable to them, and productive of more than one disorder. Thessaly and the Pindus were ripe for insurrection, and were only restrained by emissaries, sent by Capo d'Istria, conjuring them, menacing, threatening them with the vengeance of all Europe, and promising ultimate deliverance, if they did not "ruin themselves, by disturbing the plans of the allies;" using every art and argument to prevent the positive extension of the Greek territory, which he seemed so anxious to increase in the conferences of Poros. Greece was large enough for Russia's immediate objects—too large already for her future ones.

execution of a Treaty for the maintenance of Turkey you have destroyed the chief means of defence for a maritime capital—her fleet\*; you have made her believe that your object was her destruction; your ambassadors have quitted her capital. You have, therefore, according to her means of judging, formally, as well as practically, declared war. What can follow, save “the results which the Emperor expects from the blessing of Him whom justice and a pure conscience have never invoked in vain†.”

What other government, even the weakest in Europe, would venture to urge in diplomatic documents, motives of humanity, of philanthropy, or religion? It was reserved for Russia alone to prostitute all that is most sacred, most respectable, in the conventional terms of intercourse between man and man, to the furtherance of projects, entertained only on the faith of the disunion, the credulity, and the ignorance of Europe. Yet it has hitherto been her fortune to have her words believed and her acts neglected. It has been

\* It is singular how those who have undertaken to be the advocates of British interests in the East, think themselves bound to vilify and be ignorant of the means by which British interests are to be supported; for instance, Colonel Evans scoffs at the idea of Turkey being injured by the destruction of her fleet.

† Conclusion of Russian declaration of war, 26th April, 1828.



reserved for her alone to conciliate the good-will and services of all parties\*, and of all sects ; and so high does she bear herself on our dissensions, as to dare to insult, and to insult with impunity, the great powers of Europe, by speaking of the “ magnanimity of the Emperor.” Why is this endured ? Merely because distant and faint glimpses were only caught, at times, of what she was about ; and no one felt the injury her progress entailed on us, or the facilities that existed for restraining her.

“ Does any one who is acquainted with the discussions of 1821, and the proceedings of Baron Strogonoff,—with the terms of the ultimatum he presented—with the rude manner in which he rejected the answer of the Porte—and his subsequent departure from Constantinople, as the Porte truly said, ‘ without a cause’—can any one, who has any knowledge of this whole transaction, doubt for one moment, that it was the intention of the Russian ambassador to produce a rupture—or that he would have succeeded, had the ambassadors of France and England been prepared to leave Constantinople as they afterwards did in 1827 ? Was not the war be-

\* It was the Liberals throughout Europe who supported Capo d'Istria ; her first establishment on the Black Sea, she owes to Fox out of office. The treaty of Adrianople, the declaration of war, to the Tories in office—the Carlists of France look to her possession of Constantinople as the signal of the restoration of the fallen dynasty.

“ tween Persia and Turkey, which broke out at  
 “ that very time, undertaken at the instigation of  
 “ the Russian *chargé d'affaires* at Tabreez, and  
 “ justified by him in a long note addressed to an  
 “ officer of the Shah's household? Could it be that  
 “ so remarkable an apparent coincidence between  
 “ the views of the Russian representatives *at these*  
 “ *distant courts* was the result of no previous  
 “ concert?

“ But the violence of the Russian ambassador  
 “ was unavailing. The firmness and address of  
 “ the British government, and the temperate con-  
 “ duct of the Porte, postponed the catastrophe;  
 “ and it was not until the shackles we had forged  
 “ for ourselves in the treaty of London, had chained  
 “ us to the side of Russia, and the evil effects of  
 “ so ill-omened a connexion in such a cause had  
 “ already prostrated Turkey, that we not only lost  
 “ the power of preventing a rupture, but found  
 “ ourselves contributing to the aggrandisement of  
 “ our rival, and hastening the subjugation of our  
 “ ally\*.”

The war is at length concluded, Russia's mate-  
 rial means being at the last ebb; and the Porte's  
 moral means totally exhausted; still Russia wears  
 a menacing aspect after the passage of the Balkan,  
 till she extorts a threat from England of cap-  
 turing her fleet at Tenedos. She, consequently,  
 leaves the impression of the Turkish empire having

\* *Quarterly Review*, No. CV. p. 231.

been within her grasp ; and to England, the pride and confidence of reflecting that a menace of her's sufficed, at any hour, to arrest the progress of Russia. Our ambassador newly arrived, and the other diplomatists hurried by their alarms a treaty, which, if postponed a few weeks, would never have taken place ; for the Russian corps was fast melting away, and the Turkish troops were beginning to recover from their terror, their delusion, or their expectations, according to the motives that influenced them, or the means by which they had been practised upon.

Then appeared a manifesto : words, like sunbeams, are sent forth, to dazzle the eyes of Europe ; and piety and sentimentality unite to celebrate the reluctant victories of the Russian arms over despotism, infidelity, and barbarism.

The left bank of the Danube is occupied ;—it is to arrest the scourge of humanity—the plague. The important fortresses of the borders of Circassia are united in perpetuity to the empire—it is to arrest the traffic, horrible to Russia, in slaves\*. The loss of human life has been compensated by the irrevocable settlement of the Greek question—so dear to her allies, so sacred to her own sense of religion and of humanity. The

\* The slave trade of Circassia, on the repression of which Russia has advanced such great claims on the humanity of Europe, is, however, only in name, connected with the state of the negro slave, or her own twenty-five millions of degraded serfs. In Turkey, slavery means adoption. The slave is one

grievances of her own subjects, so long patiently borne—are redressed; and, in fine, the Dardanelles are made entirely free—to the commerce of *all nations*; still Russia “has remained constantly a stranger to every desire of conquest—to every view of aggrandisement\*.”

But it may, perhaps, be supposed that the extension of the Russian dominion, like our own in India, has been brought about by circumstances, and is contrary to the principles it has laid down for its own conduct. But any one who knew no more of Russia than is to be learnt from this very declaration of war, must be aware, after perusing it, that the possession of the Dardanelles ought to be, if it is not, the chief object of the policy of

of the family; is united to his master by ties of consanguinity, is trusted more than a mere relative! has open to him every career, every dignity, even the seals of Vizir. The Circassian women are slaves in Turkey; as Briseis in the tent of Achilles; the same negro, transported to the European colonies, becomes a being supposed as inferior to his white fellow-creature in intellect as in position; transported to Turkey, he may become, he does often become—priest—general—pacha. The Circassians of both sexes are now brought *contraband* to Turkey. There is, of course, no violence in their slavery. Their ideas may be different from our's, but their position is the natural result of that difference. Russia talks of putting an end to slavery! Let Europe look on her millions of beings, reduced by their condition to the level of brutes, and sunk below that level, by their degradation in their own thoughts—by the indignities they suffer without revenge.

\* Manifesto, 1st October, 1829.

Russia. "The Bosphorus is closed," says Nicholas, in his manifesto, 26th of April, 1828; "our commerce is annihilated." The declaration of war continues:—"The ruin of the Russian towns, that owe their existence to this commerce, becomes imminent, and the meridional provinces of the states of the Emperor lose the only outlet for their produce—the only maritime communication which can, in facilitating exchange, cause labour to fructify, and bear industry and riches." This is a large avowal to make; it no doubt was inadvertently made. How can the internal resources of Russia be developed, without the greatest danger to the state, whilst the outlet and inlet of their products is at the disposal of a power rendered innately hostile by a long series of encroachments, embittered by the disgust which has been engendered by the mode, and the humiliations which have been added to the injury? If the possibility of any hostile movement did not exist—if there were no such nations as France or England in the world—if the rich provinces of Turkey were not worth the acquisition—if Russia had no interest in forming a marine—if it were not necessary for her to prevent the existence of good government in Turkey, either for the prevention of an agricultural development, fatal to her own, or to take all hopes from the various populations wrested from Turkey, and who continue subjects of Russia only while misgovernment in Turkey continues—if, for none of these reasons, each by

itself sufficient to justify all her efforts, the possession of the Dardanelles were desirable, still would it be necessary for the security of the actual commerce of Russia, and must be possessed, before the government can permit the extensive development of industry which might, at any moment, convulse the empire and overthrow the government, in consequence of a verbal order of the *Reis-Effendi* to the port captain of Constantinople. "The Dardanelles is for you," said Count Nesselrode; "an important question. It is for us a vital one." "It is the key of my house," said Alexander.

But, like the extension of our own dominion in India, although ours may grow without hindrance, and expand without inconvenience or control, even if not preconcerted, the extension of that of Russia must be progressive. Russia, tightened, constrained by a vast belt, dependent on a hostile door-keeper, in sight of a rich booty, and thwarted by a great but non-diplomatic power, must, in expanding, burst that belt—must seek to cut off that door-keeper, to reach that booty, and to deceive, mislead, and upset that power; nothing can arrest her, if even inclined to stop, save good government and substantive strength in Turkey. Her intention of progress is displayed in her endeavours to deprive Turkey of these means of existence, so that its subjugation is a necessity for Russia, without being an object, and being her object, is doubly so.

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## CHAPTER II.

*Treaty of Adrianople.—Banks of Danube left uninhabited.—Anapa and Coast of Circassia.—The Provinces.—Servia.—Privileges of Russian Merchants.—Commercial Claims.—War Contribution—Mistake of £400,000 for £4,000,000.*

BUT we must return to the Treaty of Adrianople.

The first article that deserves attention is the third. The Delta, at the mouth of the Danube, is annexed to Russia, and therefore that river, the high way of Bulgaria, of the provinces, and now, by the introduction of steam navigation, of central Europe, is placed at her disposal, and the opposite bank, *is to be left uninhabited for the distance, inland, of six miles*; so that it is entirely out of the power of the Porte to retain any balancing control over it.

Article IV. consigns to Russia, without ever mentioning it, Anapa, the key of Circassia, both military and commercial, obtained by treachery at the commencement of the war. This acquisition cuts off the commerce of three or four millions of an independent and warlike population, deprives them of some necessaries of life, and of ammunition; it intercepts their communications with

Turkey, and prevents all obtrusion on Europe of their claims on her sympathies or interest.

To this cession is added nearly two hundred miles of coast, and three military positions ; moreover, two fortresses, one the chief place of a Pacha-lick, beyond Georgia ; and this Russia takes without any views of aggrandisement ; and, secure in the ignorance of Europe, without condescending to mention names, or specify particulars.

The separate Act, annexed to Article V., stipulates the following arrangements for the provinces—the nomination of the Hospodars for life ; the abolition of the imports in kind, which formed the principal source of revenue from the provinces ; the expulsion from them of all Mussulmans ; the demolition of the Turkish fortress, Giurgova : and the establishment of a quarantine, separating them from the Porte, and uniting them to Russia.

This is a species of interference too strange to mean any thing less than actual possession. To establish, in the provinces of an empire treated as independent, a military cordon of this description, would, of course, never for a moment be tolerated from any other government save Russia. This insulated the provinces from Turkey, and gave Russia the control of every individual, every vessel, every bale of goods, every letter. The idea is monstrous, of a quarantine directed by a foreign power ; and that it should be so directed is provided for. The sanitary establishment is



placed under the direction of a Russian agent : and the Russian consul, may be translated Roman Consul of the provinces.

Article VI. confirms the stipulations of Akermann relative to Servia. To the Article itself there is no objection to be made ; perhaps, for the same reason Russia did her best to prevent its execution. An aid-de-camp of the Emperor's succeeded so completely in embroiling the question of the limits, that grounds of interminable discussion would have remained open, for future griefs and renewed appeals, had not Prince Milosch thought it best to settle the matter in his own way, and eject the Turks.

On the subject of Belgrade, the Emperor was referred to ; and his decision was such as to make the prince vow never to set foot in that city again, and to transfer the capital to Semendria. Finally, the settlement between Servia and the Porte was arranged *à l' amiable*. The Sultan granted more than had been originally demanded, and added to the favour by the manner in which it was conferred, to the astonishment and exasperation of the Russian Ambassador\*.

\* Prince Milosh assembled the knezes, or village chiefs of Servia, to submit to their rejection or confirmation the firman appointing him hereditary prince. The Russian ambassador, on learning this, allowed himself to be betrayed into the most indecent violence. “ *Does Milosh think himself a Bolivar ?* ”

Article VII. regulates the privileges of Russian merchants. They are to pay only the tariff of external commerce; and, having paid that, they are to be “molested in no case, and under no pretext, “by any prohibition, or any restriction whatever; “nor in consequence of any measure or regulation, “whether of administration or of internal legis-  
“lation.” But independently of the 3 per cent. on exportation, reduced for Russians to less than 1 per cent., by the depreciation of the currency, and the antiquity of Russia’s tariff, which she has never permitted to be renewed, there are local taxes on production; against which this article was levelled. The consequence was, the disturbance of the whole internal administration of the country—the governors, and farmers of revenue, defrauded of rights and profits they had purchased, were exasperated against the Russian *protégés*;—acts of violence followed, summarily taken up by Russia, and a ferment produced, that cannot well be conceived as the result of a stipulation in a treaty with a foreign power. And in favour of whom was this monstrous privilege introduced? In favour, it will be supposed, of a large and powerful body of mercantile men. Nothing of the kind. There is not a single native Russian merchant in Turkey! Russia’s first object was to multiply her *protégés*. Presently, one-half of the exports of Turkey figured as Russian property; previously, Russian protection relieved the privi-

leged class from all civil and financial obligations ; now, new inducements were added in such unheard-of commercial prerogatives. But a far more important object was concealed behind this affection—strange to say the least, in Russia, for ultra freedom of commerce. The Turkish administration had evinced a disposition of imitating Mehemet Ali's monopolies. In its new difficulties, the idea recurred, or the suggestion was made by some of the agents of all sorts that have occupied every avenue that approach every ear of men in office. Essays were made ; they were evidently infractions of those rights which Russia defended with so much acrimony. The Russian *protégés* in common with all foreigners and natives, thus exposed to a new vexation, far more oppressive than the slight duties from which Russia had emancipated them, claimed loudly redress from their ambassador. They were told not to meddle with matters that did not concern them ! Russia's object was attained : the “ monopolies,” however inapplicable the term, were created ; a new abuse if not very oppressive, very vexatious, established ; a noxious spirit of fiscality introduced into the administration ; every Frank, from one end of the empire to the other, exclaimed, “ Turkey is lost ;” and every *employé* of Russia added, “ What a “ country would not this be, if in the hands of a “ civilised government !”

Article VIII. stipulates the amount of the

commercial claims. There is nothing else of importance, save Article IX., which determines a compensation for the war expenses; which is “to be settled, by common consent,” between the two courts.

Here, in this little sentence, lies the pith of the whole transaction; this it is, which has mortgaged Turkey to her enemy; this has led to the treaty of the 8th of July, to the convention of St. Petersburgh, and to the actual peril of the empire.

It is a memorable record of the hurry with which so important a treaty was formed—of the apathy of the other embassies, and of the facilities possessed by Russia of over-reaching her enemy—that the Turkish plenipotentiaries conceived or were led to conceive, for the transaction took place through the intervention of dragomans, that a million meant one hundred thousand\*! The Treaty was signed by them, and carried back, after the ratification, to Constantinople, under the impression that the sum due was four hundred thousand pounds, not four millions sterling.

Considering the deplorable state of the Russian troops—their utter destitution—the ravages of a

\* The sum is not specified in the treaty first communicated to the Ambassadors; but in the annexed act, although the commercial claims are minutely as the epochs of payment stipulated in the treaty.

pestilential disease\*—and the revolution that had taken place in the disposition of the inhabitants, and of the Albanian army, with difficulty restrained by the Porte from falling on the Russians, the discovery, a little sooner, of this error of a cypher, might have prevented the necessity of the inquiry in which we are engaged; but regrets are vain, except in as far as they may rouse us from the inaction that has so seriously and so uselessly compromised our interests, and, what is more, blinded us to them.

If such are the circumstances, what becomes of the right of Russia to pecuniary compensation? And had she every right in the world to that compensation, if it affects the existence of Turkey, is it not as imperative on us to nullify this stipulation, as to prevent the formal extinction of the Turkish Government? But some excuse might be found for our indifference, if Russia exercised the right, devolving on her, by the admission of her claim, in such a manner as to allow Turkey the means of discharging it. In the position of the one empire with respect to the other—a position which has admitted a stipulation such as this in the Treaty of Adrianople—“If any one of these “ stipulations come to be infringed, without the

\* When the treaty was signed, not more than eight thousand were in a state to march, though, in certain Perot circles, they were believed fifty thousand strong.

“ Minister of Russia obtaining prompt and full  
“ satisfaction, the Sublime Porte recognises the  
“ right of the Imperial Court of Russia to con-  
“ sider such infraction as an act of hostility, and  
“ immediately to have recourse to reprisals against  
“ the Sublime Porte.” In such a position, with  
every obligation weighing upon one party, was it  
necessary to possess further guarantees than those  
conferred by the Treaty—by the acknowledgment  
of the debt, and the means of exacting payment?  
Was it necessary to imprison the body of the  
debtor, and to place him in the impossibility of  
defraying the debt? In the interest even of the  
debt, he ought to be allowed to arrange his own  
affairs; but it is evidently not the sum that the  
creditor requires, it is the body of his debtor—  
while the antagonist, feeling as yet his physical  
strength unequal to the subjugation of his enemy,  
seeks to restrain and divide his powers by fictitious  
bonds, and by the semblance of right to insulate  
him from the common sympathies of humanity,  
from the public interests of Europe.

)} The Provinces and Silistria are mortgaged for  
the debt! Silistria is the most important fortress  
in European Turkey. It gives Russia a place of  
arms, in the midst of the Ottoman states, which  
solves by a menace (tacit, if not avowed) every  
difference of opinion between Russia and Turkey  
on questions of foreign policy and internal admi-  
nistration.

Such are the general stipulations of the Treaty of Adrianople—such the thorns which England, and the fruits which Russia, has reaped from the Treaty of the 6th of July.

“ England *had the air* of being the soul of an alliance, contracted between her, France, and Russia. However, the only inheritance which a Minister, who had been able to conciliate the interests of his country with those of humanity, left to his successor, was *a Treaty of 6th July*. His premature death opened a field to other views; and the great event of Navarin did not lead to those consequences which Europe expected! Let others inquire if *we owe* this grand catastrophe to mere hazard, or to the warlike humour of a brave sailor\*.”

Well may Russia exult in the acquisition of such immense results with such slender means;—but no!—these admissions are altogether incidental; they are without the deep, the intent concentration of her thoughts and energies. Not a betraying sound will escape from her lips, not a smile steal over her features, until the great day of consummation dawns, and the peals of the Dardanelles re-echo to the halls of Constantine the shouts and cries of victory and defiance, and the long-suppressed exultation of gigantic deception.

\* Valentini. Guerre contre les Turcs.

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## CHAPTER III.

*Integrity of the Turkish Government.—Influence of Russia waning.—Appeal to England.—Revolt of Mehemet Ali.—Russian Expedition to Constantinople.—Convention of Admiral Roussin.—Russia gets the Merit.—England arrests Ibrahim.—Treaty of 4th July.—Means by which extorted.—Consequences.—Turkish Embassy to St. Petersburgh.—Convention signed there.—Its Stipulations.*

BUT the Treaty of Adrianople was only *le commencement de la fin*. While the mode, the epoch, and the consequences of each of the four instalments of 1,500,000 ducats of the commercial indemnity are specified with the utmost detail, the Treaty, and the separate Act, scarcely condescend to allude to the eight millions of ducats; we only learn that “Silistria and the  
“Provinces *are excepted in the evacuation*, but  
“are to be exactly restored two months after the  
“discharge of the whole debt, the payment of  
“which will be determined by his Majesty the  
“Emperor of all the Russias, on the Sublime  
“Porte’s having recourse to his generosity and  
“his magnanimity.”

Of course other negociations must follow, other conventions are to be formed. It is no longer Russia that has to exact, to demand, to threaten—



it is Turkey that has to beg, to entreat, to supplicate—the generosity, the magnanimity of the Emperor! Still, and it ought to be loudly proclaimed in honour of the feelings and intentions of the men composing the Turkish government—however unequal to their position they were by capacity or information—that at this moment neither gold, nor flattery, nor the advantages of political connection, had betrayed one individual in their councils into intelligence with Russia. Under such humiliating, threatening circumstances, having all to fear, and also all that was in the nature of things to be hoped (delay in payment, mitigation of injury and outrage) to hope from Russia—surrounded by Russian agents, by Russian suggestions, by Russian ideas, whether in the persons of their own retainers or in the persons of the representatives, dragomans, and agents of almost all the European powers—still neither then nor at this hour is there a party or individual in the Divan to whom the very suspicion attaches of being Russian by mere purchase. There is not a Turk throughout the Empire that would not consider himself insulted by the supposition of connection with Russia. She gets men to act in her sense—but only through their fears, their ignorance, their vices, and their state of insulation and abandonment\*. What a difference from

\* It must not be forgotten that the Porte was perfectly well aware that the intrigues, for it cannot be called the policy,

Poland! This it is, that necessitates, this it is that baffles all the demoralising means brought to bear by Russia; and which would probably by this time have been unable to prevent the Government from recovering its equilibrium, had not the position of Mehemet Ali come to give Russia vigorous support, and to annihilate every remaining chance that might have saved the Empire without foreign interference.

This integrity of the Divan alone can explain its appeal to England, on the march of Ibrahim Pacha. Its appeal to a nation that had chiefly contributed to the independence of Greece—the motives of which it was not to be expected the Porte could appreciate—to a nation that had so constantly evinced a disheartening apathy and facility of delusion in its relations with Turkey, was an act of heroism which merited a very different reception. Russia all the while using her power, her influence, her intelligence, to obtain the admission of succour which was certain and at hand.

Even after the demoralising effect of the refusal of England, the demand of succour was only obtained through the private means made use of in the Seraglio, and the Porte was made acquainted

of one of the parties to the Treaty of the 6th of July, had placed Mehemet Ali in the position that matured so considerably the designs of Russia.

with it only by the note of the Russian ambassador announcing the departure from Sevastopol of the auxiliary squadron.

At this conjuncture Admiral Roussin arrived. The Porte, alarmed at the position in which it was thus placed by the act of the Sultan, and desirous to throw itself on the protection of any power that could rescue it from Russian protection, suggested underhand to the newly-arrived French ambassador the convention which was afterwards signed. Thus a fortuitous combination rendered France arbiter of the East, and of a question on which hinged the peace, the interests, and the balance of Europe. The ambassador felt that position—seized it—and, like General Guilleminot, was sacrificed.

From that moment—a moment that does not often recur in a nation's history—France may be considered as wholly effaced from the Eastern question.

If it is not known, it ought to be known, and it is not the less a fact because it is not known, that the presence of between 8000 and 9000 Russians in the vicinity of Constantinople did *not* arrest Ibrahim Pacha, did *not* save the Sultan. Their presence, had Ibrahim pushed on, would only have served further to legitimate his enterprise. Ibrahim every where declared that he was marching, encouraged by England and France, to deliver the Sultan from his Russian alliance. This notion was spread from the Elbrooz

in the Caucasus, to Montenegro on the Adriatic. From one extremity of Turkey to the other, every villager, every pacha, inquired if this was not the case. One word from either, said by a fit person, sufficed to stop Mehemet Ali, whose efforts at naval power exposed his whole fabric to the caprice of any French or English naval officer. England and France, successively, not knowing their power, shrunk from the functions of arbiter, when all the advantages of that position were assured to them; and only when Russia had occupied that post stepped in, and by a representation at Alexandria stopped the progress of Ibrahim Pacha. Russia must have lost her European preponderance, had either nation become protector of Turkey. In what a splendid position with regard to Turkey was she not placed by their formal renunciation of the merit and title of the office which they practically fulfilled. They have now permitted her to say to Europe, "I might have seized on Turkey, had I been so inclined:" to the Sultan, "I have saved you:" and to Mehemet Ali, "You owe to me your new acquisitions." They gave her to boast of the glory of at length entering the Bosphorus, and as Nicholas said, that it might be repeated, "the greater glory of quitting it."

But such a transaction was to bear practical results for Russia. These appeared in the Treaty signed 8th July, at Unkiar Skelessi, previous to the departure of the Russian squadron.

Nicholas and Count Nesselrode treated, at St.

Petersburgh, this deed as one of no importance whatever to England and France—so much so indeed that it was concluded without their instructions, without their knowledge, and even that a copy of it reached the Emperor as a piece of news. Count Orloff, with his soldier-like frankness, expatiated, on his return, on the supplications and entreaties of the Porte, which had extorted it from him as a pledge of the continued favour and protection of the Emperor.

The authority, the personal honour of the Emperor and his Ministers can alone be called in, to excuse the Envoys of France and England at St. Petersburgh, for the confidence they did not withhold from such testimony, and for the conviction into which they were led, of the absence, on the part of Russia, of any design against the independence of Turkey! It may appear impossible to doubt that the solemn asseverations of such men were not founded on some appearances, at least, that warranted or excused them. Yet not a shadow of a pretext existed for the declarations to which we have alluded. The Treaty represented as extorted by the importunity of the Porte, came upon it like a clap of thunder. It was drawn up in the Russian embassy; perhaps even in the office at St. Petersburgh; the draught of it may even have lain by for years, awaiting the fitting opportunity\*. But

\* The sole object of the mission of Count Orloff, and of the unprecedented authority with which he was clothed, was to extort the signature of this Treaty from Turkey: he

at all events it is certain that, like the convention of Akermann, it was presented not for the Porte to discuss, but for it to "approve and accept."

Every form of international courtesy was violated; individuals who were suspected of encouraging the opposition, were privately menaced in the name of the Emperor, who "knew nothing of the transaction, and received a copy of the deed as a piece of news;" so that the Ottoman Ministers desisted from an opposition which they saw, without benefit to their country, might bring ruin on the individual opposers.

But this Treaty, which interested in no ways England or France, was thought of so much importance to Russia, that Count Orloff gave the Turkish Government clearly to understand that its signature was the condition of the departure of the Russian troops.

arrived, after every thing had been terminated, to supersede then Mr. Boutenieff as Ambassador, General Mouravieff, as commander of the corps of occupation, while he was invested with the supreme military authority of the southern provinces of Russia.

These immense powers, considering the moment of his arrival, it was needless to parade; especially as in his camp style he repeated, in all the saloons of Therapia and Bouyoukdère, that he had arrived "comme la moutarde après dîner." Yet so impatient did he show himself of a moment's delay, even after learning at Odessa the termination of the circumstances that were the pretext of his journey, that, a few hours having been lost on the passage by some miscalculation, he inflicted, with his own hand, severe corporal punishment on the captain of the frigate!

A powerful inducement was also added; that of the six millions of ducats remaining due, one half should be remitted; and perhaps the Emperor, gratified by their reliance on him, might remit the whole sum. We will not weaken the effect of such a transaction, of such assertions, and such deeds, by a single syllable of comment.

Seeing, by what has been said in various places respecting this Treaty, that its nature is not understood, we will state the principal points which Russia has gained, and which made it so important an object.

She is now legitimate protector of the Sultan; and the contingency again arising, a contingency which at any hour she can bring about, an appeal to any other power becomes an infraction of stipulations. Turkey has learnt, to her cost, the penalty of every real or pretended cause of reclamation. She has been taught the necessity of "the absence of every motive of discussion." The fact of protection, which degrades the Sultan in the eyes of his people, is rendered notorious by the solemnity of a Treaty.

The Emperor assumes, in the eyes of Europe, the character of Protector. Having reckoned on remonstrance and demonstration, which, as he prejudged, would remain without real effect, he got over a very great obstacle by the apparent hazard of the position he assumed, and has maintained. The gauntlet thrown down by France and England, and then withdrawn without any

concession or any reparation being obtained, gave him a diplomatic victory worth more than many bought by fields of blood, and brought conviction to the Turkish Government, that there was no succour available for it, and that its actual state could only be prolonged by fostering the forbearance which the character of Protector imposed on "the Emperor."

If, contrary to the expectations which Russia, judging by the past, was fully justified in forming, this treaty should cause England and France to awake from their indifference, and arrest her progress, then, indeed, she will have committed a dreadful fault—the first fault she has been guilty of. This, events will alone decide. If not, then is this the last treaty that can be made between Russia and Turkey; it is the last indication of their separate existence\*.

Since that Treaty, the discussion and decision of all questions arising between the two courts, is carried to St. Petersburg.

But this subserviency of the Porte is only useful to Russia, as it enables her to overcome prac-

\* This Treaty was the prize of the daring descent of 9,000 Russians on the shores of the Bosphorus—the noblest stride ever made by ambition, if commanding talents and wonderful success can ennoble the blighting trophies, and the brutalising sway of Russia! Lord Ponsonby forewarned the Porte of the imposition of such a treaty before the departure of the squadron, showing that the projects of Russia are very intelligible, when her position is understood.



tical difficulties—as it enables her to disgust the population of Turkey, by misgovernment—as it puts at her disposal places, the natural strength of which had baffled or repulsed her in war; but above all, as its stipulations, and the intercourse and intimacy consequent on it, confer rights on her in the eyes of Europe. To maintain the semblance of this intimacy, the ultimate settlement of the loan was deferred at the period of the signature of the Treaty of the 8th July. An ambassador was to repair to St. Petersburg, to have recourse to the generosity of the Emperor in the definitive arrangements of that obligation, which has entrenched, besides all its other consequences, several thousand Russian bayonets, permanently, in the midst of the Ottoman dominions.

The ambassador selected had been the principal agent in obtaining the Sultan's application for succour. His intimate councillor was the Greek intermediary in that transaction between the Russian legation and the seraglio. Two secretaries, one a Turk, one a Greek, were selected with equal care. The mission was, in fact, nominated by Russia.

The ambassador, though he owed his nomination to Russia, was still a Turk: neither was he devoted to Russia, nor had he sold his country. He attempted to speak of her rights; he was silenced with "it is the Emperor's will." He had no alternative between submission or de-

manding his passports\*. The conviction on the minds of the Envoys of France and England at St. Petersburg, which we have above alluded to, deprived him of even the slightest degree of countenance; he therefore did submit, and the arrangements were adopted as it pleased the Emperor to command.

The Provinces were nominally restored to the Porte; while Russia, of course, so disposed of them, that she controlled them as effectually as if formally governed by her; she possessed a fortress *beyond* them, and had military roads open through them from every point of her territory, centering in this fortress; and the Emperor united to this military occupation, to the preparation of large depôts of provisions, the right of proclaiming his

\* The embassy of Achmet Pacha coincided with the first naval demonstration of England in the Levant. We have grounds for stating, that such was the alarm of Russia, that England might by a word have obtained the evacuation of Silistria, and almost any conditions she chose to exact in favour of Turkey. As England had neither convictions nor plan, the individual minister is not to be censured for the neglect of so splendid an occasion as this; but it was peculiarly unfortunate that that precise moment should have been taken for informing Russia that England's demonstration meant nothing at all; and that also, precisely at the same moment, a marshal should arrive as ambassador from France, to express the satisfaction of his government at the moderation of the Emperor! These things may appear incredible and incomprehensible—so they appeared to the Turkish government, which, having felt the difference of its own position before and after these amicable explanations, could only suppose us leagued with Russia.

moderation and disinterestedness, as of old, to his indulgent European allies.

But the occupation of Silistria being contingent on the non-payment of the debt, a loan or pecuniary succour from other powers, or a revolution in Turkey, by opening the treasures of the Sultan, could emancipate the Ottoman soil. The provinces had been, by the above-stated arrangement, withdrawn from the chances of such a contingency; Silistria was, therefore, ceded for eight years, without *possibility* of redemption\*. This term, of course, being deemed sufficient, in every case, for the full realisation of Russia's designs†. But this arrangement was again put forward as an act of moderation and disinterestedness on the part of the Emperor. His ever-indulgent allies consoled themselves with the Emperor's considerate extension of the term of payment for the space of eight years!

The yearly instalment is to be paid, not in ducats, but in the Turkish coin; not at its ex-

\* This may be denied, we know, by the astonishing vagueness left in the wording of the Treaty. If Russia objects to our conclusion, it will be for those to believe whom she can persuade.

† Even then, should the whole sum be paid, restoration is not to be made, unless all the stipulations in the Treaty of Adrianople, that impose charges on Turkey, have been scrupulously fulfilled. We have spoken of quasi monopolies introduced in reality by her agency: are these not violations of the Treaty of Adrianople? may they not some day be made useful and apt pretexts?

changeable rate for ducats at the period of effecting the payment, but at thirty-two piastres the ducat: the depreciation since the first payments subsequent to the Treaty of Adrianople, has raised the exchange to forty-five piastres to the ducat, it may rise to one hundred to the ducat, yet the Emperor formally binds himself to accept always thirty-two piastres for the ducat of the day, as the full value of the ducat. Thus is a powerful motive held out for the depreciation of the coinage, while the allies of the Emperor will exclaim, What generosity!

A strong and mountainous district in Lazistan and Adjarra, on the Asiatic frontier, had baffled the attempts of Russia during the last war. A tract of this country is annexed to Russia, as far as the signature of Achmet Pacha to the convention could annex it; that is, Russia arrogates to herself the right of attacking and subduing, in peace, a district that had resisted her arms in war; a district to which internal events had given new and immense importance. She has thus a footing in the mountains of Lazistan and Armenistan, and the means of extending, far and near, her demoralising influence.

This cession required the sanction of some pretext; it was found in the "compensations en nature," which the treaty of Adrianople admitted in reduction of the debt. The Treaty of the 8th of July had been signed on condition implied most certainly of the remission of three millions of the

debt. The cession of this Asiatic district is purchased by the remission of two of those three millions already remitted; the remission of the third million being cancelled. This is the only way that the expression to the Emperor can be understood, "all, or nothing:" unless all I demand is granted, the cession of the two millions is cancelled. But here again Russia's most indulgent allies find proofs of the moderation of the Emperor.

To crown the marvellousness of this strange and eventful history, these instances of the Emperor's moderation are published in time to calm the alarms and silence the protestations of England and France, excited by the treaty of protection. The formal announcement of their satisfaction follows unequivocal marks of distrust, and the fleets, after a demonstration so useful to Russia\*, are recalled to Toulon and Malta. The diplomatic triumph of Russia is thus proclaimed by themselves—she is relieved from all dread of retribution for the past—her acquisitions all legalised—her claims to moderation allowed—the indulgence of her allies secured. What must not the vitality of Turkey be, still to exist!

If these things are so (and who is there can gainsay them?) it becomes imperative on the

\* One consequence of this demonstration was the opening of the ears of Mehemet Ali to her suggestions, and the extension of her influence beyond the Mediterranean, and to the shores of the Indian ocean.

cabinets of St. James and Paris, to take measures to restore the independence to this Empire, which, unwillingly, they have combined with its enemy to undermine. This obligation is imposed upon them as members of the European community by the approaching annihilation of another of their compeers. It is imposed upon them by the necessity of maintaining the consideration due to themselves—the first element of political power and influence. These are motives, which, if originating in similar relations with the most insignificant state of Europe would be imperative, and which are totally independent of the immense and general interests implicated in the disposal of Turkey, and in the possession of the Dardanelles.

But it may be said, there is no necessity of proving that the independence of Turkey is lost, since the fact is admitted. Why then are not measures taken to restore its independence? merely because it is *not* known *how* that independence has been lost. It is *not* known how the plans of Russia might have been disconcerted. It is *not* known how easily Turkey may at this moment be restored. It is *not* known what will be the consequences of her subjugation.

It was not by the circumstances declared by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, that Turkey lost her independence. The first Minister of the Crown of England declared that, subsequently to the Treaty of Adrianople, it was vain to speak of the

independence of Turkey; was it not equally so on the Convention of Akermann? Was it not so since the Greek revolution gave Russia the means of isolating Turkey from Europe, and the liberty to speak and to act as the advocate and avenger of a cause she was allowed to declare, without being contradicted by word or deed, common to all Christendom and to all Europe?

But formerly the complications of the Greek question—the obstinacy of the Porte—its animosity of old date exasperated by the ability of Russia—its resistance to all counsel, all support, and the intimate connection between France and Russia, rendered Russia's game comparatively easy. These difficulties have entirely disappeared. The Greek question is terminated. The Turkish nation claims our protection: France must necessarily follow the impulse we may be inclined to give; Russia has unmasked herself—she has united the universal feelings of Turkey against her. The independence of Turkey is, therefore, an object far easier to realise than it was before the Treaty of Adrianople, before the Convention of Akermann, or the Treaty of Bucharest.

To these facilities must be added a most important consideration, without which these changes would be productive of no amelioration of our position,—the prudence, the ability that has characterised of late our immediate diplomatic relations with the Porte. The growing confidence of

the Turkish Government a single fault might have destroyed. We possess, at this moment, the government and the people. Another advantage scarcely less important, is the perfect harmony and unity of conviction and intention between the French and English embassies at Constantinople\*.

These are favourable chances, nay, certainties, which we had no right to expect ; and if we do not seize the forelock presented to us by fortune, we shall have no reason to complain, if she flies to where more vigour is to be found, to force her favours.

\* This last advantage has passed away. The French representative must of necessity receive the inspiration of his master, and our position becoming worse and worse every day. Had any circumstances at home caused the recall of the present representative of England, we should conceive that Russia had effected all that it was possible to effect, and that her game from that moment was certain. Yet Lord Ponsonby's removal was in the ordinary course of events, and would have been considered in this country a matter of little importance.



## CHAPTER IV.

*Elements of Turkish Power unchanged.—Facility of Government.—Internal Reform.—Progress of Opinion.—Character of Janissaries.—Subversion of Dèrè Beys.*

BUT although the life of the supreme authority is in Turkey fast ebbing away, there is yet vitality, sensibility, and energy, latent in the mass. The weakness of the government at this very moment, proceeds first from ignorance, which includes at once all causes of decay, and all chances of restoration ; and secondly, from the anti-national position it has assumed. It loses the affections and support of the nation, it loses its strength, by its fancied necessity of reliance on Russian protection.

No change whatever has taken place in the principles and habits of government in Turkey, since its days of conquest ; its people are yet brave and docile, political factions are unknown, and domestic morality is not less now than ever their universal characteristic. The actual prostration of Turkey is not the ultimate period of a progression of gradual decay ; she has already sunk as low, or

lower than at present, and has risen rapidly, instantaneously, again, when she was, as now, apparently at her last gasp. Under Solyman II., Greece and Dalmatia were occupied by the Venetians; Hungary, Servia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, by the Austrians; Transylvania, Wallachia, and Moldavia, by the Poles; a rebel chief overran Anatoly, and even ventured to the walls of Scutari; and another rebel in Europe contested with the Sultan its remaining provinces; add to this the refusal of the Mussulmans to enlist, the insubordination of the Janisaries, and a treasury so exhausted, as not to furnish means to hire horses for the removal of the Sultan's household from his capital\*. Yet Kiu-pruly-Mustapha had not been a year Visir, when the star and crescent brightened again over Belgrade, and the horse-tails were re-planted on the banks of the Theisse. Nor was this wonderful revolution in strength and feeling of the empire brought about by the reform of a single law, the imposition or change of a single tax, but merely by

\* The discovery of an extensive conspiracy, forced the Sultan to fly to Adrianople. The Imperial stables did not contain a sufficient number of beasts of burthen. He ordered them to be hired, but money for the purpose was not found in the treasury. He sent a portion of his jewels to be disposed of at the public auction. This confession of penury, which would have instantly paralysed or overthrown the most powerful government of Europe, saved that of Turkey, and instantaneously calmed the sedition.

an exact observance of the simple and fundamental institutions of the empire.

There was wanting in the superior administration a permanent check, to prevent the executive from overstepping the narrow limits to which its authority was confined, an authority rather judiciary than administrative, never interfering with an immutable and sacred code, which defined the leading features of the administration, the detail being filled up by not less revered local customs. Its power was despotic, but it lay unexerted until appealed to; and its force, though really insignificant, appeared overwhelming, because there was required no permanent expenditure of energy to repress systematic resistance, to enforce sequences of oppressive regulations, to maintain complications of innumerable laws\*. The executive did, therefore, overstep these limits. The very facilities of governing, gave free scope to injustice. The government lost its strength in the violent exercise of its power, and the anarchy of the capital reproduced itself in the provinces. But the evil was anarchy—it was abuse—it was crime—

\* “ We must admit, as the particular character of this government, a confidence based on the force of principle, not on the principle of force; and besides this, the design and will of yielding the greatest possible facilities to all individual relations, without fatiguing or embarrassing them by the incessant action of the authority of the government.”—*Moniteur Ottoman*, Sept. 2, 1834. Which see for an admirable article on the Police of Constantinople.

no where system. The Janissaries, a check on the individual who was Sultan, were the organ of these abuses. A revolution came; it was one of regeneration, but for the time it convulsed every portion, unnerved every arm in the Ottoman empire. At the same moment, an important province was in a state of revolt; and, as a consequence of that revolt, and of the use made of it by Russia, Turkey was in a state of hostility with the whole world. In the midst of these events, Russia declares war, and invades the Ottoman dominions *at both extremities*. The time was chosen with double perfidy; when the cabinets, who must have opposed her progress, were forcedly her allies; when the Mussulman nation was disheartened and disarmed. The unfortunate issue of that war does not therefore prove that Turkey is unable to resist such means as Russia has been able to employ against her; it proves merely that Russia did succeed, at a moment when Turkey was in a state of internal dissolution and of political excommunication. The difficulty which attended that success, and the fortuitous nature of the chances that caused the Turks to submit to the Treaty of Adrianople, instead of Russia's submitting to the Treaty brought by Muffling, sufficiently proves, that the decay of the strength of Turkey is not in her people, or her means, but in her government; and that it requires but the apparition of a second Mustapha-

Kiupruly to restore this empire to its independence and vigour; and now that the barriers of prejudice and fanaticism have been thrown down, to prospects of greater well-being than ever blessed her days of splendour.

Notwithstanding the weakness that has resulted, partly from the incapacity with which circumstances have been handled, but much more from the threatening attitude of foreign policy, and the all but fatal wounds which Russia has been permitted and assisted to inflict, the nation itself has made within ten years a progress in opinion and public education, such as no other people of Europe has made in a century; and it has thrown off, within that space of time, more prejudice and fanaticism than have been got rid of in Europe, by the most advanced countries, in as many centuries. This is accounted for by the principle we have already pointed out, that the abuses lay in the executive, not in the institutions. There were no classes of men existing by privileges for them which were exclusions to the rest; there were neither manufacturing, nor commercial, nor agricultural combinations; there were neither bodies of custom-house officers, nor tax-gatherers to put in daily familiar opposition people and government; there was no aristocratic privilege deeply rooted in the body, no democratic antipathies convulsing its mass; no opposition of interests, creating still more perplexing discord of opinion; while the

utmost freedom was allowed to local dispositions, to internal circulation, the revenue was drawn from that surplus portion of the agricultural profits which with us becomes rent, so that, compared with us, the country might be called untaxed : consequently markets and prices, left entirely to their self-adjustment, conciliated to the government, in its worst days, notwithstanding superficial violence and abuse, an under-current, deep and noiseless, of contentment, which has kept afloat, and borne along the vessel of the State through agitation which, to our eyes, offered no chance of salvation.

) It is the policy of Europe which has suffered the arms, the treaties, the protection, the gold, the counsel of Russia, to reduce Turkey to the state in which it is. It is the policy of England which alone can save her. It is, therefore, no trivial or idle investigation that we have undertaken, since it is her political elements that we have to embody into a new political instrument ; since it is by organising Turkey, that we prevent war or ensure success.

The destruction of the Janissaries has effected a change in the constitution of power, which, notwithstanding the discussion to which it has given rise, has not been analysed with the care that the deepness of our stake in the welfare of Turkey requires.

This body, was, as Voltaire remarks, the States General of Turkey. They brought to the surface,

and spread over the whole, the worst feelings and prejudices of their race; but they maintained a state of unchangeableness, the memory of which is becoming respectable by the errors that have followed the faculty of change. In saying this, we do not, for an instant, admit the doctrines of those who, in this country, attribute to the destruction of the Janissaries the ruin of the empire. They have been judged in Turkey; foreign invasion, domestic revolt, have, since their destruction, convulsed that empire. Yet what invader, what rebel, has dreamt of rallying the remnants of that corps, or of raising as a symbol, the polluted sleeve of Hadjee Beckettash? But the Sultan, supported by opinion, in the abolishment of that which really was Janissary, has been emboldened to attack that which really was Turkish.

The Janissaries were an oligarchy—military, not administrative; they squandered the military resources of the empire,—but interfered not with its political administration. They drained the treasure—but, as farmers of revenue, they did not multiply modes for replenishing it. They were an aristocracy—not of producers, to create and maintain privileges for certain interests—but of consumers, whose interests were inseparably bound with freedom of markets and exchange, and lowness of price. They were representatives of a dominant class, which, confident in its supremacy, stickled for no prerogatives that interfered with

the internal customs and institutions of the others. In fine, they were a body of Mussulmans,—not a conclave of churchmen. Though they might individually despise or maltreat a Ghiaour, they meddled not with the creeds or church governments of other persuasions, nor suffered them to be meddled with.

Here, then, we must separate the Janissary from the Turkish principles, in this controlling body. The first are, violence, corruption, and prostration of all military resources and strength; exhaustion of the treasury, resistance to all, and therefore to beneficial changes; haughty contempt for their fellow subjects possessing a different creed, and the propagation and perpetuation of fanaticism among their own.

These things have disappeared; but in consequence of the change, the Turkish principles, which lost in them an organ and support, have been left at the mercy of one man's caprice; and these are—non-intervention in the collection of the revenue—unrestricted, unburthened freedom of markets and exchange—impossibility of illegal taxation on the part of the Sultan—inviolability of local customs—appropriation of charitable and other funds—succession of property—decision of voluntarily-elected judges—of church-administration in spiritual matters, and in several important civil functions immediately vested in the elected dignitaries of the various persuasions.



These principles have been the Good Gods of Turkey, revered even by the most fanatic of her sons, preserved in the midst of the most convulsed and troubled times.

Selim, an European essayist, falsely termed a Turkish reformer, failed through his apostacy. Before he attacked the obnoxious body, he arbitrarily imposed new taxes—a violation of prescriptive right—a violation of a mixed religious and administrative creed.

These taxes, too, were of the most obnoxious kind, for they rendered exchange difficult, and raised prices; they rallied public interest and public opinions on the side of the Janissaries, and he fell a victim to the well-intended attempt of imitating Europe.

Not more a Turk, but less an European than his cousin, Mahmoud, by the progress of opinion and by a happier combination, overthrew this body; nor did he commence imitating Selim until he had deprived public interests of their representation, and public opinion of its voice.

The total destruction of the Janissaries and Dèrè Beys, who might be compared to what the Indian Zemindars would be with a weak central government, are memorable efforts of self-regeneration, which, *if Turkey be preserved*, will immortalise the reign of Mahmoud, and render it one of the most important in the history of mankind. But our immediate object, at present,

is to point out the subsequent errors and misfortunes which actually o'ercloud the political horizon of Turkey—compromise its existence, alarm its friends, and deter them from giving it that support which would instantaneously combine and utilise its latent energies. We had, at first, intended confining ourselves exclusively to the political question, but, on closer investigation, the conviction grows upon us of the importance of determining, in a more definite manner than has yet been attempted, the means by which the internal strength and confidence of this prostrate, but not feeble, empire can be restored, the causes of its depression, and the dangers to which it is exposed.

Accustomed for centuries to misconduct and misdeeds on the part of the local authorities, against which resistance was always in the end approved of by the central government, great abuses may exist, great discontent may be engendered, without these abuses being attributed to, or that discontent directed against, the supreme authority. The chief of the state has, in like manner, remained the object of universal respect and awe, from the great facility of removal that has hitherto characterised the action of this government\*. The revolution that has lately been

\* Suleyman established the gratification to the Janissaries on the accession of each new Sultan, with the express and

effected, has annihilated the power of the local Zemindars, of petty aristocracies, of delegated governors; so that if any abuse exists, if any crime remains unpunished, the fault has to be laid solely at the door of the government, which is now omnipotent for good; and the Sultan, instead of being the insignificant individual that discharges high but circumscribed functions, becomes an individual possessing the sole authority in the state. Under such altered circumstances, the attachment for, and confidence in, the principles of the administration—the awe for the office of the Sultan—the real, the only bonds of this empire—bonds, loose indeed, but tough, elastic, and hitherto unsevered, lose—not as yet their strength, but their principle of adhesion.

We say principle of adhesion, because of the obliged simplicity of the administration, and the obliged submissiveness of the chief of the empire, to a code so simple and so appropriate, that submission to its dictates was the religion of the state. The Sultan is actually the most powerful sovereign in the world, the prescriptive habits of submission remain; the checks which by controlling the Sultan's passions and caprice, created those habits of submission, are swept away.—If therefore, the Sultan could be brought justly to appreciate his own position, the merits of his nation, and the

recorded intention of facilitating the deposition of any Sultan who should forfeit public esteem.

faults of his government, he could, by a mere declaration of his enlightened will, effect such a revolution in the fortunes of Turkey as no empire has ever undergone. In fact, the destruction of the Janissaries leaves Turkey, politically, in the state in which she was, with precisely the same extent of territory, as under Suleyman the Magnificent, excepting foreign influence over her councils.

All arts—all means—that gold or ingenuity can compass, have been employed for this, the first object of Russia's endeavours, to turn to her account the personal dispositions of the Sultan, to enlist in her service—his virtues—his weaknesses, and above all his ignorance. She has reaped a large harvest of errors—she has sown an after-crop of disaffection. But the feelings of ages are not to be annihilated in one day; they will be exposed to violent fluctuations; and that habitual respect will long cling to its ancient predilections, in spite of the abuses which have now entered, more or less, into the system itself; in spite of the substitution of the will of the Sultan for the immutable, the sacred code of the Mussulman, and the unfortunate coincidence of his power over Turkey, and his subserviency to Russia. The proofs of its long forbearance are palpable, notwithstanding the series of political and diplomatic faults that have filled, without intermission, the last years—the Sultan is yet Sultan—the empire has no pretender—not an idea exists of a change of form of government.—In those districts and provinces that have been

detached from Turkey, unequivocal signs declare the desire of being restored to it; and emigrants and refugees, who have been tempted or terrified into seeking refuge in neighbouring states, sacrifice their new possessions to escape back to it. The fact is, that even under the Janissaries, although all great combinations of industry, science, or capital, were arrested; yet, in no country on the face of the earth did man enjoy such domestic, village, religious, and commercial liberty.

Now the Turkish government, unlike that of Egypt, has not the physical means of depriving its subjects of these advantages. A degree of political independence has been generated, even in the midst of these unfortunate convulsions; and new hopes and feelings are spread abroad, which every day render this people more difficult to govern ill.

Travellers declare, that there is a strong party against the Sultan; that is, they draw European conclusions, from facts observed in a state of society that has no parallel in Europe. The Sultan, as a sovereign of Europe, is not supported by one class of partisans against a class, or classes, of adversaries. The struggle is not between the opinions of different men, but between the opposing feelings and opinions in each man's breast. None curiously and complacently look for faults and errors which may support their party, or supply food to demagogue ambition; all regret the faults the penalty of which is borne equally by all. In

the distant provinces, they still even seek to lay those faults, as formerly, on subordinates, or on circumstances; and cling to their allegiance and loyalty with astonishing perseverance. The dissatisfaction is not that of a party, not even that of a nation; it is, or rather has been, that of a family, mingled with affection, and therefore rendered more violent in its expression, but long enduring, and with returns of charity, repudiating the means that present themselves as a last resort; and if patience is pushed beyond endurance now, under new and alarming circumstances, the effect will be, not only the destruction of political existence, but the destruction of many of the moral feelings that render them estimable as men.

This state of things has placed this nation in complete dependence on foreign policy; their centre of action, of direction, of opinion, has been cast without the sphere of their own interests and habits. The connection of the Sultan with Russia has forced on all the disheartening conviction—that they are in opposition with *him*; and as they have no means of controlling him, every cause of complaint is exaggerated—it is laid on his shoulders. Hatred to Russia has become a common centre, a common bond; it may be made by us a bond of conservation, of regeneration; but in the anti-national position which the government has assumed, it is a union big with the spirit of destruction.

This crisis is now matured at Constantinople, at least by the consequences of the revolt in Syria, against Mehemet Ali. Universal attention has been directed to the exhibitions that have been made—of the inefficiency of the army and the fleet, notwithstanding the docility of the men, and the excellence of the material—of their absolute dependence on foreign powers—and their consequent political prostration. The profound humiliation, thence resulting, is deepened by the connection with Russia, and the leaning of the Ottoman Emperor, and the Mussulman Caliph, on the Muscovites for support. The odium of all these measures is thus concentrated in one point—it is directed against the Sultan; because this connection is repudiated even by the administration. This remarkable expression, which sums up all we have been endeavouring to explain, was lately used to an Englishman, by one of the chief of the district in Asia, exacted by the Emperor from Achmet Pacha. “We would shed the last drop of our blood in defence of our Sultan; but why is he such a friend to the Russians? We see that he never will be worthy of the affection we all bear him, till he is guided by the counsel of England.”

It is a singular, but natural coincidence, that hatred for the Russians should have led to the disappearance of prejudices against other Christians; as their hopes, from one extremity of the empire

to the other, are now turned to us. In the capital, in the meanest village, in the centre of communications, on the furthest frontiers, a feeling of vague but intense expectation, is spread, which claims at our hands internal re-organisation, and external independence.

Its disappointment will paralyse every remaining faculty of resistance.

Unless anticipated by visible intervention on the part of England, which will relieve them from the permanent menace of the occupation of the capital, and which will impose on the government the necessity of a change of measures, a catastrophe is inevitable.

The habitual forms of combination and resistance have been swept away. There is no regular vent, by which fermentation can relieve itself; there is no regular index of its intensity. The hour, the day, the month, when the explosion will take place, no man may be able to predict; but that it will come, unless anticipated by some power or other, is a certainty to which, like death, every hour, and every change, and every effort, brings us nearer\*.

But it must be the intention of Russia to an-

\* This was written at Constantinople, immediately after the insurrection in Syria, and in the midst of the foreign and domestic agitation that followed that event. At such a moment only can be conceived the convulsions that can suddenly spring up in the midst of apparent tranquillity and repose.



anticipate an internal convulsion, in the midst of which, hatred to her would rise the ruling spirit. Anarchy annihilates the possibility of resistance, and increases the difficulties of English and French intervention; advantages naturally immense for her, but what are they, compared to full and quiet inheritance? She must also put to profit, ere it is too late, the actual subserviency of the Austrian cabinet\*. She must preserve the chains she has rivetted with such care—she must anticipate the alarms of Europe, up to this hour so wonderfully lulled—she must exclude all European powers from the partition—she must preserve the Sultan's name, and the existing forms and habits of administration. She assumes her position on this foundation, she quells resistance by the fact of her presence and possession, she calms animosities by measures of momentary conciliation, without sacrificing one iota of the authority she acquires in the absolute control of the naval and military means, the occupation of strong places, the command of the coasts, of the police, of the communications, the roads, the markets, and the commerce of the whole country—while, by balancing against each other the various distinct populations, and the hostile creeds, she will stand erect on their prostration,

\* If the Austrian cabinet is escaping from her, she has got another more powerful co-operator in the French cabinet, now manfully labouring under the banner of Mehemet Ali.

and strong in their disunion. Environed with the splendor of bloodless conquest, and the semblance of unlimited power,—to her people she will appear endowed with preternatural fortune ;—to Turkey, the supreme arbiter, not of her destinies alone, but of the destinies of mankind. She will, in fact, by the consequences of her conquest, dispose of the resources of 100,000,000 nominally independent Europeans, and present to the remainder, to France and England, an invulnerable body, and a menacing front.

The preparatives of enormous magnitude, now in progress, notwithstanding the misfortunes of the seasons—the increasing establishment of her army—the doubling or tripling of her fleet in the Black Sea—the vast expenditure for fortifications in her southern and eastern regions, where certainly no attack can be feared—the haste with which these operations are conducted—show not the designs of Russia, but the shortness of the period that may still be allowed us for anticipating an event that will mark the climax of the greatness of England.

## CHAPTER V.

*Comparison of Poland and Turkey.—Poland easily subdued.—Turkey, once subdued, easily held in subjection.—No other power will share in the dismemberment of Turkey.—Impossibility of confederation in Turkey.—Its unity is its strength.—Toleration of Islamism.*

THE history of Poland becomes at this moment a lesson most impressive and instructive. Every circumstance connected with its subjugation is an indication of the procedure, of a system then organised and acted upon, and since deeply pondered upon and improved. For at least sixty years the possession of Turkey has been an immediate object for Russia; it has occupied the earnest attention of each successive sovereign and minister. No expense has been spared in collecting and digesting the necessary information; and opportunities have offered, not only for putting in practice the plans that have been formed on Turkey itself, but of trying their efficacy on other states.

The Mussulmans are a numerous and warlike people, with unity of feeling and hatred to Russia; they inhabit a strong and mountainous country. These are difficulties immensely greater than any presented by Poland.

Poland was a champaign country; the race cognate to that of Russia; the language a dialect of the Russian. Religious persecutions, animosities, and even war, distracted the state. The anarchical aristocracy rendered the executive powerless, while it reflected on the mass of the nation the most abject serfage, affording but the form of a constitution, which, without giving any union to the body, destroyed the independence of the separate parts; affording but the name of justice and of law, which was no control to the powerful, no protection to the weak.

This government was merely suffered to exist by the jealousy of the surrounding powers, and the temptations it offered to them all, not only of influence and interference, but also of military occupation and elective sovereignty; for its territories might be called a great chase, or common, open to the troops of Russia, Austria, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, and Saxony—its crown an object of competition among the younger branches of all the royal houses of Europe, or, like Courland, for the paramours of the Empreses of Russia. But so far had Russia succeeded in overreaching her competitors in the acquisition of internal influence, that a partition was no ways to her liking; as she had acquired an authority which was equal to possession, and that authority was maintained by a physical force of only 10,000 men. Austria and Prussia only obtained a partition, and a share, by

the menace of a league with Turkey; yet the Poles were one of the most warlike nations of Europe, and most enthusiastically attached to their independence. There was, therefore, no difficulty in taking possession of Poland; but there was some difficulty in keeping it. There was the diet, which, forced to unite by the foreign pressure, might arouse itself, as it did, to some transient patriotic effort—there were the nobles, who retained the right and facility of assembling bodies of armed retainers—there were the serfs, reckless, because deprived of property and protection. The very sources of weakness, while the government retained the show of independence, became sources of resistance, under a foreign administration; resistance which, after forty years of foreign dominion, the sword alone has been capable of extirpating.

But in Turkey, the weakness of the government does not arise from discord and faction, which may subsequently furnish means of resistance. Under all oriental administrations, are markable, and to us unaccountable, facility of governing, has been established, by numerous facts in our own times, and by the entire history of the past. The reason of this is, that man, under those systems, is attached to his soil by the indissoluble chain of property; to his village, by the not less powerful bonds of moral and financial obligation. There is no political organisation

of any kind to excite and direct resistance; when the capital is lost, all idea of resistance vanishes. War is looked upon by all as the greatest of calamities, because it brings all its penalties in its immediate train. There are no loans, to conciliate the support of capitalists, to encourage warlike feelings, and throw the burthen of war on future generations. There are no contracts to be made, no shipping to be taken up, no impulse given to production, activity to commerce, increase to wages; no career of honours and distinctions opened to the directing portions of society; none of all these separate and unperceived causes which form in Europe public opinion to war, and disguise its effects. There, war is accompanied by levies of men, by the exaction of contributions, by the spoliation of harvests and property, and by forced labour. Hence an innate aversion to war—hence a submission to the appearance of strength, in no ways analogous to the personal courage, or the numbers, of the population. When a people, under such a system, lose confidence in their own government, and have not the means, do not see the way, of correcting it, they can only await the chances its own weakness may bring.

But the geographical position of Constantinople, independently of the political position of the government, gives to Russia the means of occupying the capital at once, and therefore of turning the barrier

of public hatred, which now would render a hostile invasion impossible, with perhaps twice the military means at her disposal. In the last war, notwithstanding all the difficulties she encountered, and the losses she incurred, she was invited by almost every class of the population—Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, and Turks. In Asia she was called in, and assisted by the Dèrè Beys. These facilities exist no longer; and to that very war, and its consequences, are to be attributed the necessity of amelioration, and the hatred of all classes to Russia. The first giving them an additional motive to defend their soil; the second, union among themselves, and confidence in us.

Here, then, are remarkable contrasts between the facilities of occupying Turkey and Poland.

(In Turkey, there are no religious wars, to call in a moderator; but there are separations of sects, which preclude combination against a possessor.

There are no struggles of political principles, to call in an arbiter; but there is absence of all political principle and organisation, to resist a possessor. There is no turbulent diet, to paralyse the best measures of defence; but there is a government, so weak as not to be able to defend its empire, and therefore weak enough to become the subservient instrument of its military occupier.

There are no reckless serfs, to be restrained by physical force; but there is a nation of small proprietors, whose social habits and domestic virtues

make it their first interest to preserve order and tranquillity.

In Poland, there was a class powerfully rich, and a mass wretchedly poor—extremes which touch revolution on both sides. In Turkey, there is neither great wealth, nor pauperism; but a middle state, too weak to unite from ambition, too well off to coalesce from desperation.

In Poland, these general principles produced individual revolutionary dispositions, ever ready to discover, or even suppose, causes of discontent. In Turkey, the contrary principle produces a docility in the dispositions of each individual, that inclines them not only to submit to wrongs, but to overlook them.

In Poland, every man was a Pole—was actuated by the feelings of a Pole, rallied by the cry of country—belonged to Poland. In Turkey, there is no watchword, no country—every man belongs to his village.

The abuses of Turkey interest no class in their defence; they proceed merely from the faulty administration, and offer the occupying or protecting power means of conciliating universal confidence, by correcting them.

Turkey is not an inland country, but a maritime country—not only accessible by water, but bisected by the sea; its capital cleft into three parts by the sea, its communications intercepted by the sea; and this sea not only commanded by the occupy-



ing power, but as exclusively her's as if it were an inland lake.

The destruction of the Janissaries and Dèrè Beys swept away all internal combination against the power of the Sultan. How immensely has it not then facilitated the quiet possession of the empire by the protector of the Sultan. Had they not been destroyed, Turkey would not have the union of material means, which to-day render a hostile attack on the part of Russia impossible\*, but she would have had the will, the thought of resistance, which has now vanished. Her provinces would have been open to the Russians, her Rayas their partisans; but 8000 Russians would never have encamped on the Bosphorus; and even had she fallen, the Janissaries would have remained a national body, and a centre of resistance; and the Dèrè Beys, like the Polish nobles, would have rallied the bolder spirits under their banners, or even maintained a wild and mountain independ-

\* Even in the last war, although Turkey brought into the field only raw boys, formed into battalions as they were sent into the field, two battalions only having been enrolled a year, and in all 30,000 of so called regulars, without a staff, without officers, yet the result of the campaign of 1828 was exceedingly favourable to the Turks. The campaign of 1829 was only not so because the general did not obey his orders, and because Diebitch pushed across the Balkans. European diplomacy alone crowned his temerity with success. Turkey, with all her faults, had she not been deprived of her fleet, must have been successful.

ence. Their destruction offers to Russia far greater hopes, but renders those hopes precarious; for formerly Turkey was insulated from Europe by the fanaticism entertained by these bodies. While their disappearance exposes to her attacks, to her protection, the government and the capital,—it allows, it forces the whole nation to receive, to invoke from England moral courage, and political support and direction.

Strange and wonderful combination, without precedent in former events, without parallel in its immense consequences! This hitherto haughty and intractable people of Mussulmans has been brought to implore the tutelage of a Christian power. An empire which, in extent, in resources, in population, in position, and in individual qualities and courage—in all, in fact, save instruction—

Valentini makes a confession, of no little importance, that the veteran generals were reminded, by the young Turkish troops, of the French at the commencement of the war of the revolution:—"Tels que les Français d'alors combattèrent leurs adversaires sans connaissance, et sans exercice, tels nous avons vu aujourd'hui les Osmanlis faire leur *premiers essais, sous les mêmes auspices*. Des coups décisifs étoufferont toujours des forces naissantes, qui par une guerre lente et méthodique *se seraient élevées à une puissance formidable*."—*Guerre contre les Turcs*, page 229.

His impartiality may be judged of by the following avowal, which proves, moreover, the truth of the above statement;—"Si nous trouvons ici toujours 300 hommes engagés contre 3000, et avoir le dessous, on n'y verra rien que de très naturel et rien de déshonorant."—Page 248.

is one of the greatest on the face of the globe, is brought to look with ardent expectation for the arrival of a foreign squadron, and a body of auxiliaries in its capital; and to expect, from their presence, the contrary of what they have experienced from Russia—reformation of internal abuses, and restoration of their independence!

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE DEFENCE OF TURKEY MUST PRECEDE OCCUPATION.

Should a stronger feeling of nationality than we anticipate, burst forth among the Turks, on the occupation of Constantinople, the most ardent spirits would retire inwards, to the mountains, or they would be received under the protection of Mehemet Ali, or his successor, so as to leave to Russia the only portion of the country, the possession of which is desirable to her. But the Egyptian power would furnish new pretexts and means to Russia for excluding all European intervention—for excluding all other powers from the eastern partition—which only ignorance or madness can lead any other cabinet to dream of sharing in.

If, after the event of occupation, England and France found it impossible to endure the consequences, and resolved on making an effort to expel Russia, they would find arrayed against them the very spirit of resistance which is now at their disposal. The Turks will fight, to

prevent their country from becoming a field of contest\*

Russia once in Constantinople, is vulnerable only in Constantinople. The possessor of the capital possesses the empire ; the possessor of the Dardanelles possesses the East. The importance of neither has been felt, because the possessor knew not his own advantages ; but let Russia be there, she will feel them, and make them be felt.

\* Although the work of General Valentini is the fable of the Man who could paint, and the Lion that could not ; it abounds with admissions of the individual superiority of the Turks, amidst the often merited abuse of the government, and its measures.

“ The Ottoman,” he says, “ defends his arms, as every thing he possesses, with greater pertinacity than any other nation, and fights with the devotion of despair, rather than surrender himself prisoner.

“ It is, therefore, very conceivable that 5,000 armed Turks should, by a spontaneous movement, have assembled behind the breach of Brailow, to defend it. This is the consequence of a natural warrior instinct, and of deeply-felt personal interest, which we will only attain to in our Christian Governments, by a state of perfect civilisation. With us the first bomb shakes institutions,” &c.—Page 240.

Do not these few, but remarkable lines, establish the results that naturally flow from the causes we have been endeavouring to point out ?

In the very following page we find that Kustenji ignobly surrendered ; “ *but for the hononr* of the commandant, it is assured that the garrison was almost entirely composed of old Janissaries.”

If then, the allies, by a great effort, can force the Dardanelles, they may be able to crush the power of Russia. What consequences may follow such a contingency, we confess, appears to us involved in darkness; but the chances are scarcely worth weighing, for we believe not in the probability of Russia being attacked at all, and scarcely do we think she will be attackable, when once entrenched in force, behind the ramparts of the Dardanelles.

There are men of no inconsiderable influence, who imagine, that in the event of the occupation of the Dardanelles by Russia, the other powers may scramble for the provinces. The examination of the question into which we have entered, suffices, we trust, to expose the emptiness of the expectation of possessing any useful interest in Turkey or in the Levant, on the occurrence of that contingency. It will then be for England and France not to look for further acquisitions, but to the defence of Malta and Algiers, and of so many other interests far and near. This idea is of course industriously spread by the agents of Russia, which, like all her suggestions, has hitherto been implicitly admitted by our ignorance.

Now it is to be borne in mind that the Dardanelles is the only point that Russia has to defend; that by its sole occupation she holds in subjection the whole Ottoman empire, defends her possession from all aggression, and places

beyond all reach and intercourse the various points of her own territory where an attack or a diversion could be made. Its occupation instantly covers her whole line, from Riga to Astrakan, and renders disposable not less than 100,000 men. Will any efforts be spared to render it impassable, impregnable? It is only at three days' sail, with the regularly prevailing winds and currents, from the arsenal, crowded with ships, men, stores, matériel, and artillery, that, in long expectation, has been constructed on the nearest point of her territory, and which seems to stretch out as far as possible into the Euxine, to shorten the space across which this southern eye of Russia looks on the inheritance of Constantine.

We should regret that one moment of the attention we can command should be diverted to futile discussion, or even to refutations of erroneous opinions. The best refutation is facts, which may have been neglected, but which cannot be denied; still there is a necessity for referring to a peculiarly prejudicial opinion, which has of late been propagated by the press—*the possibility of raising up, out of the ruins of Turkey, independent states as a barrier to Russia.* Could any suggestion be imagined more capable of giving to our policy an uncertain and suspicious gait? of perplexing it with remote deliberation and reference, at a moment when vigorous action is imperative; of rendering it mistrustful of all, suspicious to all, and

useful to none, save our adversary? This notion has been put forward, with a certain pomp, in essays which have found, in this middle term, a show of conciliation between two necessarily-opposed principles, the one of European prejudice, that Turkey must be lost; the other of English interest, that she must be preserved. The elevation of these states is, moreover, held out as a threat to Russia. A threat to Russia! It would seem the ingenious suggestion of a Russian agent, had not past experience sufficed to prove, that the ablest generals, diplomatists, and agents, of Russia, have never served her as she has been served by her antagonists.

The unity of the Ottoman power has not only been the cause of its permanency, but is the unequivocal object of the desires of the whole of these populations, whose interests and affections are thus arbitrarily disposed of. If they wish to correct and control that unity, it is clear they have no idea of destroying it\*. The details into

\* The most remarkable revolts of the last few years bear unequivocal testimony to the intensity and universality of this feeling.

When Mustapha Bairaktar led his victorious Albanians to the capital, it was to relieve the Sultan from the control of the Janissaries. When the Servians revolted, under Czerni George, it was to expel the Daïs or Janissaries of Servia; and, to prove that their revolt was not against the Sultan, they left unoccupied the fortresses they had taken. Mustapha,

which we have already entered, may probably contain internal evidence of our opinion not being formed in a closet, remote from the subject we are treating. We might perhaps rest satisfied with denying the conclusion; but we will not place the supremacy of the Sultan and the unity of the empire as a final object, as a political axiom, without offering some considerations, which we deem conclusive, in its support.

The repairing of an edifice is not generally

Pacha of Scodra, called West Roumelia to arms, and marched, at the head of 20,000 men, on Monastir. His proclamations breathed respect and loyalty for the Sultan, and called on the faithful to unite, to release him from the thralldom of evil counsellors. Ibrahim Pacha put forward, as his best claims to the support of Anatoly, that he marched under the sanction of a secret intelligence with the Sultan to emancipate him from Russian protection. Mehemet Ali, supposed in Europe to aim at occupying the throne, was as much overawed by this prejudice or opinion as his meanest fellow subjects. The utmost limit of his secret aspirations was, succession of the Seraskier, or the presidency of a Council of Regency. Even the Russians, in passing through the territories "annexées à perpétuité à l'Empire," prevented opposition, by proclaiming that they marched not against the Sultan, but, by his orders, against some rebel Pachas. This notion they propagated, even after their invasion. By means of it, they occupied the important position of Anapa. Is such a principle to be treated with levity? Is such an element of power to be sacrificed to the lucubrations of some periodical publications, who have occupied the vacant field of European publicity and discussion?



commenced by knocking down the scaffolding ; but here, not the scaffolding but the edifice itself is to be destroyed, by the measures proposed for its restoration. But what is the new form, to make room for which so much is to be sacrificed ? Have we not had sufficient proofs what means of self-defence small federated states possess against neighbouring monarchies ? Appeal to every instance, from the Achean league to the German confederation : they will show but internal disunion and external weakness. Look at the large peninsula of Italy, containing above twenty millions of a civilised and refined population, where one religion, one supreme church, one language, a common origin, a common history, common ruins, common interests, the same songs, the same music, the same school-books—all is to be found that can give to a great people unity of feeling, and, consequently, power. This people is, moreover, great in art and science, rich in literature—it possesses admirable roads, an exuberant soil, an immense commerce, and a position fit to command the world. Here you have the independent states that are to bring independence to Turkey—and what is the result ? What is the independence of Italy ? what is its weight in the political scale ? Nothing—less than nothing—a minus quantity—and only not absorbed by one neighbouring monarchy because another has contested the possession ; but not contested it, as the partition of

Turkey, in distant diplomatic council chambers, but in bloody struggles on the banks of the Adige, the Po, and the Tiber.

But what a contrast in the homogeneity of Italy, and the multitude of distinct races and hostile religions which now exist, separate and at peace, under the shadow of the Turkish dominion! The separate existence of each race is impossible; for, if even not attacked from without, they are too far advanced in civilization not to be vulnerable; they are not far enough, (as what people ever has been?) to be moderate among themselves. What race, then, is to be predominant? Will the Greeks submit to the Servians, the Servians to the Albanians, the Bosniacs to the Bulgarians, the Turks to the Armenians? The very supposition, should it be generally spread, would suffice at this moment to convulse the Empire. Nor are these antipathies created by race, language, and habits, alone. There is a far more important source of disunion—religion. Independent of Islamism, there are four great religious systems spread over the empire, with central church governments, complicating the subdivisions of races by other lines of demarcation, by other and more dangerous oppositions.

While the abuses of the Turkish government have been so industriously dwelt upon, who has ever dreamt of investigating the inherent difficulties, of conciliating the interests, of restraining the

passions, of maintaining the equality, of so incongruous an assemblage? What traveller has not observed the fanaticism, the antipathy, of all these sects—their hostility to each other? Who has traced their actual repose to the *toleration* of Islamism? Islamism, calm, absorbed, without spirit of dogma, or views of proselytism, imposes at present on the other creeds the reserve and silence which characterise itself. But let this moderator be removed, and the humble professions now confined to the sanctuary would be proclaimed in the court and the camp; political power and political enmity would combine with religious domination and religious animosity; the empire would be deluged in blood, until a nervous arm—the arm of Russia—appears to restore harmony, by despotism. Did not the animosities of the eastern and western churches lay the Greek empire at the feet of the Turkish conqueror? Open abruptly the political arena to similar contentions, the same scene would be reproduced; and even if the Christian sects alone remained, the theologian and sectarian acrimony of Mount Athos, of Etchmiazin, and the Vatican, would reappear, unaccompanied by the remnants of the science and philosophy of Athens and of Rome.

If these considerations are not sufficient to prove the utter impossibility of raising the Turkish empire by destroying the Turkish supremacy, whether religious or civil, look at Greece. Is her revolu-

tion not the real cause of the late progress of Russia? Look at Egypt. Has not the Mussulman schism brought on the actual crisis? Would you still increase such chances? Can Mehemet Ali restore the unity of power, by occupying the Sultan's throne? If he could, a struggle must first take place; that struggle brings Russia to Constantinople. Can Greece replace Turkey, unless Turkey is destroyed? But then, does not Russia step in? A contest constitutes her instantaneously arbiter; and that contest, in the actual posture of affairs, she can at any hour bring about\*.

Numerous are the considerations that press upon us, in support of these conclusions; but they appear

\* Russia will not bring about that contest until she is prepared with a sufficient disposable force, and with sufficient means of transport,—until the pitch of hopelessness and resignation has been reached, which she may see necessary in the Turkish government and people; and until the state of the west diminishes to the slightest possible chance the slight probabilities of an after coalition against her; but these considerations are all subordinate to the scism of Turkey. This it is that perplexes her victim in resources and in mind—this it is that gives her her rights of protector—that distracts European opinion and policy. If, therefore, she sees Mehemet Ali in danger of falling by himself, she must hasten the crisis; at this moment his position seems more precarious than ever—and this is strangely the moment taken to get up Mehemet Ali's credit in Paris and London! This is most ominous!

to us truths so self-evident, when fairly stated, that the prolongation of the discussion might embarrass the judgment without strengthening the conviction.

The settlement of Greece, such as it is, has cost ten times the trouble that would have sufficed to organize Turkey. The settlement of the Egyptian question in Egypt, or in the Mediterranean, involves ten times the danger and difficulties that would be incurred in humbling Russia at Constantinople. The cabinets of France and England have themselves created the dilemma in which they are placed; the responsibility under which they stand is self incurred; they cannot now, by any possibility, retreat, even if they had no interests of their own at stake.

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## CHAPTER VI.

*Examination in detail of material condition of Government.— Causes and effects of various alleged insurrections of the Curds, Lazes, and Albanians.—Quasi independence of the Servians.—State of Finance.—Agriculture and Commerce.*

THE degradation of the government so naturally leads to the supposition of an equal degradation and depression of the national interests, that it is necessary to the just appreciation of the state of this country to examine in detail its material condition.

The weakness of the government, which brings discredit on the country, has been, in many respects, advantageous to its well-being, seeing that the action of the government, slight as it is, is almost always wrong. The grounds of this belief we shall state as concisely as possible. We will first point out the causes and effects of various alleged insurrections, of the Curds, Lazes, and Albanians, of the quasi independence of the Servians, and then examine the state of the finances of agriculture and of commerce.

The revolt of the Curds, which has been so often cited as a proof of the disorder of the country, is only an attempt on their part to resist a project of the government for settling them permanently in villages—an attempt never dreamt of formerly, and for which, if it is properly conducted, and if it succeeds, the government will be entitled to the highest commendation—it will add to the resources of the state more than has been lost by the independence of Greece.

The Albanians are in a state of nominal submission, but of passive hostility, to the Porte. Immediately after the conclusion of the Russian war, that country assembled in arms; it was entirely subdued. It offered to the Porte a nursery of excellent troops, and might furnish several hundred thousand men. They were opposed to the nizzam, but more so the change of dress, which was an incident; however, their armed opposition was subdued. Having hitherto existed by military service—ignorant of the arts of peace, and despising them—beaten in the field, controlled in their markets and castles, they had no alternative but unconditional submission and acceptance of military service necessary to their existence. The Porte, however, removed the only man who had combined sufficient firmness and judgment to subdue and control them, so that advantage has not been taken as yet of the immense resources they offer to the empire, nor of the consequences of their subjugation—deprived at present of the means of

existence—not controlled either by superior force or by a ruler capable of forming a party among them, or of overawing them, they exist in a state of useless and nominal submission, committing of necessity partial depredations, until the Porte thinks fit to send there a fit governor, and to relieve the plethora of the country by enlisting a considerable body of them.

Servia is said to be independent, and therefore that from a useful province it is become a hostile state. Servia, as a province of Turkey, paid no tribute, in consequence of the disturbed condition it has been in for forty years; it supported, however, 2,000 spahis, soldiers possessing fiefs, who certainly rendered the Porte but slender service, and were the chief causes of its convulsion. The Servians, oppressed in turns by the Sultan's pachas and by their provincial janissaries, were almost constantly in a state of revolt. Three armies have been lost in that country—the neighbouring provinces distressed and exhausted, and auxiliaries offered to every invader, in the warlike inhabitants of this advanced position.

Since the settlement that took place at the end of the last year, Servia is to pay a regular tribute of 3,500,000 piastres yearly. It has become attached, by its dearest interests now coinciding with long prejudices and feelings, to the supreme dominion of the Porte, which assures it the most unlimited freedom of internal administration and commerce, advantages which it can appreciate



better than any other province, by the contrast which its position enables it daily to make with the Servian tribes under the administration of Austria. Its prosperity, important in itself, extends its influence to the surrounding country: its tranquillity and loyalty restrains the Bosniacs and the Albanians, while the independence and the elevation of the social position of the Servians elevate the character of the Rayas elsewhere, and render impossible former oppression by the refuge it affords, and the respect it commands. Instead of the Porte's having in future to expend its resources, and the blood of its subjects, in quelling revolts produced in Servia by its maladministration, Servia becomes the means of restraining commotions elsewhere; and instead of its offering auxiliaries to foreign foes, it has 30,000 brave and warlike troops; and, in case of invasion, 100,000 to defend the empire; if, indeed, and that is always to be understood, the Turkish Government can be brought to be a friend to its people and itself. Although the various Treaties between Russia and the Porte have stipulated this internal freedom and independence for Servia, Russia used every effort to prevent the fulfilment of the stipulations she extorted, so as to lose entirely, for the moment, the affections of this people, and to confirm their attachment to the existence of the Porte, by completely unmasking her own designs.

This is the only independent state of the east,

that has not imitated Europe, an imitation universally fatal. The Crimea—Turkey itself—in as far as that imitation has extended; Egypt; Greece—are all instances of the impossibility of engrafting European fiscalty on the simplicity of eastern institutions, and of forcing it on the adverse prejudices, opinions, and interests of the people. The cause of this happy difference is, that the above-mentioned states have seen but the *results* of European civilisation at a distance; Servia has seen the *means* on her own borders.

A revolt, as it has been termed, has recently been quelled in Lazistan, on the eastern frontier of Anatoly. The facts are these:—In this strong and remote district, the Dèrè Beys had maintained their ground. There were from twenty to thirty of them, possessing from fifty to five hundred villages each, recognising no authority save their own, paying no tribute to the Porte, and constantly at war among themselves. In the last Russian war, they naturally were unable to make any head against her—they joined (when they did join) the different pachas with hostile objects, and were by them considered more dangerous than the avowed enemy; besides, many of them were in correspondence with Russia. This conduct, and the humiliation of defeat, exasperated the whole country against them. At this period a great amelioration took place in the general administration of the Pachalic of Trebizond, in which

Lazistan was included; the pacha was disgraced, and ordered to Constantinople; he was then reappointed, and, on his return, a total change was observed in his conduct and administration. As the strength of the Dèrè Beys had always been in the weakness of the provincial governors, and in their mal-administration, this change instantly blew into a flame the disaffection of the Lazes to their hereditary chiefs. These had, however, numerous partisans—they assembled troops—Tousji Oglou, the most powerful of them, had constructed at once a fortress and a palace at Rizch, and had collected 15,000 men. Achmet Pacha, the kiaya of the Pacha of Trebizond, was sent against him, with, as he says, 7,000—as the Lazes themselves say, 1,500 men. One shot alone was fired. Tousji Oglou's men dispersed instantly, or joined the Sultan's troops. He himself was taken; his castle, so extensive, that it required the daily efforts of 500 men during a month to overturn it, taken, and the other chiefs dispersed, to maintain themselves as long as possible in their holds; but they were every where pursued by the indignation of the people, and, notwithstanding there was not at the disposal of the Pacha a force sufficient, unassisted, to have reduced one of them in his strong hold, if properly defended, yet in four months not one remained. Two of the principals were executed, the remainder were suffered to go and remain unmolested, but without authority in the country;

but several, who had had connection with Russia, took refuge in her territories\*.

Here then a revolt, which is supposed directed against authority, and quelled by an exercise of power, is in fact a revolution in a province hitherto in a state of anarchical independence, which has ended by connecting it with the remainder of the empire, and prepares it to be converted into a formidable barrier against Russia, from which it is now detached. Russia is there at present the object of a hatred, unequalled even in the remainder of Turkey; that feeling will gradually wear off, if the Porte acquires sufficient strength to force upon them Salian Ichtsab, &c. Those violations of her principles and her creed, which have cost her so many insurrections, have occasioned her so much weakness, given so much strength to Russia, and to which she is so wedded, and the nation so opposed, that the weakness of the government becomes a condition of its existence.

These are some of the very recent imitations of European fiscality affecting exchange, and levied by government tax-gatherers. The immutable code and creed of Islamism establishes a tenth of profits, of all descriptions, as the only legitimate tax collected by the people themselves. The Arab political economists hold, that a tenth of profits furnishes the maximum of revenue. At an early period, even

\* Russia has made much boast of delivering up to the Porte Cadi Kirran; but *he was not* a Dèrè Bey.

under Omar, scales of assessment were introduced. On the occupation of Constantinople, several imitations of the Greek system corrupted the simplicity and beauty of the Turkish; still it has remained the best, the steadiest system of finance in Europe, notwithstanding the political misfortunes of the country, the errors into which it has fallen, the violence that has been exerted against it, the necessities under which the state has laboured, have never led to bankruptcy\*, or to the incurring of foreign debt; and no abuse at present exists that is not branded with the word abuse, and which cannot be removed without impairing the system. This statement may little agree with the epithets of travellers' note books. We trust, in future, it will be found necessary to know something of the institutions of Turkey, before either condemning or admiring them.

There is, perhaps, no district in any country, Servia excepted, where greater contentment reigns at this moment, or greater devotion to their sovereign; and the motives are self-evident,—the old abuses have been swept away, the new ones have not been introduced. Lazistan is a sample of the feelings that would at this moment animate and connect the whole empire, if the Sultan had felt what he could make of his empire when he had

\* The depreciation of the currency, instead of being a mode of meeting difficulties, in fact increased them—the currency is *not paper*.

destroyed the Janissaries. Lazistan to-day exhibits a living proof of the astonishing impulse which this empire has at times received from an able monarch or vizier, and renders credible and intelligible, relations and events, which otherwise would appear fabulous or incomprehensible.

The Lazes are of Georgian origin, and have, since the possession of Georgia by Russia, gradually been converted to Islamism. The proximity of Russia had from the first introduced elements of disorganization into this province; the authority of the Porte was weakened, and finally subverted, by the opportunities thus afforded to the Dèrè Beys to usurp its authority. But the very means employed by Russia, to open to her this barrier of the empire, prepared a new and extraordinary element of resistance.

Without entering into the causes, it is sufficient to state that numerous examples prove the fact, that wherever Dèrè Beys have superseded the municipal bodies, the people have lost their individual character, their tenacity for their ancient habits, traditions, and religion. Russia introduced disorders into this province, and fomented them; the Dèrè Bey system sprang up, and this, with the discredit attached to Christianity by the neighbouring administration of Russia, has led to the apostacy of the Lazes. Russia, in separating them administratively from the Porte, has brought about their religious union to the Sultan—she has,

moreover, raised their character; for it must be observed, that the difference here is not between the Bible and the Koran, between Christianity and Islamism, but between the superstition and idolatry of the Greek church and the simplicity of the Mussulman practice, between two systems of which the apparent differences are religious, but of which the material differences are political and social.

The Georgians are proverbial for drunkenness and debauchery; they are not brave, they are superstitious. Those who have become Mussulmen seem to have entirely abjured the characteristics of their race; they have become sober\*,

\* “ The epitaph of Darius, which records his remarkable power of drinking much wine, and bearing it well, presents a singular trait of national manners, and it is curious to mark the change, in this respect, of modern times.”—FRASER’S *History of Persia*, p. 110.

This, *in a note*, is an admission made by the conscientiousness of Mr. Fraser.

Klaproth, speaking of the ancient wild rights of the Circasian princes, adds, “ Cependant ils y ont renoncés en embrassant le mahometanism. Depuis cette époque le peuple a aussi changé les habitudes sous beaucoup de rapports. Ils buvaient de l’eau-de-vie à l’excès, &c., à présent ils s’abstiennent de toutes ces choses.”—KLAPROTH’S *Tableau du Caucase*, p. 74.

We have never dreamt of answering objections or refuting false opinions, or false testimony, regarding Turkey. But while this page is under correction, a number of a periodical, devoted to popular instruction, benevolently intended to dispel

chaste, and hospitable; these are habits of their new faith. Their character has acquired dignity by belonging to the honoured class. In confirmation of this change of spirit, the establishment of their schools in each village dates from the epoch of its conversion.

We have dwelt thus particularly on this district, for three reasons:—first because it illustrates forcibly the character of the people, and the prin-

ignorance, refute errors, and destroy prejudices, is opened by the writer; it treats the hundreds of thousands that benefit by its useful knowledge, to an article on *intoxication and opium eating in Turkey*, and refers to a former article on the same subject. This is really intolerable. The falsehoods and nonsense put forth (of course proceeding from some one who has written a book on Turkey), are below observation, and we notice it only in the hope that the benevolent and enlightened directors of that publication may examine and test the truths of the assertions they are the means of propagating.

The writer of these pages, after five years spent in Turkey, knows but one old man who eats opium. He knows three in England, two being ladies. *His individual* experience would lead him to report in Turkey the English as opium eaters. The opium eating story is one of those instances of European ignorance and credulity with which a European traveller may amuse his Turkish entertainers.

This note has been submitted to a gentleman who has travelled long in the East, as many have, and who has had the rather extraordinary advantages of acquaintance and friendships beyond the pale of *Frank* society. His observation was, “*add my six years rambles in Turkey without knowing or seeing one opium eater.*”



ciples of the Turkish systems, old and new : secondly, because it is a portion of this province that Russia has extorted by the convention of St. Petersburg : thirdly, because it shows the state of a population, the name of which is scarcely known\*, which has never been visited by a traveller, and which, *even at Trebizond*, is represented as so wild and savage, that it is impossible to land on the coast.

In all these instances it is evident that appearances are fallacious, that the very causes of despair to the friends of Turkey, are really proofs of the great facility of governing that exist, if properly used. This is still further established, by general submissiveness to a corrupt administration ; and the absence of crime, which there are no visible means of punishing or repressing.

Prosperity is arrested by want of confidence—by restrictions on production and commerce—by the eminently hostile attitude of Russia—the precariousness of internal tranquillity—by the misintelligence between Mehemet Ali and the Porte, and by the effects, still unrepaired, of the late events in Anatoly : under such unfavourable circumstances, it would be irrational to look for any very remarkable improvement ; and the slightest indication of

\* “ La quatrième branche des Georgiens comprend les “ Lazi—c’est un peuple farouche.”—KLAPROTH’S *Tableau du Caucase*, p. 87..

improvement must afford alike matter of surprise and congratulation.

The absence of all statistical returns, and the extreme difficulty of obtaining general information, and of knowing, with any degree of certainty, in what state Turkey is, throw difficulties in the way of obtaining correct estimates, that hitherto have proved insurmountable. The revenue, drawn almost exclusively from production, is the best, and, indeed, the only official test of the condition of the country; and we have fortunately had the means of ascertaining pretty accurately the state in which it is. The revenue, compared with former periods, is reduced, by the defalcation of the tribute of Greece—of Moldavia and Wallachia—of Albania, for many years—of Servia and Bosnia, Egypt, Syria, and Candia—of Bagdad, and of the Pachalics of Erzeroum, Kars, and Akhalsich, which have scarcely paid any thing to the Porte since the Russian war. The regular expenditure, on the other hand, for the army, navy, and administration, has been gradually increasing, and has doubled within the last eight years\*. This year

\* Notwithstanding 300,000*l.* have been expended on the festivities on the Sultana's marriage, a new palace, a large, new, and several minor schools, barracks, and other edifices, debts and progressive redemption of a species of long annuity, at 12 per cent., have absorbed 200,000*l.* more. These sums ought not to figure as regular expenditure, and amount to 60,000,000 piastres.

there has been a very considerable extra expenditure, yet we have grounds for asserting that there is a larger surplus of revenue over expenditure than has been obtained for a century. Yet there has been no confiscation—no very crying abuse or extortion—none that have profited the treasury ; so that the increase proves a very positive and very astonishing increase of production.

A larger body of troops are on foot than ever were maintained before, a standing army of 60,000 men\*, with all the necessary administration, and without sufficient control in the expenditure, occasions a heavier outlay than formerly 2 or 300,000 irregulars.

The fleet has occasioned considerable expenditure ; and the construction of new vessels, within the year, repairs or building alone, if paid in money, would amount to 30,000,000 piastres—it really cost the government a much larger sum in the diminution of revenue appropriated to this object.

The pay of civil servants now begins to figure in the budget, having before been allowed to pay themselves—their number has been considerably reduced. The Pachas have been reduced to a

\* The regular troops are an additional expense of thirty millions beyond the sum paid for the Janissaries, and the revenue of the fiefs of 12,000 cavalry, which government has taken into its own hands, having enrolled the holders in regiments.

fourth of their former number, which greatly facilitates the administration, while it is a relief from heavy charges and great abuses. The salaries have not yet been settled—but the ministers, and several of the higher functionaries, have already commenced drawing their salaries from the treasury; although additional resources are still left them, they receive £.4800 per annum.

It is not alone war and revolt that have weighed down the nation, but the expenses of these wars, and the subsidies to Russia. Thus, independently of the expenses of the war, nearly £.3,500,000 have been paid to Russia. The Egyptian campaign is calculated at £.1,500,000—the Albanian at £.1,000,000. These charges have, of course, directly or indirectly, to be borne by the cultivators, their means of production crippled, and the treasury impoverished.

Considerable capital has been expended in the erection of schools and churches by the tributaries, in consequence of the permission granted after having been withheld for two centuries; this is so much withdrawn from the sources of production.

But the greatest misfortune of all, has been the drought of this season, which has every where seriously injured the grain crops. Some provinces are in great distress, and if the whole country is not afflicted with the horrors of famine, it is solely owing to the astonishing increase of cultivation during the last sowing time; still, prices, compared

with last year, have advanced 20 per cent, and the average of last year was above former ones, in consequence of the demand from the country that formerly supplied grain.

This internal prosperity, that has overcome so many and such great obstacles to its development, has made itself be felt on external commerce. During the last three months, traffic is in a state of stagnation, in consequence of the Plague. The Persian trade has been interrupted by an act of legitimate retaliation. Still our exports to this country must, during the last year, have greatly exceeded the former one. The prospects for the next year are still more encouraging, grain has in a great measure failed, but the crops of Indian Corn, and especially of Rice, exceed every expectation. Silk has been produced in quantities exceeding any former period, and the price has likewise advanced, in consequence of the supposed diminution in Italy and Spain\*.

Cotton and Wool† have also increased, though not in the same proportion. The fruit crop has been very abundant; oil most abundant, and in great demand‡; so that while the exportations of

\* Silk has advanced 20 per cent.

† Wool „ „ 15 per cent.

‡ The exportation of oil was formerly prohibited, so that the permission was to be purchased at a rate and with difficulties too great to render the exportation important. The production was therefore neglected. This prohibition and

Turkey, on which she depends for the means of purchasing, are greatly augmented, prices have not fallen, but, on the contrary, have greatly advanced in almost every article\*.

But the source of the prosperity is the increasing independence of the peasantry ; and the lightening of the local burthens. Great and beneficial alterations must have taken place in these points, to permit of any amelioration under actual circumstances ; it is on the progress of these alterations, that hopes of increased consumption of our manufactures must be founded. This increase will of course be immediately affected by the large credit which this year's production will open to Turkey in Europe.

It is to be remarked, that this commercial prosperity is not owing to measures adopted by the

the monopoly of it have been removed, although the trade in it is not entirely free. This, with the reduction of duty on olive oil in England, and the demand at Marseilles, has already caused an increase of 20 per cent., although the crop is more abundant than in any year since 1828.

\* Opium has for three years been a monopoly (it is the only monopoly in Turkey), during which time the official exports have dwindled to one-half, but the diminution is by no means so great, as large quantities are smuggled. The increase of this article does not, therefore, keep pace with the rest ; it is represented this year as stationary, the price has advanced 30 per cent. It perhaps is superfluous to observe, that opium is produced for exportation for the China market, the home consumption being so small as not to enter in any degree into the merchants' calculations. If opium were largely consumed in Turkey it could not be a monopoly.

care of the government for the protection of commerce. It is the result of the improved political condition of the producer, and has to contend against the will, intention, and, as far as it can go, the injurious regulations of the government\*. Not one measure has been adopted to favour commerce since the opening of the oil-trade, a measure forced by the menaces of Mitylene, when arguments were found of no avail. Since then a monopoly of muslins was attempted, in favour of the Armenian esnaf; it was defeated by the representations of Lord Ponsonby. It was attempted to impose on the fairs the duty exacted in cities, on the sale of goods; two fairs, rather than submit, dispersed; one was held in a new place, to avoid the new imposition, which also has been abandoned. An attempt has been recently made

\* The most remarkable of these are the Teskeres, or Permits, for exportation. These have been styled by the merchants, "monopolies;" the term is, however, inapplicable—they do not affect internal commerce—they do not affect those objects which interest any large class of producers—they are principally for wool, the price of which has, however, advanced 50 per cent., within five years; valonia and galls, which are no one's property, and are collected in the mountains; but they do not affect grain of any kind—salt, tobacco, fruits, cotton, silk, &c. These permits amount to a tax, the injury of which would never have been observed, had it not touched the interests of the Frank merchants. They are principally owing to Russian interference, but they are also an indication of progress. Formerly, a governor would have taken by violence—he now seeks to take financially.

to prevent at fairs all money from circulating, save that of the Sultan. A moubayagi was sent to the fair of Cashan—he established a booth of 'change, and published an order, that all foreign coin should be exchanged for money of the Sultan, according to the tariff. The tariff fixes, relatively to the other coin, the Turkish money  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. above its exchangeable value: the result was, that the camels and mules were immediately reloaded, and in a few hours the booth of the agent of the mint was left standing alone.

The safeguard of Turkey is that habitual attachment to the chief of the state, which has held it together for so many centuries: one single fiscal regulation of this sort, without one paras profit to the treasury, endangers more that feeling than the loss of some thousand lives, or than the sack of a province.

This is a consideration of the very greatest importance; it shows that the causes and consequences of disorders, under a centralised and a localised administration, are wholly distinct: that is, insurrection in England or France would be against the government, and prove hatred to the government; but insurrection in Turkey is against, or hitherto has been against, the local governor, and in favour of the general government—supposed by us to wink at rebellion through weakness, but, in reality, considering a justifiable act, what we conceive treasonable. Now the local governors have



lost their power, now the government interferes with those interests which were inviolable before—markets and prices, and that through an agency equally obnoxious; therefore do we now see resistance to the government itself, or a tendency that way. This explains how Russia may prepare for herself a teeming country, and a dissatisfied people, and, consequently, a powerless and despised government; for the want of cohesion, uniformity, and centralisation in the government, takes from it all power, authority, and respect, when it acts against the character of the people, and their traditional habits of self-administration.

Other circumstances combine with these indications of internal prosperity, to favour the supposition of a rapidly-increasing traffic with England, which are—greater facilities and security of navigation and communication, than have hitherto existed—principally the establishment of insurance-companies for short voyages, which have been in operation for the last four or five years, but the full advantages of which are only beginning to be felt now—a weekly post to Vienna, established six months ago—the opening of the Danube, and regular steam communication with Vienna by the provinces—the prospective establishment of steam communication with Marseilles—steam packets to ply regularly between Constantinople and Smyrna—a sailing packet between Constantinople and Trebizond, which has

been plying for nearly a year—and steam-tugs to tow vessels through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, where the long continuous prevalence of northerly or southerly winds is the greatest drawback on the immense advantages of this unrivalled position. As to inland communication, a universal conviction now exists of the necessity of establishing roads and posts—a commencement has even been made; and on a point like this, where the advantages cannot be at all conceived until the results are seen, the commencement is the chief difficulty\*. A road has been commenced, and already carried 30 miles from Scutari, in the direction of Broussa—post carriages have been brought and tried, and this experiment is to decide on the feasibility of connecting by post roads the principal cities of the empire.

This progress—these facilities, together with other considerations, if undisturbed by political events, bid fair to render Turkey, in a few years, the largest mart in the world for English manufactures.

But were England to acquire over the councils of Turkey the influence necessary even for its political existence, and use that counsel prudently, Turkey would be under the necessity of unloosing those administrative chains, those commercial prohibitions, that lock its resources from the light—then, and then only, can its worth be known.

\* Since this was written, great progress has been made.

A manufacturing people, our first element of prosperity, is abundant, and cheap materials. What unlimited supplies would this country not afford? What natural facilities of transport by sea, and on her now unfrequented rivers? What bounds to the production of cotton, of the finest qualities—of silk, of tobacco, of wool, of dyes and drugs, of corn, oil, hemp, tallow, flax\*? The facilities of exchange render production comparatively cheaper than in any other of the countries from which these articles are at present exported in quantities. Her forests, and inexhaustible mines, offer richer natural sources than are elsewhere to be found. Timber, of the finest qualities, may be procured for little more than the expense of transport and cutting; and forests, almost wholly useless, from which navies might be built, are within three hours' sail of her capital. Copper is at present extracted, in thousands of tons, at a third of the market price of Europe†, even by their ignorant processes; and it might be extracted

\* No article which forms a considerable item of export from Russia is permitted to be exported from Turkey, notwithstanding *the free importation of all goods*. Why this is so, it is useless to inquire. How completely has Russia fooled the whole world, and on every question—war, politics, literature, hemp, tallow, flax, and linseed! After all, these are the material points, and she alone knows how to handle them. She has no commercial treaties.

† The copper of the mines, administered by the Pacha of Trebizond, cost him, when transported to the shore, and twice refined after smelting,  $3\frac{1}{4}d.$  per lb.

by tens of thousands of tons, at a diminished cost.

The restrictions and prohibitions which act so injuriously on Turkey, are, after all, trifling in themselves. We have not to struggle against a tariff; but to point out administrative errors, and direct administrative reforms, which will increase with their wealth, their custom—and in advocating these measures for our own benefit, we shall not be looked on with jealousy by the various national interests, but on the contrary as benefactors. This is a consideration of some importance, although it might require more development than the question, even yet, may command attention for.

Were the commerce of Turkey thus emancipated, so immense would be the production, that the price of raw materials would fall throughout the world, and a revolution in commerce would take place similar (since there is nothing greater to which to compare it) to that produced by the discovery of America. We took the plants and seeds of Turkey, and discovered a new world fit for their expansion to set them in; we transported thither an European population to cultivate them. But that world is at a distance, the labour of a rapidly-increasing population is dear, restrictions are placed on the returning the remunerating value of our produce. Here two continents lie known on the map, unknown, unexplored in their resources—men are at our disposal in millions—

labour is cheap, communication easy, a political system and a commercial system, which we make such as suits us best; and which in so doing, renders us supreme in the affections of the people—no restrictions arrest or incommode our direct traffic; and thence, north, south, east, and even west, new markets extend. A combination of commercial freedom may be here established, to balance first, and then destroy the systems of commercial restriction extending in Europe. Every object we purchase will be paid for in British goods, and every ton, exported or imported, will be embarked in British bottoms.

These results, whether as to the strengthening of Turkey, the obtaining a control over her councils, the production of a greater supply of cheapened raw materials, or greater demand for our wares, it is in the power of England to realise or frustrate, to hasten or retard. It is not by her policy alone that they are to be brought about, but also by her commercial system, as affecting Turkey both directly and indirectly. Some of our commercial regulations have been more injurious to Turkey, even than our political errors. The preponderance of Russia over Turkey, can be accounted for by the Tariff of England alone, and we trust this subject, hitherto enveloped in mystery, will soon be rendered intelligible. Above all things, some com-

mercial concession at this moment is necessary\*, as the means of preserving to ourselves the chief benefits of her future prosperity—of anticipating a connection, the advantages of which, no other nation foresees at present, but which will hereafter become the object of rivalry and competition.

\* Several important reductions have been made on articles which are largely imported from Turkey ; but if the distinction were expressly made for Turkey, its moral effect would be very great, and this might be the commencement of a reciprocity system, which other circumstances and experience might modify, and to which other states might subsequently be added.

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## CHAPTER VII.

*Turkey, a portion of the European system.—Union of France and Turkey, as opposed formerly to Austria, and now to Russia.—Effect on France of extension of Russia to the Mediterranean.—Effect on England.—Only to be prevented by strengthening Turkey.—Union of France and England must cease, unless directed to this end.—Actual state of things necessarily leads to the proximate realisation of Russia's designs.*

WE have hitherto treated Turkey as a principal question, referring to the powers of Europe merely in as far as their policy has influenced her state or existence ; we shall now examine the interests of those powers with respect to each other, referring to Turkey merely as the field of their contests, and in as far as its wealth, arms, commerce, positions, and marine, may give influence and power to each of the rival or allied cabinets.

A distinguished diplomatist, in the late apprehensions occasioned by the complication of the Belgian affairs, and the representative of one of the great powers, observed, “ Why all these alarms ?  
“ No gun will ever be fired in Europe for Belgian  
“ independence. It is in the East, that the arena  
“ will be opened for the European struggle.”

Yes, it is rendered every day more evident, by

thronging events, the conviction is daily growing in the minds of those who direct the councils of Europe, that the solution of European embarrassments lies in the East, and that the Turkish question is not only *a* European question, but that it is the chief among them.)

In France there is a general, a vague idea, that the interests of England are principally involved in the preservation of Turkey; while in England, it is supposed that it is France that is chiefly interested. We trust to be able to prove, not only that both are equally interested, but that there alone can the action of both Governments be combined for the purpose of maintaining, of preserving, those interests which are common to both.

The political interests of France have ever been, and ever must be, opposed to the aggrandisement of Russia. They must be so, even if to-morrow Charles X. were restored by means of Russia. The interests of France are, and ever have been, connected with those of Turkey. What are her interests then in the aggrandisement of Russia at the expense of Turkey?

When Austria and Poland pressed hard on Turkey, Louis XIV. poured 200,000 men into Germany, to restore the balance\*. When menaced by Russia, French engineers and officers instructed the Turks, formed schools, raised batteries, and perseveringly rendered what service the then

\* See Appendix, No. 2.



intractable Ottoman would accept. When Poland was partitioned, France was not interested, only because governed by the mistress of Louis XV. But then France was a despotic monarchy, united to Russia by political principles, if opposed to her by political interests. In 1793, France assumed a new position; she adopted political principles which extirpated in France itself the interests, and ranks, and opinions on which were founded the authority of its former Government, on which are founded the Governments of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Here are motives of hostility inherent in the very existence of these Governments; an hostility that can never cease while France affords a vulnerable point, while any of these possess the means of aggression.

Russia became the centre of a combination which twice struck Napoleon to the ground; and however little her own means contributed, or could contribute to that end, she directed the movement, because she was the chief advocate of the principles that arrayed themselves against the power of France; principles liable to violent assaults in the states of her allies, but which have remained invulnerable and supreme only in Russia.

This hostility of Russia is not a consideration appreciable only by statesmen in their cabinets. The Cossacks have twice bivouacked on the Seine.

France, overwhelmed by the whole of Europe, and exhausted by the inordinate ambition of her

ruler, had, for a time, ceased to give cause of alarm to the northern powers. In 1830 she assumed her dangerous, her menacing attitude of 1793. The northern powers did not fly instantly to arms, because they had learnt, by experience, a surer mode of attack (perhaps they committed a great error in not doing so), and the insurrection of Poland, and the movements and discontent in Germany, showed them their real weakness, if attacked, and the necessity of subduing every resistance at home, and of combining all their means before displaying the signal of a war of political extermination, that, once lit, must have blazed with a fury, and spread with a velocity, unparalleled at any former period of the most convulsed times. Russia, as formerly, is the centre and soul of this combination, grounded on the common necessity of crushing the principle of France.

Austria and Prussia cling to Russia, because exposed to dismemberment by every movement of France, because exposed to internal commotion at every hour. Russia is their refuge against both dangers, while she, secure in her distance, her climate, and her poverty, prepares a crisis in which the various states of Europe will mutually exhaust and destroy each other. In the endeavour of both to swallow up the states of Germany, they are supported by Russia, they are opposed by France; hence a double source of dependence on her, by the objects she can favour, by the hostile influence

she can counteract. What would Russia be to-day, but for the rivalry of France and England? What would she be without the war of liberalism and despotism? It is in these contests that she has been aggrandised; these contests are necessary to her future aggrandisement. France is the object of attack. France must therefore look on each accession to the strength of either of the allies—not as on a question of foreign or commercial influence, but as ammunition introduced into a hostile fort—as reinforcements entering an enemy's camp on the eve of battle.

In this state of real hostility, what must the consequence be of the accession of all the resources of the Turkish empire to the northern alliance? From that hour Russia is invulnerable—a few thousand men suffice to guard her southern and eastern frontiers—her attention is all concentrated on the west. A very few years will double or triple her revenue. The commerce of Europe will be in her hands—in her control will be placed all the materials at present used in the arsenals of France. A formidable fleet will be launched in the Mediterranean; she will immediately possess a navy superior to that of France. The influence and commerce of France is immediately arrested in the sea hitherto her own; and at any hour Russia may transport her Cossacks to the shores of Italy or of Spain, to support the factions, and the principles which, at

present, cause France so much inquietude. These circumstances will re-act on Belgium, on Germany, on internal faction. The very hour that Russia is entrenched at the Dardanelles, these consequences will be evident. Then will the time be at hand for carrying into execution the plans so carefully matured in the three cabinets, and for extinguishing, by a third occupation, the spirit that inspires such terrors to the two northern courts, and which gives its supremacy to the third.

England, to-day the ally of France, will she be so then? Can she send fleets or armies to her support? Clearly impossible. Whatever may be her sympathy, England cannot again engage in a continental war—and this struggle will be confined to the dry land.

If such consequences flow from the occupation of Turkey, is not that question one of existence for France? Supposing it possible for these consequences to be delayed, is it less so? A nation's life does not run out with the few sand-glasses that mark the period of individual existence. The life of a nation is its system;—that life in France is already seriously compromised—and a few steps further gained by Russia, its fate becomes irrevocable.

But reanimate the Ottoman empire, the whole picture is instantaneously reversed; Russia will be arrested where she is, and prevented from becoming

any thing save that which she is, poor, exposed, and vulnerable in her centre. While the Dardanelles are Turkish, Russia can never dare to irritate the maritime powers. Even were a war necessary to reanimate Turkey, France now chooses her time, instead of Russia choosing her's ; she has the whole Ottoman empire, with its immense power of resistance, to oppose against her ; she avoids the armies of Germany, if they are hostile, and she calls in the maritime, and, still more important, the moral force of England. Success is certain, and the means insignificant. She requires 500,000 men, besides the national guard, to be prepared against the contingencies of European affairs. The fleet actually at sea, would, in three months, solve the Turkish question entirely in her favour, carrying as a consequence, every European obstacle—setting at rest the irritation in the Peninsula and Belgium, excited by Russia and her compeers, to divert her attention from the field, where she has only to appear, to be victorious—and to comprehend to appear.

Not less imperative are the interests of England. The northern combination, political against France, is commercial against England. This subject demands a separate and more detailed exposition. Suffice it for the present, to say, that the countries buying from us and selling to us, to the yearly value of thirty millions, would be placed under the immediate control of the coalition, and

of course under the regulations of the Russian tariff; not as it is to-day, but such as it would be when the mask is wholly dropped. What would the effect on the internal state of England be, if a considerable diminution of exportation occurred? But it is not only the direct effects of the tariffs of the coalition that is to be apprehended—would it not command the tariffs of northern and southern America? Are the opening prospects of commerce, not to speak of that actually existing in Turkey alone, of no importance? Is it nothing, to see projects maturing for direct communication with India through the Turkish Territory, while the Danube is rendered navigable, while canals are about to connect that stream with the other rivers of Austria, and with those of Russia, Prussia, and Bavaria, so as to establish a direct communication between the manufacturing districts of Germany with the marts of Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Arabia, and even India itself? Is it for England to allow freedom of commerce to be extinguished in the only portion of Europe where it exists? Is it for England to allow an empire, a principle of whose existence is freedom of commerce, to be swallowed up by the most restrictive power on the face of the earth? Is it for England to allow the first commercial position in the world to be occupied by such a power? These motives could not have been appreciated by Lord Chatham; they did not then

exist, because the fiscality of Russia had not been developed, when he said, with all the concentration of deep conviction, "with the man who cannot appreciate the interests of England in the preservation of the Ottoman empire, *I will not argue.*"

While Russia, as the St. Petersburg Gazette\* has even already ventured to threaten, expects to march "by Constantinople to Paris," she looks with not less interest to the exclusion of the commerce of Great Britain from the continent as a means of rendering England powerless, and her own allies subservient for the advantage she may have it in her power to grant, independently of any commercial advantage she may reap for herself.

On the occupation of the Dardanelles, disappears the importance of our possessions in the Levant. They were only valuable because the Turks held these straits. When Russia is there, they are valueless, and will soon be untenable; although the expenses of harassing observation may greatly increase our internal embarrassments.

But Russia here, also, has views distinct from her allies. Our Indian possessions—shall we fight for them on the Dnieper, as directing the whole

\* This memorable article in the St. Petersburg Gazette, was, on the reclamation of France and England, disavowed—but afterwards published in the Yassy Official Gazette, and produced a strong sensation on the Russian troops, then occupying the provinces.

Mussulman nation, or shall we fight for them on the Indus, at Bagdad, or in Persia, single-handed—close to the insurrections she will raise in our rear, and when she is possessor of Turkey and Persia? In the Black Sea, we have France to support us. Russia, by her principles, her interests, and her designs, must wage war to the knife, with England\*. England and France, by

\* The identity of the position of England, or rather Europe and Russia with that of Athens and Philip, is truly remarkable. On the one hand, the same concentration of political power—the same spirit of conquest—the same command and combination of arms and diplomacy, of cunning and falsehood, of successful delusion, facility of sowing dissensions, success consequently of every scheme, an equal dexterity in the use of the sword in war and of the pen in peace, generals, spies, diplomatists—all the machinery so ably put in motion by Philip, is to be found, but how magnified, how improved! at the disposal of the Slavonic association for conquest. On the other hand, as in Athens, we find the same craving after news and indifference to facts—the same bravery of speech and cowardice of action—the same forensic bickerings, internal animosities—the same combination of dread at the progress of their enemy and contempt for his power—the same confidence in commercial prosperity, in maritime supremacy, in civilised reason over barbarian strength. The same considerations also of material causes—the Hellespont and Byzantium, the winds of the channel, the commerce of the Black Sea, &c. The oration on the Chersonese and the Fourth Philippic, with a few verbal alterations, might be supposed addressed to England at this day—God send that the results be not similar! In the last-mentioned oration there is the following apposite passage:—" But it is against



taking up a position of defence now, oppose to her the mass of the Ottomans, and the body of the Ottoman Empire, render useless for aggressive purposes the unwilling subjects she has acquired since 1774, and detach from her, and neutralise her now subservient allies. England obtains the co-operation of France, which would be impossible on the Indus. France obtains the co-operation of England, which she will not obtain on the Rhine. Russia's spirit of conquest, which torments and menaces every corner of Europe, will be extinguished; her banners arrested along the 3000 miles of their progressive movement, from the Vistula to the Araxes—her power lost in Europe—her face for ever turned from the east and south.

We have more than once repeated, that the allies of Russia, united to her in western policy, united to her in the abandonment of the Ottoman empire, are necessarily detached from her by the decision of England and France to restore the Turkish Empire. To developpe this idea, which

“ our constitution that his arms are principally directed, and  
“ there is a necessity for this. He knows that all his con-  
“ quests, however great, can never be secure while you are  
“ free; he therefore sees in your freedom a spy on the inci-  
“ dents of his fortune. In the first place, therefore, we are  
“ to consider him the enemy of our state—the implacable  
“ enemy of our free constitution. In the next place, be  
“ assured that every thing he is concerting, he is concerting  
“ against our city, and that wherever any man opposes him,  
“ he is opposing an attempt against these walls.”

alone contains the solution of the whole question, we must examine the interests and motives which, under different circumstances, may determine the policy of Austria.

Austria, the old enemy of Turkey, has already been enriched by recovered Hungary,—by Transylvania, Sirmia, and the Austrian Croatia, wrested from that empire. A hundred years ago she was inspired with the hopes of the possession of European Turkey and Constantinople, but another enemy of Turkey has arisen—another competitor of Austria; Russia has succeeded to these expectations.

It then became Austria's policy to unite with Turkey to repress this northern intruder; but the bond of the Polish partition reduced her to insignificance, subserviency, and silence. Still, as the power of Russia has increased, her indecision has diminished; and, during the last war, she was prepared to pour her armies into Wallachia, and did not do so only because England was engaged on the side of Russia. But leave Turkey to her Russian enemy, and Austria will seek to profit by the catastrophe she has not been able to prevent.

But her interest in the Turkish question is but a portion of many cares. Her first object is that of self-preservation. The first shot fired on the Rhine, or in the west of Europe, will be levelled at her existence. Her government is under the control of a high aristocracy—an aristocracy in

the great Slavonic and Hungarian divisions of the empire, essentially feudal, without a middle class between it and the serfs, whose position is not far superior to those of Russia. But this system, precarious as it is, has not the advantage of uniformity; the supremacy of the government, and of the local aristocracies, depends on employing the military means of one province to enforce submission in another; and on this precarious submission depends, not only the unity of the empire, but the existence of the aristocracy, who direct its policy. The preservation of peace is, therefore, the first of Austrian interests, which she must maintain by the sacrifice of all external interests, if necessary. But if her political state loudly deprecates every external collision, her financial state not less imperatively demands repose, and her fiscal regulations can suffer no violent disturbance.

France, by her principles alone, endangers Austria, and the system of government on which the existence of Austria depends. The interests of France, moreover, are opposed to the consolidation of Austria's supremacy in Germany and Italy. The power of France, if she is powerful, will deprive it of that supremacy, and expose it to an attack in case of war. The principles of France, no less hostile than her interests—no less dangerous than her power, combine with both to render that supremacy precarious in profoundest peace, pre-

carious even under the most favourable dispositions of the government of France. But the government of France being popular, it is evident that neither the interests, nor the popular principles of the nation, can, in any case, be long excluded from action on her foreign policy; if they were, a change of administration would follow, and bring with it violent reaction. Therefore, no compact, no treaty, no alliance, no concession, that it is in the power of France to make, can in any degree calm the alarms, or soothe the hostility, of Austria. But France, at this moment, does exert an opposing influence in Germany; she does hold Ancona. For three centuries the views of Austria have been fixed on Italy. Her principal influence in Europe depends on her possession of Lombardy, and on her control over the remainder of the Peninsula. Her Italian possessions furnish a large contingent to her army, and a large portion of her revenue. Her possessions on the Adriatic give an outlet to her whole empire for its industry, and nourish that industry by foreign produce. But they are so dependent on the presence of a strong body of Austrian troops, that Prince Metternich has declared, that the principle of intervention is a *vital question* for Austria. So that while French intervention puts these possessions in the greatest hazard, the recognition, by France and England, of the principle of non-intervention, is fatal to her

possessions, if she is obliged to conform to it; while its mere proclamation multiplies her difficulties and her dangers.

While France maintains so large a military force on foot, Austria must maintain her actual establishment, disproportioned to her means, beyond the resources of her treasury. Yet no combination can diminish this necessity; because, were France even to reduce her standing army, she could not dismiss her national guard, become now a portion of her institutions, a vital part of those principles, already in their moral character so dangerous to Austria. These considerations may so deeply affect the mind of Prince Metternich, that he may consider all remoter interests or apprehensions of little importance, when compared with the necessity of diminishing the power of France, since he cannot expect to modify her principles by any thing short of a third occupation. This, at least, is the only grounds on which we can account for the late subserviency of Austria, which may prove, which must prove fatal to her in common with the rest of Europe.

The means of laying France in the dust present themselves in permitting Russia to occupy Constantinople. Prince Metternich may hope to counterbalance the acquisition by additions to the territory of Austria in Roumelia—additions which may furnish uncontaminated nurseries of soldiers, to subdue revolutionary principles in other

provinces. He may be more impressed with dangers of an internal than an external kind; and he may suppose that Russia, having a new field opened to her ambition, her views will be directed to the east, her energies and resources absorbed in that pursuit, and all dangers for Austria postponed to a period remote, and until the attainment of results subject to many contingencies. That in the mean time the animosity of Russia must be directed against France, and Russia must be not only little inclined to quarrel with Austria, but desirous to augment her strength, for the furtherance of their common objects. Prince Metternich will consider that Russia, at Constantinople, would come into immediate contact with France; that the animosity which had animated, for so many years, both governments, while the whole of Germany was interposed between them, would necessarily be exasperated; so many interests, on which Russia can now exercise only a remote and uncertain influence, would then be subject to daily interference, control, and menace. Russia's influence and commerce would become predominant in the Mediterranean, in Egypt, in Greece, her navies threatening, and her Cossacks within reach of Italy, Spain, Corsica, and Algiers. Russia would then, at any moment, be ready to attack France; her military establishment would be rendered necessary to her own defence, instead of being a source of alarm to Austria; and, under

such circumstances, France would never venture to send a large force into Germany or Italy.

The hostility of Austria to France, occasioned, for centuries, by their common views on Italy and Germany, and latterly, by the opposition of their political principles, has rendered Austria necessarily dependent on the maritime superiority of England, to protect herself in her commercial and other interests exposed to the operation of the marine of France; but the union of these two powers renders their common principles more dangerous, and takes from her all confidence, all possibility of support in the maritime power of England against that of France. But, in the creation of the naval power, which Russia necessarily and immediately becomes possessed of, Austria finds relief from her dependence on England.

It is in Prince Metternich's power, at this moment, to grant to, or withhold from Russia the possession on which these results hinge. He has, therefore, immediately pressing upon him the conviction of great danger from principles he has in personal horror; and he has the feeling of holding in his hands the destinies of Europe. These sources of alarm on one hand, and confidence on the other, are, no doubt, ably worked upon by Russia\*; and Metternich may think, by one able

\* The means taken by Russia to win her way into the favour of individuals, as well as to bring about events, are really curiosities in politics. Her progress is a real political

stroke, to bridle France, to annihilate the European commerce of England, to dissolve a union which evidently, unchecked, will in a few years arbitrate supremely in every European interest, and so strengthen the northern combination as to render it capable of exterminating, with the sword, the political institutions to which he is opposed; and of restoring, and effectually securing, the supremacy of the absolute principle by the destruction of the press.

However, while the questions at issue are placed in the west, whatever be the views of the cabinet, Austria must exert every energy, arm her last man, expend her last florin, in the cause of the northern alliance; for there the first reverse is fatal to her power, and without a contest the pro-drama—incidents, situations, decorations, changes of scene and scenery, and always ending in the desired result. It is since the revolution of 1830, that Russia has acquired such ascendancy over Austria; but this ascendancy is not wholly owing to the alarms of Austria: After the revolution of July, the first messenger from St. Petersburg brought Prince Metternich the announcement, that the Russian minister at Paris had been ordered to follow the march of the Austrian minister, and to quit Paris if he thought proper to do so. Metternich instantly appeared to himself the director of a great system—the controller of the destinies of Europe. From that hour, Austria has not reckoned sacrifice what Russia demanded, nor spared concessions. Could Metternich do less than enjoin to his minister at Constantinople, and his agent at Alexandria, “loyal co-operation” with the representatives of Russia?



perity of her adversary menaces her system. There she has all to hope and nothing to fear from Russia—all to fear and nothing to hope from France; but transport the field of discussion, and the chances of collision to the east, and the scene is wholly reversed. Here, on every point, she is in competition with Russia, and on each she is connected with England and France; Austria interposed between the adverse principles of the north and the west, contains within herself that opposition. She has two sets of interests at variance and at war, and one or other must predominate, as the corresponding principle predominates without.

Austria, the rival of France in Germany, is the rival of Russia in Turkey; the antagonist of France in Italy, she has equally strong motives for being the antagonist of Russia in the provinces; the competitor of France in the Levant, she has to dread the supremacy of Russia in the no less important outlet of the Black Sea. Russia already tampers with the Illyrian military colonists that guard her Hungarian frontiers, and is actively engaged in the three Turkish provinces nearest to Austria, in preparing a state of things that will render them valueless property to Austria. France affrights Austria with a chart—Russia affrights her with a creed.

No Austrian statesman can be blind to the consequences, if Russia take possession of Constantinople? No pretence of equivalent can Austria find in the half Russian provinces of Servia, Bosnia, and Montenegrin\*? It will be more profitable even for Russia, that they be apparently possessed by Austria. She looks to maritime acquisitions, and will gladly purchase, by so insignificant a cession, the prolonged subserviency of the Austrian government. But what will be the independence of the Austrian empire itself? All its commercial relations in the Black Sea are at her disposal; two-thirds of its territory are encircled by her frontiers; its commercial marine in the Mediterranean, which numbers so many thousand fine vessels, may be at any hour proscribed by an Ukase. What becomes even of its possession of the Adriatic?

Russia, occupying the Dardanelles, the key of all traffic of the Levant, enforcing what regula-

\* We have already stated, that Russia had become an object of hatred to the principal men; but Austrian domination would very soon awaken Russian predilections: Austrian intolerance and fiscalty would soon prepare food for Russian propagandism; even now, however unwillingly, they are obliged to lean on Russia, as her influence pervades and predominates everywhere. She gives bribes—sends agents and spies—she can promise and threaten. Her eye and her finger are every where, or what is, perhaps, even worse, suspected of being every where.

tions she may think fit, throughout Turkey\*, and in its necessary dependencies, Egypt, Greece, and the islands, *will she suffer* the Austrian, or any other flag, to form seamen and a marine in the commerce of the Levant? Of course the Russian mercantile marine will both occupy the caravan trade and the trade between the Levant and Europe. But she will, moreover, from the coast of Dalmatia, from the Seven Islands, which must ultimately fall to her, command the Adriatic in a military point of view; and thus, in every case, deprive it of its value for Austria. Is it not then Austria's interest to maintain an intermediary power at Constantinople, the destruction of which must immediately lead to an immense development

\* Even already in the provinces has she ventured to command the withdrawal from Europeans of the privileges granted by the Turkish government to all foreigners throughout its states. It is needless to quote the entire interruption of the European transit trade through Georgia; for it must be evident, as the sun at noon-day, that one of the principal motives of Russia in her acquisition of the Dardanelles is the erection of a great naval power; and, as a means to that end, she will exclude all European traffic and shipping; and she has only to make Turkey retaliate on France and England their own regulations, effectually to exclude both. She will supply the East with what manufactures she can raise, thus protected against English and French competition, and with those of Germany, whose commercial relations will thus be in her power.

of France on the one hand, or of Russia on the other, equally fatal to her\*?

And if France and England unite to compel Russia to desist from her designs against Turkey, will not Austria rejoice to see the war so long menacing between the opposed principles and the rival strength of the two alliances, to which she holds merely for self defence against its consequences, carried far from Italy and the Rhine? Must she not rejoice to see that the consequences of that war will bring accession of strength to neither of the powers, which alike cause her anxiety and alarm? The object of that war being the protection and consolidation of a

\* Since the first edition was published, the circumstances have entirely altered. Austria has had time to weigh more maturely, and to perceive more clearly, the dangers that menace her from the north. These dangers have been doubled by the union of France and Russia, which destroys entirely the balance that existed even a few months ago. It is no longer time to choose between French or Russian connection. The only chance of salvation is now a cordial co-operation with England. All dangers are now concentrated in one point—one position alone remains for a stand to be made against Russia—shall that point be sacrificed, or not? Prince Metternich must say “it shall not”!

The union between France and Russia is, however, between Louis Philip and Nicholas; this union cannot exist in the face of publicity—it is a mystery, and its disclosure and publication in this country neutralises half its effect—a decisive step taken by England practically dissolves it.

power which must prevent both from becoming preponderant in Europe.

But that above all which is most dreaded by Austria is, that the war that threatens, once engaged, will become one of political principles—that France and England will not be arrayed against Austria and Russia, but that Liberal will be arranged against Absolutist, and popular against divine rights. If, therefore, the storm bursts in the east, the field of contest is removed from her soil, and the principles of the belligerents are left in repose. There no watchwords will be proclaimed, that may thrill through the clubs of Vienna, that they may arm the slave against the master, the subject against the sovereign, the brother against the brother. England and France, in assuming the defence of Turkey, stand forth in the majesty of their united power, and of obliged moderation, as the advocates of the public interests of the European community; they seek no support from political theories or political antipathies. In the government they undertake to defend, the favourers of liberalism may find individual independence such as the freest state of Europe does not possess—while the Absolutists may console themselves by seeing the constitutional governments supporting the purest expression of their favourite system—a monarchy absolute in its form, combining religious and civil supremacy, and doubly sanctioned and sanctified by right divine.

Let the squadron of England and France appear in the Black Sea, and the decision of Austria cannot be doubtful. The union of England with France is a guarantee of the disinterestedness of the intentions of both. Their power, when combined on this arena, is irresistible. Their object, not a war of propagandism, of revolution, but one of conservation, of protection; assuring not only the independence of Austria against the north, but elevating a power in the south to balance the influence she dreads in the Mediterranean and in Italy. The speedy termination of the contest, the instantaneous success of the allies, must be the first of Austrian objects, because she is the first exposed to the danger; nay, the certainty of dismemberment by *any* struggle in Europe.

It is on the strength of these considerations, that we conclude, that if Russia is attacked in the Black Sea, the alliance of France and England is established, by the combination of their action on a common field—that the northern coalition is instantaneously dissolved, its positions and defences turned—the government, strong by its diplomacy and important by its position, brought over to our side, and the whole chances and dangers of war concentrated on the head of that single power which, always aggressive, because nowhere else assailable, has complicated and embroiled the affairs of Europe, to open to herself, in the midst of the confusion, a road to Constantinople.

This is a mere contest of dates. If Russia is first at Constantinople, she combines, necessarily, all the resources of the northern governments ; she develops a naval power, to which there can be no possible balance in the Mediterranean ; Greece and Egypt become dependencies ; no state can partake of the spoils of Turkey, or subsequently share in the commerce of the Levant, the Euxine, or Central Asia and Persia, Arabia, Syria, and Egypt. The possibility of all useful union against her on the part of England and France vanishes ; and civilisation itself is threatened with a more dangerous eclipse than it suffered from the overflow of the barbarians in 604.

If England anticipates Russia, she has with her France ; Austria enters to hasten the termination of the struggle, if necessary ; the whole Ottoman empire is called to arms, the troops and fleet of Mehemet Ali united to them, and the only result that will then be worth accepting, will be the retreat of Russia behind the Dnieper, which moderate prudence and consequence in the policy of the cabinets of France and England would never have permitted her to traverse.

But we must not neglect, in this inquiry, the position and resources of Mehemet Ali. A state of hostility has sprung up between him and his sovereign, which has grown with the growth of Mehemet Ali's power ; and this hostility is a necessary consequence of the position occupied by Russia.

The consolidation of the Sultan's power is fatal to Mehemet Ali; he must be, therefore, even without any intelligence or concert with that power, ready to play into the hands of Russia, to keep the Sultan weak, though perhaps not with the idea of bringing Russia to Constantinople. But England, in the Treaty of the 6th of July, 1827, did not anticipate the Treaty of Adrianople; nor France, in raising up Mehemet Ali against his sovereign, the Treaty of the 8th of July. So Mehemet Ali, with more reason—for he secures, at least, his life interest in Egypt—may become the chief instrument in the final consummation which he has already brought so near.

Mehemet Ali's power now solely rests on the sword. In proportion as he feels his insecurity, he must look to the support of Russia—look to the disorganising influence of Russia on the Porte as his only safeguard; he may even prefer a contest with his Sovereign to the prospect of insurrection or gradual decay, for the chances it may offer to Russia to step in with the means of holding Constantinople. He is therefore brought to that point where, not only he can be rendered subservient to Russia, but where he desires what Russia desires.

Mouravieff\* gave him clearly to under-

\* It may appear surprising that we date, as so recent a period, the direct connection between Mehemet Ali and Russia. Could Russia neglect a power which now throws



stand that, while Russia interfered to protect the Sultan, she left him at liberty to secure as much of the Sultan's dominions as he could ; and in fact, he has not forgotten that England and France, and not Russia, had arrested the progress of Ibrahim. Russia has now taken care to have at Alexandria an agent equal to the post, and capable of entering into these questions with the Pacha without a dragoman.

The agent of Russia may easily alarm the fears, and awake the interest of the Pacha to Russian counsel, by showing him his danger on the one hand from the animosity of the Sultan, calmed, for the moment, by the energetic representations of Russia ; he may show him that Russia has even deviated from the terms of her engagement into her scale such immense weight ? She did not neglect it, and ably has she continued to bring about its growth and position. During the Restoration, France was the tool of Russia. Her armies were sent into Spain to quell the principles she now sends her armies to support ; her influence was used in Egypt to raise an enemy to the Ottoman empire, and to produce consequences which she must now, if not wholly blinded by adverse destiny, run the chances of a war to avert. But France entered into the scheme, not as she entered Spain, on compulsion, but with the view of sharing with her Russian patron the spoils of Turkey —with the view of balancing the influence of England in the Mediterranean ! Thus Russia exercised an additional authority over France, and proved her disinterestedness, in making that vacillating cabinet contribute to the furtherance of her own views, and to the destruction of the Ottoman empire.

to the Sultan, for the sake of his preservation ; he may show him, on the other, that his hostile position to a sovereign that it is the intention of the maritime powers to defend, puts him in hostility with them ; that, moreover, France and England are both opposed to his aggrandisement ; the one resisting him in the west, the other in the east, both patronising Greece, and guarding the integrity of the Ottoman empire ; he may succeed in persuading a man who, however great his ability, has never had his mind formed to political judgment, and who has been led, by the duplicity and intrigues of the portion of the French administration that most actively served Russia under the restoration, to form a low estimate of one, at least, of the allies, that his interests were not opposed to those of Russia—that their interests were common—that the weakening of the Sultan was necessary to both, and that the occupation of Constantinople itself by Russia, would be the means by which he would become the pastor and preserver of the Mussulmans scattered by the storm—so that he should unite the succession of the Califat to the patrimony of Mahomet. What must not the effect be of such suggestions, and proceeding from such a source, to a man of Mehemet Ali's ambition, and in his perilous position ! He may even have had his regards turned to rich and renowned plains, where millions of his co-religionaries groan under a

christian yoke. He may have been told how easily that dominion may be upset. A combination between himself and Persia, may have been detailed under the direction of Russia. It may have been shown him that an Egyptian camp at Bussorah—a Persian camp at Herat, with no more than the secret agency that Russia at this moment employs, would suffice to render government impracticable in India, to dry up the sources of revenue—to excite to revolt in all the remotest points of these wide-spread dominions, leading to the necessity of precautions and observation, and armed force to watch disaffection and quell insurrection. What a field is not here opened—what motives, what temptations, has not Russia at her disposal for all men and all circumstances? Bank notes, crosses, and portefeuilles for London and Paris. Crowns, and sceptres, and empires, for Alexandria, and Teheran. This may be treated as a vision: it is one of those visions by which Russia arrives at realities!

It is quite idle to talk of danger to Turkey from Russia, if England is on the side of Turkey; that is to say, if England sends even a couple of line of battle ships into the Euxine. That declares that Turkey has the support of England: the Turks would feel that England was committed, and England (which is not less important) would have a complete ascendancy over the Turkish government, and direct its measures. Our con-

viction is, that a burst of enthusiasm would arise in the capital, and be re-echoed from the farthest frontiers;—nay, that an electric chord, extending from the western limits of Poland, to the fishermen on the east of the Caspian, would receive a shock from the avowedly hostile contact of our vessels with the waters of the Euxine, which would shake at once those regions free from the grasp and the pollution of Russia. If this is true, or if it is any thing like the truth, it is clear that there is no attack to be feared from Russia against Turkey; but, supposing that none of these internal causes of insurrection or even inaction existed, and that Russia was prepared to defy the union of Turkey and England—what could she do—make a descent on Constantinople? clearly impossible with an English squadron there—supported by 50 or 60 Turkish men of war. Clearly impossible again, because she has not, at the utmost, the means of transporting at once more than 10,000 men; and 10,000 Russian as *enemies*, certainly could not at present come within reach of the capital. Should she send an army into Roumelia, she would require not less than 200,000, for she lost nearly that number last time, when England was committed against Turkey—when Turks and Christians were at war on all points, and both were in opposition to their own Government, which they accused of putting them in a state of hostility with the whole world—when Turkey had no troops whatever—when no counsel or advice

far less direction could be tolerated by the Turkish Government from us, whom it justly considered leagued with her enemy—when, above all things, her fleet had been destroyed by us. Now Russia could not venture to attack Turkey with less than double the force put in motion during the last war—and how is she to find means of transport\*. The confined region of the provinces is incapable of supplying them—an insuperable obstacle is thus placed to the passage of such a body of troops as passed in 1829, for then the transport was effected by sea; not only was the sea her's, but the Turks were obliged to reserve 15,000 of their best troops (and they only had 30,000 at all disciplined) to guard against a descent on Thrace, and the destruction of the reservoirs of water for the metropolis. Then also was Constantinople blockaded by Russian vessels (*non-belligerents*) on the south. It must be superfluous to proceed with the contrast of that period and the present. The

\* The post between Tiflis and Odessa is partly served by oxen, horses are so scarce. Even during the campaign of 1829, when provisions were particularly abundant, and when the Black Sea was covered with her transports, it is mentioned as a fore-thought highly creditable to Diebitsch, that he had transported, from the Crimea and the banks of the Volga, camels and other beasts of burthen, without the assistance of which he could not have effected the passage of the Balkan. But such a movement on the part of Russia is an utter impossibility.

result of Russia's success, has been the moral prostration of the Turkish Government, which ceases the moment that England steps in.

But putting aside again the dangers of insurrection to Russia, putting aside the incapacity of Russia to attack Turkey, she having England as her ally, would it be possible for Russia to defend herself, if Turkey even now released from that state of prostration by the support of England, and freed from her own errors by the counsel of England, chose to assume the offensive against Russia? The whole question depends on the possession of the Black Sea. The power occupying the Black Sea, in any collision between the two, must be the aggressor, or no collision can take place. The union of England with Turkey gives Turkey the command of the Black Sea.

The idea of aggressive warfare would rouse all the energies—silence all the dissensions—combine all the efforts of the Mussulman population. Every point of Russia is open and vulnerable—once the Russian vessels have retreated to their harbours; for each point she would be equally alarmed, and her communications would be cut off. Turkey has 60,000 tolerably disciplined troops, all disposable; 2 or 300,000 irregulars could be assembled at a call; fifty sail of vessels, with small craft, could break down the Russian defences, where most considerable. The Georgian provinces would instantly

throw off the yoke; even the Wallachians, Moldavians, and Bessarabians\*, would join in the general impulse; the millions of brave and independent Circassians would pour across the Couban, and spread over the Crimea—and where would Russia be?—sending troops to Warsaw, not to Silistria!

But such extremities never can be proceeded to—we have no hostile intentions, no aggressive designs against Russia. She knows too well the consequences to provoke them; but she is quite right to threaten, while threats obtain victories. Our object is not to push England into war, but to save her from the fearful consequences of giving Russia greater strength in our fears than she possesses in her own arms.

Russia must, necessarily, be overwhelmed if attacked; for if circumstances favoured her, she would not wait to be attacked. She would attack—surprise—occupy. The chances are all actually against her for war: famine, poverty, weakness of defences at Sevastopol, and elsewhere, contests and *serious reverses* in the Caucasus, the

\* This province, formerly a part of Moldavia, has to regret its detachment from the worst governed province of Turkey. Still it is less oppressed than any other part of Russia; for important exceptions have been made in its favour to conciliate the cognate tribes. It is emancipated from serfage and conscription, and is yet so barbarous as to deplore Russian civilisation.

union of France and England, irritation against her in these nations, general discredit in Europe, power of resistance in Turkey, unfitness in her navy, bad state of her army, necessary loss of her allies, and peace in Europe. All chances equally work for her in the maintenance of peace; gradual disorganisation of Turkey, prolonged and exhausting misintelligence between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan, calming of the irritation in Turkey, of the irritation in Europe, slumbering of the Turkish question, and restored confidence on that subject, probabilities of confusion and conflict in various places, of internal troubles in France and in England, of disunion between them, even of general war in Europe; cessation of famine at home, increased resources in Moldavia and Wallachia, improvement of finances, progress in preparatives, great and rapid improvement of her navy, levies on a scale beyond a war establishment, active progress in defensive works, subjugation of the coasts of the Caucasus. These are the chances or the progress offered her by every hour of nominal peace, while she is permitted to keep a curb in the mouth of Turkey, and place a load on its back—a spur in its flank. If on Turkey the salvation of the whole European question depends, can this be endured? If not promptly succoured, it must sink. The last few months have hastened its exhaustion; months, not years, if abandoned, will number its remaining career.



And what will this succour cost the two first nations of the globe, whose colossal rivalry have for thirty years shaken and overthrown every institution, every throne in Europe? United now happily in their objects, their interests, their principles, and their might, it will cost them even yet but to say—"Let Turkey live." While the Bosphorus is still open, will they not say the word? Their squadrons anchored in the Bosphorus, they dictate their own terms to Turkey; to Russia they proclaim, that from that day they intend to arbitrate supremely between the nations of the earth. Their power is only limited by their indecision.

While the government of England takes "peace" for its motto, it is idle to think of supporting Turkey. Peace, that is, useful peace, flows from the mutual respect of two, not from the inclination of one.

But in England it may be said, even though our government feels its position, that of France may not. We answer, it is wholly impossible for the French Government not to follow the impulse of that of England. The administration in France, that suffered England alone to bridle Russia, would not exist an hour. Besides, the Government of France holds by many ties to that of England; France, if we act, must and will support us.



## POSTSCRIPT.

IT is now six months since this essay first appeared; during this interval, there has occurred no fact to recal interest to the east—all seems tranquil as the flow of a deep and undisturbed stream, the course of which is probably never again to be interrupted—but how is the scene changed! If the reader will turn back a couple of pages, and reconsider the chances there placed against Russia for war, the chances pointed out as working for her in peace, he will find that, during this short period of six months, most of the chances unfavourable to her have disappeared, and those favourable have become fact.

*Famine*,—which paralised all her energies, and during which the maintaining of her semblance of strength may be called a miracle, because brought about by means incomprehensible to us—that famine has disappeared.

*Poverty*,—with Famine, her financial difficulties have disappeared; she is in no want of money\*.

\* “ It is of course impossible to pierce the veil of mystery with which Russia covers all such transactions; yet, many things may be known, although not capable of proof. Elections in England—certain expenses at Paris and Vienna—in Vendee lately—in Spain and Portugal, must have amounted to a very large sum. The Chancellery at Constantinople is like a money-change. It has been seen ankle-deep with coin.

She has refused the offer of the Turkish Government to pay off several instalments at once (!) She has recently, and without a word being heard about it, raised a loan at Warsaw of 3,700,000*l.* (the second since the revolution), which is already 8 per cent. above par; she can have, therefore, no difficulty in borrowing. She has 2,500,000*l.*, war indemnity, coming in from Poland, and the subjugation of Poland gives her a considerable pecuniary profit by the diminished establishments, military, civil, and judicial, a saving of between one and two millions sterling.

*Weakness of Defences at Sevastopol.* They are strengthening.

*Contests in the Caucasus.* She is withdrawing her troops thence. She has no aggressive movements to fear from the Circassians, and now that the changes in Turkey have diminished the difficulties and danger of occupying Constantinople, she will leave the Caucasus to itself; it was important, as the barrier that has hitherto arrested

Boutinieff, within three weeks of his arrival, drew bills on Vienna, &c., for 40,000*l.*; yet he could not have come empty handed. The post regularly brought back pack-loads of gold,—none of the indemnity had been remitted to St. Petersburg—8,000,000 of roubles were said to be appropriated to the new fortifications of Sevastopol; the new naval armaments contracted for cannot be stated at less than 2,000,000*l.* The half of the revenue of Russia must suffice for all internal and peaceable ends; the other half may fairly be considered as devoted to the preparations for war.”—*British and Foreign Review*, No. I., p. 119.

her. She has now in view a shorter cut; she therefore concentrates her troops towards Sevastopol and Odessa, to bring for the present these military demonstrations to support the action of her diplomacy at Constantinople, to demoralise the Turks, to act more powerfully both on the Porte and on Mehemet Ali. Who can tell if the period she has set is not really very near, and a rupture produced between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan will be the occasion taken for securing the co-operation of the Sultan's authority, to cause her troops to be admitted as friends?

*Union of France and England.* If such a union still lingers, it certainly is ineffective for the eastern interests of either; probably this weight, then, against Russia, is now in her scale.

*Unfitness of her Navy.* In a rapid state of progress, every month producing an augmentation of guns, vessels, and efficiency.

*Bad state of her Army.* Army left more disposable—new levies since then—provisions, forage, improved means of transport.

*Peace in Europe.* We now have war in the Peninsula to distract us\*.

\* The following extract from the Berlin Gazette, of the 18th Sept., will show the longings before hand of Russian policy, for some troubles to occupy England in the west.  
 “ The number troops entertained by Russia in the south,  
 “ is double that in the north, in consequence of the fears  
 “ inspired by the state of the east, although the troubles of  
 “ Syria are appeased—the pretensions of the English cabinet  
 “ are still to be dreaded. It is astonishing, that in London,

And finally, the *power of resistance in Turkey*. We have sufficiently shown that Turkey wants

“ more is said and written about the east than the west, where assuredly a fermentation reigns, that the disappearance of two generations will not extinguish. They endeavour to guess at the real state of the east, and in the meantime neglect to observe the menacing symptoms that appear at home—and no attention is given to Spain. The system of Canning ought to have guided the present ministry, who will expiate one day their fatal negligence, &c.” A following passage is too curious to be omitted.

“ But the ill-disguised *entêtement* of the English cabinet is extraordinary, when the Oriental question is agitated. For him who knows the prejudices of Lord Palmerston in favor of Turkey—and the task that England has imposed on herself, of *arresting the effects of the destructive principle* ; it ceases to be matter of surprise to see the noble lord alarmed at every moment, and calling out fire when nothing inflammable exists around him. All the world knows the convention of Russia with the Porte, and the manner in which Russia understands it. All the world knows the commentaries addressed to the Porte by the Ambassador of Russia. Lord Palmerston persists alone in seeing nothing, or rather he believes that each article contains a double sense. This explains the presence of the English squadron in the Mediterranean, where it goes and comes, passes and repasses, as if to excite complaints, as if to bring about some adventure to justify this useless activity ; we believe it will be lost trouble, and that the English admirals will be no more successful in causing the Porte to deviate from its ordinary tranquillity, than the diplomatic notes of Lord Palmerston have succeeded in neutralising the negotiations, and ruining the system followed at Constantinople, and St. Petersburg.”

neither limbs nor hearts ; it is a head she wants. The Sultan is all powerful ; he can do just what he pleases ; that is, he can make himself the centre of national feeling, confidence, and strength ; or if he can make himself the centre of national antipathy, and the cause of national convulsion and prostration. The degree of influence which Russia can acquire over his mind, is therefore in a great measure the indication of the progress she has made towards the subjugation of Turkey. All external collision has now ceased, all resistance of a public or political nature to the power—that garrisons Silistria—that assembles armies almost within sight of the capital—that has bewitched all Europe—that possesses alone means of access to the sovereign and the government, is of course not to be dreamt of ; *no news* will therefore come henceforward from Turkey. But an incident or two, may be worthy of the attention of those who do not conceive the occupation of Constantinople “ *un fait accompli.*”

At the commencement of the Ramazan, the Russian ambassador announced to the Turkish government, that he had received from the Emperor Russian decorations, to be distributed to the Turkish regiments which had formed part of the camp of Unkiar Skelessi ; and that his majesty wished, by this distribution, to impress still more deeply in the memory of the troops, and the Ottoman people, the recollection of that period of fra-

ternity. This distribution of Russian medals to the Russian troops had been several times before resolved on, but as often abandoned, the period not having arrived when it could be enforced.

Mark the moment now made choice of for insisting on this distribution.—The Ramazan! the period of fasting—of Mussulman sanctification—of relaxation of discipline among the troops, and of supervision over the people—when long vigils, and meetings in the streets and coffee-houses, facilitate combinations. This is always the epoch in which dissatisfaction foment; and what fitter mode of leading to insurrection than the forcing, at such a period, by the government itself, this brand of degradation on the Turkish army. The answer to the application for the distribution of the decorations, which was officially made by Boutinieff, was for several days evaded, and in the interim the troops were sounded. It was found that they were animated by the most decided spirit of resistance, and that there prevailed among them a general determination not to permit the decorations to be affixed to their breasts. Boutinieff pressed his demand, in terms still more urgent. A short delay was solicited, on the ground of the Ramazan, its religious observances, and pious preoccupations. These arguments being without effect, the dangers of the moment, and the dispositions of the troops, were represented to him, and the apprehensions of the government unfolded, in friendly confidence.



The implacable minister replied, that it was necessary to overcome resistance, and to contend with danger; that the Emperor would learn with indignation that there was a disinclination on the part of the Turkish ministers to make that use of his present for which he had destined it, and that any delay would be considered by his majesty as a serious offence. He saw that it was necessary to convince, or to intimidate, each of the ministers separately. One evening he invited himself to sup with Achmet Pacha, another evening with the Vizier, another with the Seraskier, another with the Kyhaia Bey. He also visited the Reis Effendi, but did not sup with him, because this minister was suffering from indisposition. During eight consecutive nights, he visited one or other of the principal personages, using to each the language appropriate to his position; flattering, caressing, and threatening, by turns. The road being thus smoothed, he once more peremptorily repeated his demand for the distribution. The government had then only one course to adopt; this was, to inspire terror for the purpose of escaping destruction, and to fulfil, with as little danger as possible, the will of the Czar. Those who had most positively and energetically refused to accept the decorations, were seized and beheaded; and twenty young men forfeited their lives as an offering to the genius of Russian moderation!

Do the annals of politics record a more odious

act than this? What language possesses terms capable of characterising it? The Ottoman government resisted as long as it was able, without declaring itself in open insurrection against the Russians. Placed between the dread of incurring the displeasure of the Emperor, and the danger of an insurrection at home; terror alone could deliver them; it was therefore deemed necessary, on the order of the Russian minister, to call in the aid of the executioner. Such measures are carried into effect by a brilliant, elegant, amiable, and prepossessing diplomatist; how steeled, then, must be the resolution of that merciless system! what may it do—what may it dare, one day, to annihilate in Europe the institutions which are obnoxious to it!

It was then that conspiracies were spoken of, and that the English fleet was recalled from Malta. There was no conspiracy save that of the Russian minister; no executions but those which were ordered in consequence of his insisting on a distribution, which he was assured could not take place without that horrible preliminary. There was no executioner but one—the Russian ambassador.

What must be the feelings with which these events have inspired the troops,—what the dissatisfaction and hatred which the Sultan has drawn down upon himself by these acts? If, to-morrow, the Russians should attempt to dethrone him, what soldier would expose his breast, or draw his sword in his defence? This unhappy sovereign

will be abandoned to his fate, for the crimes of the Emperor, who will one day date a ukase from Constantinople, by the consequences of this and such like crimes.

Boutinieff has in this gained a victory of the first importance—he has succeeded in putting blood between the Sultan and his army, and that at a time, when the head of a Mussulman is almost as inviolable in public opinion, as the life of a citizen among us is inviolable in the eye of the law. This tragedy has occurred at a moment when such atrocities are not screened from general attention by the rapid movement of public and absorbing events, or by prosperity, which wipes away the stains from absolute power. These unfortunate victims fell in the midst of their countrymen, already excited by alarms, and attentive to the least signal denoting new catastrophes, irritated by suffering, and requiring, as some compensation for the miseries that press upon them, that life at least should be protected against the vicisitudes to which it was formerly exposed. Davoud, Pacha of Bagdad, Mustapha, Pacha of Scodra, were both taken in arms—the one is honored with a government, the other gratified with a pension. Times are changed, and the sabre which now no longer sheds the blood of culprits, of rebels, or of enemies, should at least respect that of servants, unimpeached, save for their honest zeal and honorable devotion.

This fact sufficiently proves that the Russian system is ripening, and gaining strength. Whilst Russian diplomacy in the different courts of Europe professes ignorance whenever allusion is made to designs on Constantinople; whilst they are lavish of assurances—of falsehoods—and declarations; here the mine is completed, the inflammable matter is collected, and the moment for lighting the match is the only combination as yet incomplete.

At the close of last year, the Turkish government had come to the determination of definitively regulating the army and the fleet. With this view, they decided on applying to England for a certain number of superior naval officers, and to France for a certain number of military officers in every branch of the service, a portion of whom were to be placed at the head of a military school. A large building (Galata Serail) was to be put into a fit condition to receive 500 pupils and the requisite number of professors. A naval school was to be established in the Arsenal, or at Prince's Island. All was arranged, and letters were about to be dispatched. Russia, on learning this, made remonstrances, and inquired whether the Porte wished to consign the instruction of her army and navy to turbulent men, the republicans, *the Janissaries* of England and France, to inculcate ideas of disobedience and insubordination. These representations, certainly not without effect, were still

insufficient; and then it was declared that if the project were really adopted, the Emperor would view it with the utmost displeasure, and would not patiently witness the troubles which must speedily convulse Constantinople, by the mere fact of the presence of a considerable number of foreign officers, seeking to annihilate the power of the government, and revolutionize the armed force. From that moment the scheme was abandoned. One phrase has now become a spell, "It is the Emperor's will." By it, Boutinieff already reigns in Constantinople.

What is the result of this state of things? That the Turkish ministers have totally abandoned all hope of extricating themselves from their present degrading situation, or of escaping from speedy destruction? They see that they are delivered up to Russia, and that henceforth there will be no thought of delivering them. They are resigned, because resignation is the only course for them. So at least they think; for as we have frequently remarked, the government has arrived at such a degree of distrust of itself, and fear of others, that no energetic resolution can arise, except by external influence and support. Depression has sunk to its utmost depth, and each day of existence seems to the Ottoman government a day of grace, for which they ought to thank heaven. In this state of things, what is to be expected but the acceptance of the Ukase, which will annex Constantinople to

the Russian Empire? All will bow down their heads, and return quietly to their homes.

In conclusion, let us connect the most recent facts that indicate the triumphant march of Russia.

Persia, in 1826, nourished such a spirit of resistance to Russia, that she declared war against her. She was beaten, humbled, her spirit broken, a debt imposed on her, her provinces occupied; and her soldiers, two months after the triumph of Russia, turned against Turkey\*.

In 1828, Turkey nourished such a spirit of resistance to Russia, as to declare war against her. She was beaten, humbled, debt imposed, provinces occupied, bound by treaties, and garrisoned.

In 1830, Poland arose in arms, and shook off the yoke of Russia; she is conquered, prostrate, and in herself hopeless.

In 1832, Turkey, attacked by Mehemet Ali, made an effort to emancipate itself from Russian thralldom, and to throw itself on England; she was spurned back into the arms of her enemy. Five years have sufficed for her to subdue three hostile and aggressive kingdoms, her neighbours—five years have sufficed for opening up the portals of India, where a hostile nation has hitherto stood as watchman—for rendering definitively her own, that great, that ancient Poland, so long, so uselessly—called the Bulwark of Europe; and for

\* See Appendix.

converting into an unresisting and subservient ally, her old, her terrible Ottoman foe. Five short years have sufficed for the accomplishment of labours, in which a century of prosperous enterprise would have been profitably expended. He must be a bold man who can talk—not of war, but of peace! Since, then, four years for new preparation have been given her, four years chances of information and combination have been lost, and the occupation of the Dardanelles is now, in anticipated submission, considered “*un fait accompli*,” except in its consequences, although a hundred leagues of the blue deep stretches between her capital and the Russian arsenals, and the channel leading to that sea has yet soundings for a British squadron.

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## APPENDIX, No. 1.



### ON THE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY

OF THE

### RESOURCES OF PERSIA TO RUSSIA.

*See Introduction.*

IT is very natural that those who are unacquainted practically with the facilities that exist in the east for handling men;—the ease with which, by a little dexterity, the enemy of to-day may be made the partizan of to-morrow—those who have not seen how affections can fluctuate, passions arise and subside, and how opinion, that sole bond of Eastern Government, responds with instantaneous and obedient vibration, to the touch of the skilful hand—it is very natural that those who do not understand this moral state of the East, should vastly underrate the prospects of Russia—that they should not perceive the elements of military power which she is now acquiring in the political and moral control she is allowed to establish over Persia and Turkey. The resistance, the public and personal resistance, the implacable hatred of the Circassians to Russia, the drawback they have proved on her strength and resources, the barrier they have presented to her extension, have actually propagated the belief

that Russia weakens herself by extension. The Circassians are Mussulmans; and, therefore, people believe that all Mussulmans possess the same power of self-independence, the same unsubdued spirit of mountain freedom. This is a grave error; and this barrier, not subdued, but passed (it is nearly so), the power of Russia will expand south, east, and west—not only not arrested by religion and its predilections, by mountains and their spirit, but it will combine, for its own ends, if allowed the time, the very obstacles that have hitherto retarded, but never cooled, her ardour, nor arrested her march.

The whole history of the East establishes as facts, that which we have not sufficient knowledge of its habits, and of its political institutions, to preconceive or account for. Its continual changes, the sudden development of amazing power and prosperity, the as sudden prostration of power, show the facility of building up as of breaking down, and prove how easy it has then been for one individual's genius to command victory and dominion. What may not the genius of a system effect! There, conquerors have marched from triumph to triumph, with the rapidity of a courier. A skirmish has been known to decide the fate of a hundred millions of men. A few months have often sufficed for the erection of systems that have endured for ages, and for raising empires from the lowest pitch of degradation to the pinnacle of power.

At once, in illustration of this truth, and as throwing light on events in progress, we will quote a passage from an unpublished journal of Mr. C. Burgess, who for several years has had a command under the late Prince royal of Persia.

“ The account of the part they (two Persians, now protégés of Russia) took in the last wars, I will give in his own words. As soon as the prince royal, Abbas Mirza,

commenced his expedition against Tiflis, Shiack Alee Mirza, another of the king's sons, came into Ghilan, to raise an army of tufankchés or riflemen, from Mazanderan and that province, with which he was to make an incursion against Lenkeran, and to proceed as far up the banks of the Caspian as he could. He was joined by Mustapha Khan, a famous Mazanderan chief, Bàlà Khan, of the Talish tribe, and Meer Hassan Khan, of Lenkeran, before the Russians took possession of it, and whose family are the hereditary governors of the town. The army might muster about 12,000 men, irregulars, and chiefly riflemen, which is the force best suited to the woody impracticable nature of the country they were to act in. They set out without giving the Russians any notice of their approach, and took Lenkeran, Salian, and Bakou\*, almost without resistance. They were in the act of besieging Kouba, thus having completely turned the Caucasian chain, and the Daghestanees, and other of the mountain tribes, were bringing in heads of Russians to their camp in hundreds; when, all at once, there came in the night a courier to the prince commanding, Shiack Alee Mirza, with the news of the prince royal having lost the battle of Gengà or Elizabethpol†; on this, he, without acquainting any one but his immediate suite, decamped, and at daylight, when the whole army arose, to their great astonishment, their commander was nowhere to be found. Of course, a panic was the immediate consequence, and each chief went off with his own followers to his home, and thus this successful force melted to nothing. The Russians had been so much alarmed at this incursion, that the people at

\* Bakou was not taken; it was surrounded and blockaded.

† Abbas Mirza, had he pushed on to Tiflis, must, after all, have driven Russia beyond the Caucasus.

Astrachan were beginning to prepare to move, and the whole of the Caucasian tribes, who have never, even to this day, submitted to the Russian yoke, were completely set in motion, and fast uniting with the Persian force. What the effects of such an expedition would have been, had their commander been a man of enterprise, it is impossible to say; but the fact of a Persian force so commanded, and so organised, having overrun such a tract of country, and taken three fortified towns, may fairly lead to the conclusion, that had the Persians been assisted, as they ought to have been, in the war by England, and English officers had authority in their army, the results would have been far different from what we have now to contemplate. Meer Abon Talib, who was in Astrachan at this time, was placed under "surveillance" by the Russian police, for the part his brother was taking; *however, at the close of the campaign, he was released, and the family again taken into favour\*.*"

\* The next passage contains too deep a moral to be omitted.

*Tabreez, March 8, 1834.*

"To-day I rode into the caravansera Gulshaw, one of the principal ones of the town, and found Mirza Rezza, the chief of the customs, and Auvek, who is called the head of the Russian merchants in Tabreez, in fierce dispute; who was right it was very difficult to say. The cause of quarrel appeared to be, that some Russian subjects had attempted to defraud the customs, in which Auvek defended them, and, it appeared to me, unjustly; however, be this as it may, nothing could justify Auvek's setting his arms a-kimbo, and crying out 'I have defiled your fathers' graves; how dare you eat such dirt as to oppose the authority of the Russians! don't you know that this town and the whole province is our's, whenever we please to take it, and yet you dare to interfere with our subjects.'"

What is, then, the *military* strength of this Russia, when twelve thousand irregulars, so collected and so officered, can sweep along 200 miles of her most important frontier, carry or blockade three fortified places, meet with no resistance, and spread terror to a city like Astrakan, 300 miles within her lines? But mark what follows:—The victorious body, that Russia has no means of resisting, is dispersed by the pusillanimity of their leader, and the absence of all combination. Russia, by combination, triumphs—she takes possession of the very district from which these men had been collected—crosses the Araxes—forces Persia to sign the Treaty of Turkman Chai, in February, and in April moves a body of these very men against Turkey—where the success of the *Russian* arms is, by the confession of Paskewitch himself, owing to the *Mussulman* troops.

This leads us to notice another subject of some importance. The vast erudition, the profound research of M. Klaproth, and the official sources of information open to him formerly at St. Petersburg and Moscow, have deservedly rendered him the first and almost the sole authority, at least on the continent of Europe, with respect to the Caucasus, and to central Asia. He left Russia, as it is understood, in disgust, consequently no suspicion attaches to his views and statements of a Russian bias; indeed the reverse is generally supposed. Now there may be circumstances that might justify the supposition of their being more of collusion than disgust in his flight or exile. Certain it is, that the effect of his writings have been eminently favorable to Russia's projects. He has established the opinion that the Mussulman population are most difficult of subjugation, and that Russia must weaken herself by every conquest she makes. We insert a paper of his, published at Paris *a few months before* the Persian

war, in the *Courier Français*, which produced a deep sensation at the time, and was reproduced in several works. The tendency to lull public attention, to calm alarm, is marked in every line—the opinions appear unaccountable in a man of M. Klapproth's information—the *mis-statements* perhaps render the source of the opinions intelligible.

“ Since Russia has extended her possessions beyond the Caucasus, she finds it necessary to maintain a numerous army in the newly conquered provinces. But the countries occupied do not afford sufficient provisions for the army, and supplies must therefore be forwarded by the Black Sea, and across the Caucasus, along a road seldom practicable for waggons. All articles necessary for the equipment and arming of the troops, being conveyed in the same manner to Georgia, it will be readily perceived that the possession of that country must be burthensome to Russia. Forty thousand men scarcely suffice to keep down the population of Georgia, and the warlike tribes of the Caucasus, who are ever on the watch for opportunities to plunder the country, and to carry off the inhabitants into slavery.

“ Constantly menaced on one side by the unsubdued mountaineers, the Russians cannot make a free disposition of the forces which they have to the south of the Caucasus. A war with Persia must greatly embarrass them ; for though it is easy (?) to order 100,000 men to pass this chain of inhospitable mountains, it is quite impossible to feed them when they have arrived at their destination. No part of the Caucasian Isthmus produces corn in sufficient abundance to admit of any considerable exportation ; and if a surplus did exist, the difficulty of the communications would prevent its conveyance to

the less fertile provinces. The great obstacle which this deficiency of provisions presents, *will always prevent* Russia from augmenting her army in Georgia, and from *making extensive conquests* in Persia. The portion of the latter country through which a Russian army must pass in marching on Tehran, the present capital of Persia, is still *less fertile* than Georgia. (?) It is solely inhabited by wandering tribes, (?) who live upon their flocks; cultivated fields are rarely seen. (?) On the approach of a hostile army, the Nomadic population would probably retire with their cattle into the mountains, where they would be able to defend their property against the Cossacks, who might be sent out to forage for provisions. Besides, Tehran is surrounded by deserts; (?) and in those countries there is no means of securing subsistence for an invading army. (?) To carry on war in such regions, it is not sufficient to have an army well equipped and well commanded; it is, moreover, necessary, that the troops should be inured to the climate. The insalubrious air of *several* districts of northern Persia engenders fever and other diseases, which are aggravated by unwholesome food, and chiefly by the eating of fruit, from which soldiers cannot abstain.

“ In advancing on the Persian territory, the Russian troops would leave behind them at least 120,000 Caucasians, well armed; and all the Georgian population of the Isthmus, ready to seize any favourable opportunity for revolting; and, finally, the Mahometan tribes of Karabagh, Shirwan, and Daghestan, always willing to shake off the yoke of the Infidel. Embarrassed in its march by the want of articles of the first necessity, the invading army would find itself constantly harassed by the Persian light cavalry, a description of force fully equivalent to the Cossacks. Every one knows how much unfore-

seen attacks by such troops contribute to fatigue and damp the spirit of an army on its march.

“ Were the Persians themselves prudent enough, or were they sufficiently advised, to avoid a pitched battle on the invasion of their territory by the Russians;— were they to allow the Russians to advance, and confine themselves to cutting off the communications between the different corps of the enemy and Georgia, they would infallibly succeed in destroying the invading army, or in compelling it to return with loss to its own country. But the stupidity and false courage of all Mahometan nations will probably prevent them from adopting a course so advantageous to themselves. They are always ready to try their strength in the open field with an army of infidels; and then the bravery of the Russian soldier, directed by European tactics, is capable of withstanding an enemy tenfold more numerous. But one, two, or three battles lost, do not decide the fate of a semi-barbarous state. (?) The difficulty of conquest will be infinitely less to Russia than the retaining under her sway the provinces of which she may obtain possession. (?)

“ Moreover, *the aggrandisement of Russia at the expense of Persia cannot fail to prove disadvantageous to the former of the two; she will acquire provinces of no value, the inhabitants of which, being zealous followers of Islamism, will never be sincerely attached to her government. She will therefore find it constantly necessary to maintain a considerable number of troops in the conquered country, which must give occasion to extraordinary disbursements, besides the expense of the administration. She will then be in a situation as embarrassing as was the East India Company, after the war imprudently undertaken against the Birmans, and the glorious peace which terminated it, when the new con-*



quests beyond the Ganges reduced the English to the situation of holding themselves long on the defensive against their neighbours to the eastward."

The drift of this article no one can mistake, *now* that events have shown the groundlessness of the assumptions. Here is the first authority on this question assuring France that Russia could not triumph over Persia, and if she did, that she would weaken herself. These opinions he supports by the bold assertion of falsehoods, and he concludes with an artful allusion to India, to rouse up the old rivalry of French ambition, and to tell it, that if really danger existed in the east, it was only to the colonial empire of Great Britain.

M. Klaproth tells us that the northern regions of Persia are solely inhabited by wandering tribes, and that the country round Teheran is a desert. The northern districts of Persia are Agerbijan and Ghilan. With respect to the first, Mr. Fraser says, "This province is one of the most productive of the kingdom, and provisions and comforts abound." With respect to the second, he tells us that it "Displays scenery which for beauty and interest cannot be surpassed in any part of the world. Large corn fields, divided by excellent fences and hedges, varied with copse-wood, orchards, and groves, from among which the neat cottages of a village often peep out, and fine swelling lawns with noble park-like trees dotting the green surface, or running up the hill sides in natural glades." Of course the elaborately erudite M. Klaproth could not be ignorant of what every child that has gone through his school-book exercises must know, that the northern regions of Persia are the richest, most populous, and fertile portion of that country. During this war, Azerbaijan fed a Persian army

of 50,000 men, the Russian army, and the inhabitants, without difficulty, and with scarcely a rise of price.

The loss of two or three battles not deciding the fate of a demi-barbarous people is a novel doctrine. Alexander the Great refuted it—more eloquently did Mahmoud of Ghizni refute it, as every conqueror in the East has done.

As to the latter paragraph, it is a series of false propositions. Opposition to Russia in those regions, while England stands aloof, depends solely on the energy of the Persian government. Whatever diminishes that energy takes from them the power of that resistance—when that ceases to exist, these countries cease to cause Russia to expend men or treasure, and, on the contrary, contribute to her resources. As to the comparison between the Persian and Burmese wars, Russia made Persia pay the expenses of the war to the uttermost farthing; we incurred a debt of twelve millions beyond the sum recovered from the Burmese.

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## APPENDIX, No. 2.



### POLITICAL CONNECTION OF FRANCE AND TURKEY.

*See page 116.*

IN an introduction prefixed to the French translation of this Essay, there are the following observations on the fact of the historic union of the interests of France and Turkey.

“ Turkey—Turkey brought to the edge of an abyss is the subject of this work—solemn and terrible question, which touches, by every point, the repose and happiness of the whole of Europe, and in which are necessarily involved the interests, the honour, and the futurity of France. Curiosity alone, in the absence of more honourable and powerful motives, might alone lead us to follow the development of this political drama, in which events—acts—intrigues—prepare a catastrophe which must place in our epoch one of those great revolutions which change the face of the globe.

“ Since the day in which was created that political system which for three centuries has regulated the destiny of Europe, no alliance is recorded by history more advantageous, more necessary, or even more constant, than that which has bound France to Turkey. When, at the commencement of the sixteenth century,

the people of Christendom became alarmed at the conquests of Selim and Soleyman—when the Popes endeavoured to reanimate the spirit of the crusades, the kings of France required, as it were, a diplomatic inspiration, to resist the religious sympathies of their people, and to avert the dangers with which their country was menaced by the ambition of the House of Hapsburg, which sought to appear the instrument of an universal religious movement, and thus to subvert a dangerous rival, the subversion of which must have rendered that house the mistress of Europe. It was a phenomenon new in Europe; it was, to use the expression of the times, scandalous to see the very christian king leagued with the chief of Islamism against an apostolic emperor. However, from the very principle of that alliance, French diplomacy received an impulse and direction so natural, so profitable, and so necessary, that during three centuries France never once deviated from this political dogma\*. What would have been the resistance of France if under Francis I., Henry IV., or Louis XIV., the House of Hapsburgh had aspired to the occupation

\* It would be superfluous to talk of the commercial advantages which France has reaped from this alliance; but we cannot pass over in silence a historic fact, which had escaped the erudition of the Minister of the Interior, in his lucid exposition of the rights of neutrals, in affirming that France, at the treaty of Utrecht, was the first to recognise this right. M. Thiers makes a mistake. "The treaty (concluded a century before the treaty of Utrecht), between Henry IV. and Mahomet III., contains this remarkable clause,—'Que les marchandises chargées à notis sur vaissaux Français et appartenans aux ennemis de la Porte ne pouvoient être pris sous preteste qu'elles venoient des ennemis de la Porte.'"

of Constantinople, or even to influence over the councils of the Porte? If at the close of the eighteenth century France abandoned this prudent system, it was only because she herself had been seduced into projects of universal dominion, and the conquest of Egypt and Syria naturally led the young hero of the Pyramides to the conquest of the Bosphorus. These illusions dispersed—Napoleon revived the old Dogma of French diplomacy. When at Erfurt the two Emperors appeared, in the midst of mutual concessions and deferences, to divide, between themselves, Europe into two equal portions, while, in reality, each sought the means of arriving at undivided domination; it was the question of the Bosphorus that tore the veil asunder. The hero of Austerlitz, at the head of France, of the Empire, did not dare to abandon Constantinople to the pacific Alexander. Will Louis Philippe and the France of July be more courageous, in face of the enterprising and happy genius of Nicholas!"

After a happy and original exposition of the species of dictatorship that Nicholas exercises throughout Europe, the writer returns again to the Eastern question. "The magnitude of its imminent results has nothing comparable to it in the annals of diplomacy. This Eastern question, essentially a French question, offers to France the most fortuitous and solemn means of restoration to the path of national honour, and also of national security. One energetic decision would, as it were, by a miraculous metamorphosis, transfigure the most defective and despised portion of our system—our diplomacy. And this species of external restoration could not be without a salutary influence on our internal state."

This observation is not more profound than true. A reasoner seated at Paris could arrive at the idea of the diplomacy of France requiring a deep conviction—a

recognised spring of action, to be effective only as the result of long study and reflection. The second conviction, that the diplomacy of France must be spiritless without such a principle, is but an inference from the first.

Whoever has wandered over that arena, where the interests and destinies of Europe are at stake, must have stumbled over these truths. What in the one case is intellect, in the other is sense. We who have seen the diplomatists, and the admirals of France, acting in all senses with the activity of mind that characterises their country, but without the unity that once was its motto, should have considered the worthlessness of the diplomacy of France, too common and notorious a fact to merit observation. This we have no hesitation in affirming, that, if, during the last ten years, France had never heard of Turkey, and Turkey had never heard of France, that Russia would now be half a century further off from the realisation of her projects than she actually is.

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## APPENDIX, No. 3.



### TURKISH OIL AND RUSSIAN TALLOW\*.

*See Introduction.*

IF we were studiously to sit down to arrange our Tariff, with the view of favouring Russia and injuring Turkey, we should make it just what it is. If our influence over Turkey had been subsequently directed to the same end, it would have produced just such results as those which are before us. By favour of our Tariff, by regulations of Turkey, introduced contrary to her stipulations with us—by the dependence in which we are self-placed on the markets of Russia, for *every article* imported into England from Russia, do we deny ourselves commercial and manufacturing advantages of the very greatest importance—do we pay Russia annually several millions, which otherwise we should pay to Turkey; and thus have we given to Russia the power of encamping on the Bosphorus, of injuring the prosperity and degrading the power of our own empire, and of endangering the peace of Europe.

We take one instance for the present—oil and tallow.

In all countries possessing that inestimable fruit, or enabled to procure its produce by commerce, the olive

\* This paper was drawn up at the period of the Russian expedition to the Bosphorus. It is inserted as an illustration of the effects of a score in a tariff on political combinations, and on national prosperity and independence.

and its oil have been considered, next to bread and salt, necessaries of life; yet in England it may be said to be unknown. Oil is the best material and principal ingredient in the manufacture of soap, necessary to the cleansing of the person and the clothes of each individual of our population;—oil in England is almost unknown as an ingredient of soap. It affords, naturally, the best and cheapest light for our northern nights;—in England it is used for light only by the rich. Oil is useful and necessary in a great proportion of the chemical processes on which the greatness of the country depends, and is absolutely necessary to the working of every piece of machinery throughout the empire;—the importation of oil into England, where not a single olive-tree exists, amounts but to one-sixth of the importation into olive-growing France! Cloths, dyes of all kinds on all stuffs, and soap, are staples of French exportation—not produced by natural advantages; she owes them to her oil.

The substitutes which we have forced into use, instead of oil, are, chiefly, tallow—inferior in almost every case, wholly inapplicable in many, to the deterioration of our produce, and the restriction of its exportation; also of higher price, as will presently appear; and, moreover, wholly inadequate to supply the demand without an excessive increase of price; other inferior substitutes are found in cocoa-nut oil, oil from seeds of all kinds, and palm-oil, all admitted at a lower duty.

The country which principally grows oil, admits, without any restriction whatever, the produce of England, its demand for which is only limited by its ability to furnish us with produce in return. It is a country which, politically, we wish to strengthen, and with which our object is to establish and cement the closest connection. The country which furnishes tallow restricts by every



means the importation of our produce, and applies the resources, furnished by our traffic, to endeavours to raise up rival manufactures, and to political purposes, and to military operations, hostile and dangerous to us. While our vessels *return* light from Turkey, they *go* light to Russia. Our trade with Turkey is carried on exclusively in English bottoms; our traffic with Russia is shared with Russian vessels; and will be the means of improving the Russian marine.

But it might be supposed, in compensation for the injury, politically and commercially, inflicted on England by the next to prohibitory duty of 8*l.* 8*s.*\* on oil,

\* Since that period the duty has been reduced to 4*l.* 4*s.* but scarcely any results have followed. Every day's experience teaches us the immediate connection between the tariff and manufacturing intelligence. A fractional duty has often changed the whole course of commerce, and prevented great resources not only from being brought into action, but from being known. Oil, now that the duty is 4*l.* 4*s.*, is almost as much excluded from manufactures as when it was 16*l.* 16*s.*, or 8*l.* 8*s.*; because habits have been formed, and because the retail price is nearly what it was, that is, about 200 per cent. above its real value. Oil, it is also to be observed, does not keep, especially when exposed, and when there are not proper vessels; nor can these be afforded, unless the sale is great and the demand constant. This accounts for the slowness of the advance in the consumption of oil, and the appreciation of its qualities. The first experiments must be made in detail, and it is to be procured in the retail shops at an exorbitant price, and is, moreover, old, if not rancid.

The importance of oil in woollen manufactures is not understood. The beautiful texture of the Tunis caps has been found, by recent experiments at Constantinople, to be chiefly

that at least we have an abundant or an adequate supply, which is to be obtained alone by the favour accorded to Russian tallow,—quite the contrary,—the price of tallow is at this moment rapidly rising, because the supply is inadequate to the demand. It has, within a few months, risen 10*l.* per ton, and the reserved stock on hand has dwindled, within the last three years, from 15,000 to 3,000 tons; and as the reduction of duty on soap and candles will naturally lead to increased consumption, it is certainly fair to anticipate, that the benefit proposed, by the reduction of the duty, will in a great measure be frustrated by the increase of price. The price has

owing to the use of large quantities of oil during the manipulation of the wool and yarn; one-third of the weight of wool has been there employed, and the fabric nearly equals already that of Tunis. Precisely the same process (excepting the quantity of oil) is employed at Genoa, also the same wool; but the caps bring a sixth of the price of Tunis caps: one-tenth of the weight of wool is there used. Olive-oil is used in all the celebrated cloth manufactories of France and Germany. The attention of the writer was first awakened to this question by seeing olive-oil used in some of the cloth districts of Prussia, from whence rape-seed was exporting to England to supply oil for the cloth manufacture in England. He inquired why they did not use rape-oil, which they had at their door, instead of olive-oil imported from the East, through Trieste, and conveyed by long and expensive land carriage, making it several times the price of rape-seed oil. He was told that experience taught them, that rape-seed oil had not the smoothness of olive-oil; that the fibre of the wool, when moistened by it, did not lie so well; that the cloth was not so soft or so brilliant; and that if their government taxed oil so as to put it out of their power to use it, they would not employ rape-seed oil, but abandon the manufacture of cloth.

already advanced to 48l.\*, but what limits are there to its rise? It might be supposed that the increase of price would, whenever it had passed the level of the duty on oil, attract oil to our market, so that the price of tallow would be lowered by the demand being divided; but in practice this by no means happens. Speculations of this precarious nature are never undertaken without the prospect of enormous profits, if successful. Merchants and manufacturers are attached to their habitual routine, and so high a duty, even were oil introduced under its opera-

\* The Russian merchants, anticipating such a rise, held on, the price at that moment rapidly rose as stated in the text, but a large importation into England of other oleaginous substances, and a most abundant home supply of tallow, checked the rise, alarmed the holders—the Russian reserved stock was thrown into the market, so that since that period, tallow has fallen 10s. per cwt., the loss falling entirely on the Russian proprietors and merchants. The reduction of the duty on oil, even such as it is, has still further depressed the market. A new source of supply is also opened in the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia of finer quality than the finest Russian tallow. A couple of vessels are at present expected, and in the precarious state of the market their arrival will probably reduce Russian tallow one or two shillings more per cwt.—every shilling reduced on the cwt., is a loss to Russia of 50,000*l.* Russia has therefore suffered, by these combined causes influencing the English market, to the amount of 500,000*l.*, and perhaps another sum equal to the half of this by the reaction of this depression on the continental market. If the Wallachian tallow now comes in, to cause a further reduction, Russia will practically feel what a thorn these provinces are in her side, and England may commence to perceive what the advantages are of which she has been so long deprived in the Ottoman dominions.

tion to supply the place of tallow, would deter merchants from speculating in any other oil, save that which is of the best or most approved quality, or from accustomed ports, so that the demand would immediately raise the price of oil, at the particular marts whence the supply was habitually drawn. In support of this, I appeal to the fact, that in 1800 we were paying Russia 100*l.* per ton for tallow, while oil was retailing throughout the Levant at 35*l.*, yet the French soap-boilers esteem oil at 46*l.* worth tallow at 36*l.*; our soap-boilers know nothing of the use of olive-oil, in consequence of its systematic exclusion by the higher duty it pays than tallow; in fact, by this unadvised, and, perhaps, heedless stroke of a legislative pen, we have raised the resources of Russia, during the last 33 years, by a sum which is certainly not below 50,000,000*l.*!

It must be borne in mind, that the question is not, which of the two—Russian tallow, and Turkish oil—we are to admit, and which to reject, but whether or not it is expedient or politic to admit Russian tallow on terms which are a virtual exclusion of Turkish oil. Let the tallow be admitted as heretofore, but let oil come in free. It will be readily admitted, that if the commerce of England were left to the control of interests and intelligence alone, oil, in proportion to its abundance, and comparative lowness of price, would supplant all other substances of a similar nature. The demand for tallow is evidently increasing—Russia's powers of production are not—if, therefore, tallow were the best of all oleaginous substances which could be substituted for it—if it were desirable that Russia should be our sole market, even then would it be imperative on England to look for inferior substitutes, and a less advantageous source of supply.

During the last eight years, almost every article that

enters largely into commerce, has fallen very considerably in price, while tallow, on the contrary, has been increasing, and of course its relative value receiving greater augmentation than that indicated by the price current\*.

The effect of our Tariff has been—

- 1st. To exclude England from the soap trade. England importing oil unrestrictedly would have supplied the whole of north and South America, and a great portion of Europe with soap.
- 2nd. To give her worse and dearer soap for home consumption—either for general use, or for application to other manufactures.
- 3rd. To induce her to use an inferior article in the preparation of her woollen manufactures.

\* This table has been compiled from official returns and price currents, between the years 1825 and 1833.

	<i>per cent.</i>		<i>per cent.</i>
Alum has fallen . . . .	36	Sugar, from . . . .	13 to 33
Copper . . . . .	24	Cheese . . . . .	38
Coals . . . . .	50	Beef . . . . .	22
Borax . . . . .	46	Anatto . . . . .	78
Soda (carb. 80) . . . .	55	Cochineal . . . . .	57
Hops . . . . .	50	Indigo . . . . .	53
Iron, bars . . . . .	45	Tobacco . . . . .	60
— pigs . . . . .	52	Gum Lac . . . . .	50 to 75
Lead . . . . .	52	Galls . . . . .	47
— Red . . . . .	40	Rice . . . . .	12 to 25
— White . . . . .	42	Silk . . . . .	30 to 70
Leather . . . . .	27	Wax . . . . .	31
Salt . . . . .	60	Pepper . . . . .	20
Spermaceti . . . . .	41	Tea . . . . .	11 to 17
Spirits . . . . .	33	Coffee . . . . .	13 to 27

but Tallow has increased 9 to 15

Soap „ 2 to 6

- 4th. Ditto in dyeing.  
 5th. Ditto for machinery\*.  
 6th. Ditto for light.  
 7th. She has sacrificed 200,000*l.* yearly to Russia, in increase of price on the inferior article.  
 8th. She has deprived herself of the advantages that would have flowed indirectly from the benefits from which she has excluded herself—increased capital, employment of shipping, and compensating demand.  
 9th. She has transferred most important financial and commercial resources from a people she has to defend, to a government which she has to combat.

The yearly imported consumption of England at present is—

	<i>tons.</i>
Tallow . . . . .	50,000
†Palm oil . . . . .	10,000
Olive oil . . . . .	5,000
Fish oil . . . . .	30,000
Rape and Linseed oil . . . . .	5,000

100,000

of this quantity, at least 50,000 tons are employed for soap, machinery, dyeing, lighting, and other purposes to which oil is more peculiarly adapted. The change from tallow to oil would of course be gradual, and the more so, as thereby the price of tallow would be lowered; and this in itself is an immense advantage, while on the other hand, that of oil would be increased; so that other

\* The objection to the use of olive oil for machinery is partly founded; but if olive oil were *fresh* and cheap, it would be employed in this country as largely for machinery as on the continent.

† Palm oil is charged only 2*l.* 10*s.* per ton.

nations would lose the unjust advantage over us which our regulations give them. This quantity, then, we may fix as the maximum of our probable demand, which, if realised, would be a transfer of the most lucrative branch of Russian commerce from Russia to Turkey. Let us therefore ascertain the actual amount and distribution of the oil trade in the Mediterranean, its capabilities of meeting an increased demand, the effect of such demand on price, the cost of production, the prospect and the means of increasing production.

## ACTUAL STATE OF THE OIL TRADE.

*Consumption.*

	<i>tons.</i>
Germany by Trieste . . . . .	10,000
Holland . . . . .	2,500
St. Petersburgh . . . . .	2,500
Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, &c. . . . .	2,000
England . . . . .	5,000
France, for soap . . . . . 25,000	} 30,000
————— other purposes . . . . . 5,000	
	52,000

## SUPPLY.

Kingdom of Naples and Sicily . . . . .	30,000
Spain, Corsica, and Sardinia . . . . .	2,000
Candia, and Greek Islands . . . . .	10,000
Barbary Coast . . . . .	10,000
	52,000

This is an approximate average, taken between the years 1824 and 1828; since that period, the proportion furnished by the Levant has increased; and besides the

above, at least 3,000 tons are shipped directly from the coast of Asia minor to America, and to the Black Sea.

#### LEVANT TRADE.

It is impossible to pretend to any accuracy in endeavouring to calculate the internal commerce or the actual production of Turkey, Barbary, and the Levant, but the following considerations will at least show how vast the field is. The foreign commerce, as above, amounts to 23,000 tons; the coast and inland trade to as much or more; let us say, therefore, that the oil which passes the native custom houses amounts to 50,000 tons: one quarter of the produce does not pass the native custom houses.

The regions of European and Asiatic Turkey, the northern districts of Africa, over which the olive tree is scattered, must at least amount to 400,000 square miles. Now calculating (et infra) the produce of an acre entirely occupied with olive trees at three-fourths of a cwt. of oil, then, if only *one-fiftieth* of these regions were occupied with olive trees, we should have a produce of 200,000 tons. Again, the population of these regions, which either grow or are in the immediate vicinity of olives, cannot be reckoned at less than 4,000,000 of families; and as the entire population not only consume oil exclusively, for cooking, for soap, and for light, but eat the olives themselves as food, and as such consider them, next to bread, a necessary of life, it will not be too great an allowance to set down an oke, ( $2\frac{3}{4}$  lbs.) for the weekly consumption of each family, this will give 250,000 tons. Of course it will be understood that these considerations are advanced merely to prove the vastness of the production, but by no means as calculations even remotely approximating to its real amount.



The quality of oil of the Levant is excellent, although no care is taken of its extraction, or in keeping it afterwards.

The olive is no less eminently calculated for the physical than the political atmosphere of the East, so much so that it is the only species of culture that has outlived the last twelve years of confusion; numbers of the olive-trees have of course been sacrificed; but so much respect is paid to them, that they have been spared by all parties, unless when pressed by necessity.

The Morea and continental Greece produced, before the revolution, 8000 tons;—Candia has exported 20,000 tons in one year. Some idea of the productiveness of this magnificent island may be formed from this, that in 1828 the irregular Greek commission, which held precarious possession of one-half the island, raised a sum of 9,200,000 piastres, or 122,666*l.*, from an export duty on oil, although the duty was not paid on the whole, and at the time, in many places, the olives were lying two and three inches thick on the ground. A great portion of the island is covered with forests of olive-trees, of the greatest beauty, and planted in long and majestic rows: and the wilder and loftier parts are thickly scattered over with sturdy plants of the oleaster, the oil of which is reckoned superior to that of the domesticated species; its produce is too small to be available as a crop, but the tame olive grafted on these stems, bears abundantly in three or four years.

The Ionian islands exported to Venice 8000 tons; but the cultivation of the olive-tree was promoted by bounties, and maintained by penalties, which have been removed; this forced production has therefore diminished to 4000 tons. The island of Mitylene, and the coast of Aivali, can export, it has been supposed, in favourable years,

20,000 tons—Egypt, which formerly imported, will soon be able to export. The coast of Barbary, according to the testimony of those engaged in the traffic, may be made to furnish, with proper administration, and with a steady and regular demand, and consequently with diminished charges, 30 to 40,000 tons. Putting these facts together, we may rest assured that England may triple or quadruple her demand for oil without unduly augmenting its price. A momentary increase of price would take place if a sudden demand were opened, but that increase would tell on France, and other countries, now enjoying, in all the manufactures requiring oil, an unfair advantage over us, but of our own creating.

It will prove that such a mass of production and consumption must possess great elasticity, and, independently of the facilities of augmenting the production which shall afterwards be pointed out, it is clear that a slight increase of price in Europe, were the fiscal and habitual barriers removed, would suffice to draw westward some tens of thousands of tons annually even from the stock which at present exists.

The chief obstacle to all improvement is, of course, want of capital among the cultivators. Though the cost price to our merchants, or at Malta, averages 20*l.* per ton, yet the cultivator seldom receives 12*l.*; an increased demand will therefore benefit the cultivator, and indirectly improve the quality of the produce, without enhancing the price to the foreign merchant—perhaps even may we anticipate a reduction of price from the emancipation of the cultivators from *accapareurs*, and also from this, that the chief resource of the peasant, when his fields were plundered, being the olive and the mulberry, he had to look to these two articles for a larger share of his subsistence.

An increased demand would benefit the producer, and improve the resources of the country :—first, by utilising their present resources; secondly, by improving their mode of extracting the oil; thirdly, in the preparation of proper vessels for keeping and transporting it; and fourthly, by improving and extending the cultivation of the trees; and an increased demand for oil would be more beneficially felt than any other, as, while it offers the same proportional rewards to labour and industry, it would instantaneously create value: in many parts of the country, the fruit of the olive-tree, moulders uselessly on the spot where it grew. Open a demand for currants, and you benefit a few hundred proprietors. For silk, you require labour and capital to be advanced. For any agricultural produce, it must be sowed and watched, and waited for; but create a demand for oil, you utilise that which exists, which is immediately productive, which benefits the whole mass of labourers, and adds value to every acre of land\*.

The emblem and the gift of Minerva may be considered the staple and the inheritance of Greece. The olive of Attica, multiplied under the too anxious care of Athenian legislation, still covers its valleys and its plains; but in the Morea, its culture marks the sway of Venice; and in the central parts, where that sway did not extend, there are scarcely any. The Turks, who in general left interests to adjust themselves, have left no practical records of social improvements introduced by their care; perhaps the only instance of their direct interference is, against the culture of the olive-tree—they cut down 30,000 in Hydra, that the Hydriotes might turn their

\* At the period that this paper was written, several projects had been entertained for benefitting Greece; the reduction of the duty on currants, for instance.

attention exclusively to the sea. The Venetians, who sought in their foreign possessions the means of producing *cheap* and abundant supplies, gave, as the Athenians, bounties for the planting of olive-trees, so that the Ionian islands, under their administration, became forests of them; but they prohibited the exportation, except to Venice, which neutralised the benefits of the increased production; and they rigorously prohibited their being cut down, so that, in process of time, in these islands, as in the plains of Athens, these trees, which are adapted to light and hilly soils, occupied exclusively the low and rich lands, and while they require light and air, and a free exposure, were crowded together in confined spaces and sheltered valleys, to the injury of trees and crops, and to frequent risks of entire failure; because, forced in the early part of the season, they are subject to blights in March, which in some places destroy every third crop.

#### COST OF PRODUCTION.

Dr. Sibthorp estimates the produce of the best trees at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  cwts. (Walpole's Turkey, Vol. I., p. 162.) This may be a bare possibility; at Naxos a gigantic tree is shown, which bears traces of the remotest antiquity, its trunk resembling net-work, which is said to produce that quantity. Beaujour strikes the average at 20 French lbs.; and this was at Athens, under the unfavourable circumstances above indicated. The average may be 30 lbs., the trees occupying the intervals of fields or ridges, or bordering vineyards, and receiving no other culture save that which, independent of them, was applied to the soil. But let us suppose that they occupied exclusively the soil, and allowing 120 trees to the acre, at 30 lbs. per tree, we shall have  $1\frac{1}{2}$  tons per acre, and, as the produce is biennial,  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a ton annually,—say the culture of the acre, covered with trees, and the expenses of extraction,

amount to 3*l.*, which certainly is above the mark. Then allow 1*l.* 10*s.* government tax on land, trees, and tenements, this will give 4*l.* 10*s.* per acre, or 6*l.* per ton, cost price; but to this must be added interest on value of trees, which must vary with circumstances, and this variation, and the immediate adaptations of interests and expectations to it, is, perhaps, one cause of the great elasticity of commerce and production throughout the East.

On the spot where these details were collected and this calculation was made (Naxos, in 1829), the peasant sold his oil at 1½ piastre per oke, or 10*l.* per ton, and considered himself amply remunerated, although three months after, or in January 1830, it had risen in the neighbouring market of Syra to 22*l.*

Perhaps the price of oil is more steady than that of any other article, and its value under the Republic of Venice\* may be taken for a criterion of its future value, since then the price was sufficiently high to extend the cultivation of the olive-tree, and it seems likely that in future, the increasing demand for oil will raise its value above the regular rate of profit, as the shores of the Mediterranean, or rather the trees actually standing, whether domesticated or yet wild, will have, for fifteen or twenty years to come, the monopoly of the supply. The supply from Naples is increasing at the rate of two or three per cent. per annum. Cultivation, it is true, is increasing in France, and a considerable saving of oil, by the improved process of extracting it, has been effected. In Apulia and Calabria, within the last two years, a great number of olive-trees have been planted, and the French method of extracting has, two

\* The Ionian oil was estimated at Venice (in 1794), at two sequins the barrel, or 10*l.* per ton.

years ago, been introduced at Bari; when it becomes general, the saving, both of expense and of oil, will be much greater than in France, as their previous method was more rude; in the cultivation of the trees, also, there is great room and some prospect of improvement.

But with the supply, the demand of France is increasing, so that there is no chance of exportation from that country, or even of a diminution of her present importation of 30,000 tons; on the contrary, the merchants of Marseilles conceive that their trade in oil and export of soap might be very materially increased. They have demanded free importation of oil, or at least, greater facilities than they possess at present (owing principally to the navigation laws, foreign vessels paying an additional 10 per cent., the trade being carried on in foreign vessels, the cargoes have to be transferred at Nice, Sardinia, &c., to French bottoms, and but for this facility of evading the law made to protect the interests of Marseilles, probably Marseilles would have had no participation in this immense and lucrative traffic), and showing that by lowering the price of the Levant oil, from which soap is made, that not only would great benefit flow to the internal soap trade, and its export to neighbouring countries, but that it would give to France the entire supply of the Brazils, and indeed of North and South America.

In fact, the demand for oleaginous substances is unequal to the supply. The demand outstrips the supply, as the table of prices above given must alone suffice to prove; this disturbance of industrial interests is no doubt occasioned by England's having restricted her enormous consumption to tallow from the north. There exists fortunately, however, vast stores of a superior substance available, but neglected, around the shores of the Levant.

It is high time for England to cease to do herself this injustice. It is high time for her to become sensible of the advantages she has neglected—before the oil growing country passes under the dominion of the almost exclusive holder of tallow\*.

This exclusion might be intelligible, or at least would be on a par with other commercial follies, if England had oil grounds, but fortunately, England has none (excepting Rape and Linseed).

Do we debar ourselves from this most important article, to force into use the inferior but favoured produce of some country, unrestrictedly admitting our manufactures? Precisely the reverse—we use the inferior article from a country that excludes our cottons†, woollens, or hard ware. We exclude the better article from a country that takes what we have to give, without restriction, without embarrassing regulations, and almost without customs.

But perhaps our foreign customers, the Americans, &c., prefer the soap made of tallow? just the reverse—America supplies itself from Spain, and from France, which imports the oil we neglect, to the entire exclusion.

\* The Government Bank has lately advanced 500,000*l.*, to enable the Russian merchants to hold on their tallow, and force up its price; this operation may put in the pockets of those interested at St. Petersburg 2 or 300,000*l.*

† Russia imported from England, in 1832, cottons, value 1,259,964*l.*, of which 1,136,787*l.* was for twist, which she is not yet able to do without, but very soon will be, leaving 123,177*l.* for cotton stuffs, so large a portion of our former trade with Russia. Turkey, the same year, imported cottons 778,422*l.*, of which, yarn 88,759*l.*, leaving for stuffs, 689,663*l.* (Egypt and Barbary included); since then, the exportations to Russia are decreasing, as for the last ten years, and those to Turkey, increasing.

of England. The small export of soap that takes place, is in consequence of the importation of palm oil from Africa, greatly inferior to the olive oil, but which pays only 2*l.* 10*s.* per ton.

But then perhaps, by our actual system we secure a more steady and cheaper supply—far from it—to the negative and privative injury inflicted on us as consumers, as manufacturers, and as merchants, by the use of the inferior article, must be added the positive loss incurred by the price, as regards its value, of that inferior article being higher than the other.

As a last reason that perhaps might be urged in favor of our present system, let us suppose it to be argued, that the rendering ourselves dependent on oil, might endanger this branch of industry, if supplies were cut off by war—the objection indeed could scarcely be seriously or honestly made, but how could our supplies in war be cut off? either by the refusal of the supplying country to permit the exportation, or by those supplies being intercepted by superior force at sea. This subdivision of the objection is a sufficient answer. But what was the fact during the war. We were paying 100*l.* per ton to Russia for her tallow, while in the Levant, olive oil *was retailed* at the rate of 35*l.* per ton, and not only was the sea open to us, but our vessels, which carried to Salonica, &c., goods to be smuggled into Europe, returning in ballast. Here we have an enormous production of a most essential object of consumption, a most essential ingredient entering into various processes, a raw material, necessary for various manufactures on which the prosperity and greatness of this country depends. Yet England does not share in the distribution of this object—she employs a substitute of which the supply is limited, and which is rising in price, while all other objects are falling.

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It is needless to enter into minute calculations, to prove what must be evident to whoever has given this or any similar question the slightest attention; and that is, that our Tariff has produced this effect, and that for 20,000*l.* yearly accruing to the treasury (for this is the only motive although a fallacy in itself), the public fortune has been injured directly, and demonstrably to the amount of 200,000*l.*, negatively perhaps to ten times that amount. Power given to a government that excludes our commerce from her territory into which new states are gradually incorporating, and the peace of the world placed beyond salvation, by the wealth furnished to the only aggressive power which wants but money to become irresistible.

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